Ambassadors promote domestic exports to a host country and represent the inter- est of their home country at large. However, are trade benefits equally distributed domestically? In the United States, a substantial number of ambassadors are former governors or legislators (“politician ambassadors”). We argue that politician ambas- sadors are particularly equipped with knowledge and incentives to promote exports from their home states to host countries. Leveraging the biographic information of 164 ambassadors and US state-level exports to 30 major export destinations from 2002 to 2020, we find that the home states of politician ambassadors, compared to other states, enjoy a significant export increase to host countries on average (“home-state effect”). We find that the home-state effect is particularly apparent in countries where the US exports the most, and in industries that export final goods. Personal background of ambassadors can explain how the benefits of diplomacy are distributed domestically.

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