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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230419T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230419T110000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034004
CREATED:20230103T042925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230411T165833Z
UID:1223-1681896600-1681902000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Boram Lee (LSE)\, "Baptists and Bootleggers in Trade Politics: How Treaty Recognition Makes Side Agreements Credible"
DESCRIPTION:Studies show that liberalizing governments include social and environmental clauses in trade agreements to gain pro-trade support from activists. However\, these studies do not address how the government makes issue linkage credible to activists\, who understand that the government has weak incentives to enforce such linkages once the agreement is ratified. How do liberalizing governments make issue linkage credible to activists despite the commitment problem? Focusing on U.S. government decisions regarding environmental clauses in trade agreements\, I argue that a liberalizing government uses international treaties to mitigate activists’ fears of defection. By recognizing environmental international organizations’ authority in trade agreements\, the government can mitigate activists’ fear of defection and increase their support for trade agreements. Using original data\, I find that the government recognized environmental treaties with more ties to U.S.-based activists in designing environmental clauses in trade agreements from 2000 to 2016. Based on a comparative case study\, I also show that activists with ties to recognized treaties supported issue linkage whereas those without ties to the treaties joined forces with anti-trade groups. \n\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/lee-2023april19/
CATEGORIES:season7
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230322T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230322T133000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034004
CREATED:20230103T041148Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230302T173857Z
UID:1220-1679486400-1679491800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Ed Mansfield (Penn\, presenter) and Omer Solodoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)\, "Pandemic Protectionism: COVID-19 and the Rise of Public Opposition to Trade"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nHow did the COVID-19 pandemic affect public attitudes toward international trade? In this study\, we argue that the pandemic promoted protectionist sentiment in the United States. Based on cross-sectional and panel data\, we find a substantial increase in Americans’ opposition to trade following the outbreak of the pandemic. This heightened opposition was both long-lasting and pervasive\, cutting across demographic\, economic\, and partisan lines. We also find that experiencing a personal pandemic shock stemming from contracting the Coronavirus or suffering economically from the pandemic contributed to rising hostility to trade. Further\, the effect of such shocks was driven primarily by Republicans\, a result that accords with partisan motivated reasoning. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nLink to PDF \nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/mansfield-2023mar22/
CATEGORIES:season7
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T133000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034004
CREATED:20230103T040526Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230525T190341Z
UID:1215-1676462400-1676467800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Kate McNamara (Georgetown)\, "The Politics of the New European Industrial Policy: How a Post-Neoliberal Shift Is Transforming the European Union"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nMarkets require rules\, made and enforced by governments\, and modern market-making has therefore unfolded as an intrinsic part of state-building. While the European Union is not a Weberian state\, it has not been immune to these processes. Over the last three decades it has constructed a Single European Market and a currency while building political authority and expanding its institutional capacities. The EU has done this through supranational market-making largely centered on neoliberal precepts of competition and openness. Today\, however\, the EU is breaking with that tradition by pursuing an active\, interventionist European industrial and geopolitical market-making strategy\, layered above the member-states. Scholars have yet to fully grapple with this new and contentious shift. This paper begins this task by describing and mapping European industrial policy and situating it within the larger global turn to industrial policy\, while raising a series of questions about the political sources and consequences of this change for the EU’s political development\, and for broader transformations in capitalism in Europe and beyond. \nModerator: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/mcnamara-2023feb15/
CATEGORIES:season7
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230125T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230125T133000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034004
CREATED:20230103T034828Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230118T162912Z
UID:1212-1674648000-1674653400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Patrick Bayer (Strathclyde\, presenter) and Federica Genovese (Essex)\, "Climate Policy Costs\, Regional Identity and Backlash against International Cooperation"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nScholars in international political economy are increasingly interested in how the sub- national patterns of major economic adjustments such as trade investment and environmental reforms fuel public opposition to international institutions that are meant to catalyze those adjustments. While the literature has sharpened the understanding of material policy costs and their implications for public opinion\, the impact of less material considerations—for example\, specific subnational identities—is still largely unexplained. In this paper\, we explore if and how vulnerability to climate policy\, which pushes communities to lash out against rapid decarbonization\, is moderated by a sense of strong regional identities\, which may reduce the appreciation for national policies at the expense of international ambition. We present new survey evidence from the United Kingdom that assesses if and how communities with different sensitivities to distributive climate policy costs and subnational identities form varying preferences for international cooperation. Our study of 3\,000 individuals from three different geographically targeted areas supports our argument and highlights the importance of new climate-related cleavages among politically relevant constituencies on international integration. \n\n\n\nModerator: Iain Osgood \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/bayer-2023jan25/
CATEGORIES:season7
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