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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for GRIPE
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230712T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230712T133000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034000
CREATED:20230303T235114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230704T054022Z
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SUMMARY:Siyao Li (Pittsburgh)\, Aditi Sahasrabuddhe (Brown\, presenter)\, Scott Wingo (CACR)\, "The Limits Of Economic Statecraft: RMB Internationalization And The External Security Environment"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nExpanded use of the Chinese currency beyond China’s own borders is an important indication of China’s growing influence in global affairs. Contrary to earlier expectations however\, China has only internationalized its currency\, the renminbi (RMB)\, on a very limited scale. While this outcome is not altogether puzzling\, we argue that the conventional wisdom on international reserve currencies has overlooked security considerations\, namely security and military partnerships from the currency issuing state\, and the external security environment as key factors in generating and strengthening support for international markets in its currency. We advance an historically informed argument of the security limits to RMB internationalization. We demonstrate that the deployment of China’s primary tool for currency internationalization—RMB swaps—is constrained by the dual exigencies of guaranteeing security for overseas economic interests in addition to domestic goals of maintaining domestic financial stability. We then show that RMB internationalization is influenced by both Chinese and US security alliances. We find that\, counterintuitively\, the growth of China’s military power and ability to back its economic interest seem to constrain its choice of BSA partners in regions closer to China given existing US military alliances. \n\nModerater: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/sahasrabuddhe-2023jul12/
CATEGORIES:season8
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230614T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230614T133000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034000
CREATED:20230303T234925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230525T195513Z
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SUMMARY:Sung Eun Kim (Korea)\, Rebecca Perlman (Princeton\, presenter) and Grace Zeng (Princeton)\, "The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nHealth and safety standards offer a convenient means by which governments can credibly claim to be protecting the population\, even while pursuing less publicly- oriented goals. In the realm of international trade\, such regulatory standards have most often been studied as a method of veiled protectionism that can help nations privilege domestic industry while skirting World Trade Organization requirements of openness. Yet precisely because health and safety standards create ambiguity about their intent and are therefore difficult to punish\, nations may be incentivized to use them for goals that extend well beyond protecting domestic industry. In particular\, we theorize that governments will\, at times\, use regulatory barriers as a means of po- litical retribution. In order to show this\, we collect and translate detailed\, original data on import refusals by Chinese border inspectors between 2011 and 2019. Though os- tensibly intended to keep dangerous products out of the hands of Chinese consumers\, we demonstrate that import rejections have systematically been used by the Chinese government as a way to punish states that act against China’s interest. \nModerator: Lauren Prather \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/perlman-2023jun14/
CATEGORIES:season8
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230517T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230517T133000
DTSTAMP:20260421T034000
CREATED:20230303T234801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230509T153831Z
UID:1295-1684324800-1684330200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Minju Kim (Syracuse\, presenter) and Shu Fu (Chicago)\, “Bringing Home the Bacon: Politician Ambassadors and Home State Trade”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nAmbassadors promote domestic exports to a host country and represent the inter- est of their home country at large. However\, are trade benefits equally distributed domestically? In the United States\, a substantial number of ambassadors are former governors or legislators (“politician ambassadors”). We argue that politician ambas- sadors are particularly equipped with knowledge and incentives to promote exports from their home states to host countries. Leveraging the biographic information of 164 ambassadors and US state-level exports to 30 major export destinations from 2002 to 2020\, we find that the home states of politician ambassadors\, compared to other states\, enjoy a significant export increase to host countries on average (“home-state effect”). We find that the home-state effect is particularly apparent in countries where the US exports the most\, and in industries that export final goods. Personal background of ambassadors can explain how the benefits of diplomacy are distributed domestically. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \n\n\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/kim-2023may17/
CATEGORIES:season8
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