Abstract: Technology development is unequal. Existing research suggests that the lack of credible and profitable market demand causes such unequal innovations, leading to the neglect of technologies with low market returns. We study how international organizations (IOs) can mitigate such inequalities. Specifically, IOs can leverage their central role in global aid procurement and provide information about the potential market demand, which helps channel investment into neglected technologies. Empirically, we investigate how the World Health Organization’s (WHO) information provision on vaccine priority can shape R&D investment in infectious diseases. First, we study how the WHO sets priorities for vaccines. Using disease characteristics to explore the variation in the credibility of market demand across different diseases, we find that diseases with unequal geographic distribution receive higher priority from the WHO, while severe diseases are not listed as a high priority, confirming that the WHO provides information to substitute for the lack of credible market demand. Further, we evaluate the effects of this priority-setting strategy and find increased market entry of vaccine products listed as a high priority. However, we do not find increased R&D investment in high-priority diseases. This paper reveals the potential and constraints of information provision by IOs to correct for market failure in technology development.