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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250505T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250505T133000
DTSTAMP:20260430T084541
CREATED:20250415T194534Z
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UID:1747-1746446400-1746451800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Tal Sadeh (Tel Aviv\, presenter)\, Gal Bitton (Harvard)\, Benjamin Daßler (LMU) and Yuval Hirshorn (Tel Aviv\, presenter)\, "Blame Attribution and Blame Shifting to International Organizations: The case of Bank-Supervision in the EU"
DESCRIPTION:The 2010-12 European banking crisis triggered severe recessions\, job losses\, and austerity measures. In response\, member states delegated some bank-supervision authority to the European Union (EU). We argue that blame for a taxpayer-funded bank rescue can be shifted from the government to the EU\, especially from Left-wing governments\, and especially by Eurosceptic citizens. We also argue that blame shifting cannot take place where the public does not attribute blame to the government for bank rescue in the first place\, which is the case for net recipients of taxpayer-funded bank rescues\, the well informed\, those who trust banks\, and ideological supporters of the party in government (in group bias). We test these arguments using a conjoint survey experiment with 1\,724 participants in Germany. We find that a hypothetical taxpayer-funded bank rescue reduces support for governing parties by 18 percent on average\, but that this effect is mitigated by 11 percent on average if the EU is involved in bank-supervision. Our contribution to the literatures on retrospective and economic voting\, and blame avoidance\, is threefold: (1) we use experimental design to separate blame attribution from blame shifting\, studying the potential for blame shifting (citizens’ behavior\, not government action); (2) we control for blame attribution to\, and shifting from non-government; (3) we demonstrate that banking failures in particular can change citizens’ political behavior\, and that banking failures can politicize bank supervision by the public\, even if in normal times it may seem as too technical for citizens to grasp. Our findings provide important insights into the potential for international organizations (IO) to offer blame avoidance opportunities for national governments. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/sadeh-2025-05-05/
CATEGORIES:season12
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250416T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250416T133000
DTSTAMP:20260430T084541
CREATED:20250212T220250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250410T003843Z
UID:1699-1744804800-1744810200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Zoe Ge (IE\, presenter) and Mengfan Cheng (NYU)\, Can International Organizations Shape Technology Development?
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Technology development is unequal. Existing research suggests that the lack of credible and profitable market demand causes such unequal innovations\, leading to the neglect of technologies with low market returns. We study how international organizations (IOs) can mitigate such inequalities. Specifically\, IOs can leverage their central role in global aid procurement and provide information about the potential market demand\, which helps channel investment into neglected technologies. Empirically\, we investigate how the World Health Organization’s (WHO) information provision on vaccine priority can shape R&D investment in infectious diseases. First\, we study how the WHO sets priorities for vaccines. Using disease characteristics to explore the variation in the credibility of market demand across different diseases\, we find that diseases with unequal geographic distribution receive higher priority from the WHO\, while severe diseases are not listed as a high priority\, confirming that the WHO provides information to substitute for the lack of credible market demand. Further\, we evaluate the effects of this priority-setting strategy and find increased market entry of vaccine products listed as a high priority. However\, we do not find increased R&D investment in high-priority diseases. This paper reveals the potential and constraints of information provision by IOs to correct for market failure in technology development.\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ge-2025-04-09/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250319T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250319T133000
DTSTAMP:20260430T084541
CREATED:20250212T215952Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250507T181254Z
UID:1696-1742385600-1742391000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Beatriz Jambrina-Canseco (LSE) and Stephanie Rickard (LSE\, presenter)\, The Political Impact of Active Labor Market Policies Amid Manufacturing Job Losses
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Transformative political shifts\, such as rising polarization\, disillusionment with globalization\, and the surge of radical parties\, have been linked to the disappearance of manufacturing jobs in advanced economies. We argue that the political effects of deindustrialization are shaped by public policy responses. Leveraging the geographic and temporal variation in job losses and active labor market support within a single country\, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences model to compare electoral outcomes over time in municipalities with and without mass layoffs\, and with and without generous re-training and re-employment programs for displaced workers. We find that incumbents gain votes in areas where layoffs are paired with generous active labor market programs\, while radical left parties typically lose votes. We provide evidence that these political effects are driven\, in part\, by local labor market dynamics. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \n 
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/rickard-2025-03-19/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250219T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250219T133000
DTSTAMP:20260430T084541
CREATED:20250212T215857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250213T065808Z
UID:1692-1739966400-1739971800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Leo Baccini (McGill\, presenter)\, John Hicks (Wisconsin) and Paula Rettl (Harvard)\, Populism and Political Trust: Evidence from Latin America
DESCRIPTION:We investigate the effect of populism in countries experiencing severe economic inequality. We posit that left populist parties use a mix of strong redistribution policies\, which tackle the roots of political dissatisfaction\, and anti-elite rhetoric\, which increases credibility in maintaining the electoral pledges\, to build electoral support. In turn\, this policy and rhetoric innovation leads to an increase in trust in institutions among left populist voters\, especially when their party is in power. We test our argument in Latin America\, using a repeated cross-section individual-level dataset (1995-2020) and an original survey experiment. We find strong evidence that left populist parties elevate political trust among their voters and that this positive effect is driven by pledges to implement generous redistributive policies. Trust does not increase among voters of other party’s families\, including right populist parties. We also find that the use of populist rhetoric increases voters’ confidence in the actual implementation of social spending and poverty reduction programs when left populist parties are the incumbent. \nLink to PDF \n 
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/baccini-2025-02-19/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T110000
DTSTAMP:20260430T084541
CREATED:20250107T222421Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T173008Z
UID:1659-1736933400-1736938800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Krzysztof Pelc (Oxford)\, “Who’s Afraid of Moral Trade?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: While conventional wisdom views divisiveness as an obstacle to engagement among individuals belonging to different ideological camps\, this article examines a mechanism that relies on such differences. In a moral trade\, individuals with different beliefs exchange commitments on actions pertaining to those beliefs\, in a way that is mutually beneficial. If structured correctly\, Democrats and Republicans\, pro-life and pro-choice advocates\, vegetarians and evangelists can all commit to arrangements that can generate “moral gains\,” turning zero-sum games into positive-sum games. This article formalizes moral trade and examines some of its unique characteristics\, emphasizing in particular the distinction between consumption tastes and moral tastes. The potential gains from moral trade are vast\, yet would such trades ever take place? Despite its potential for mutual benefit\, moral trade may run afoul of prevalent norms against commodification of principled beliefs. It is also prone to significant credibility problems: parties have reason to doubt the other side’s true beliefs\, and fear that they will not follow through on their commitments. To gauge the significance of these obstacles\, I run two survey experiments on a combined sample of 4300 US respondents\, strategically timed in the run-up to the 2024 Presidential election. Large majorities appear open to moral trade. Individual-level variation suggests a balance of self-interested and normative considerations. On the basis of the results\, moral trade holds promise as a welfare-enhancing mechanism in polarized societies\, yet the design of the exchange mechanism matters.\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/pelc-2025-01-15/
CATEGORIES:season12
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