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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T093000
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DTSTAMP:20260515T132146
CREATED:20250107T222421Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T173008Z
UID:1659-1736933400-1736938800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Krzysztof Pelc (Oxford)\, “Who’s Afraid of Moral Trade?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: While conventional wisdom views divisiveness as an obstacle to engagement among individuals belonging to different ideological camps\, this article examines a mechanism that relies on such differences. In a moral trade\, individuals with different beliefs exchange commitments on actions pertaining to those beliefs\, in a way that is mutually beneficial. If structured correctly\, Democrats and Republicans\, pro-life and pro-choice advocates\, vegetarians and evangelists can all commit to arrangements that can generate “moral gains\,” turning zero-sum games into positive-sum games. This article formalizes moral trade and examines some of its unique characteristics\, emphasizing in particular the distinction between consumption tastes and moral tastes. The potential gains from moral trade are vast\, yet would such trades ever take place? Despite its potential for mutual benefit\, moral trade may run afoul of prevalent norms against commodification of principled beliefs. It is also prone to significant credibility problems: parties have reason to doubt the other side’s true beliefs\, and fear that they will not follow through on their commitments. To gauge the significance of these obstacles\, I run two survey experiments on a combined sample of 4300 US respondents\, strategically timed in the run-up to the 2024 Presidential election. Large majorities appear open to moral trade. Individual-level variation suggests a balance of self-interested and normative considerations. On the basis of the results\, moral trade holds promise as a welfare-enhancing mechanism in polarized societies\, yet the design of the exchange mechanism matters.\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/pelc-2025-01-15/
CATEGORIES:season12
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