BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//GRIPE - ECPv6.15.20//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:GRIPE
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for GRIPE
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/New_York
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20220313T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20221106T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20230312T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20231105T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20240310T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20241103T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20250309T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20251102T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20260308T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20261101T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20270314T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20271107T060000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260422T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260422T130000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20260121T180045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T020555Z
UID:1869-1776859200-1776862800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Junghyun Lim (UNC)\, "Depopulation Paradox? Depopulation Risk and Immigration Policy Preferences"
DESCRIPTION:How does depopulation risk shape individuals’ support for open immigration policies? Depopulation poses growing challenges in developed economies\, including declining tax revenue\, and skills shortages. While immigration is often proposed as a major solution\, it remains unclear whether those most affected are receptive to it. On one hand\, depopulation may boost support for immigration by highlighting its economic benefits. Yet it may also raise concerns among natives about losing majority status and fostering out-group anxiety\, leading to stronger opposition to immigration. I examine this question using a survey experiment in Italy\, a country facing serious depopulation. I find that raising awareness about depopulation risk has little effect on preferences regarding immigration policies\, while significantly increasing support for pro-natalist policies and the repatriation of co-nationals. Among those with strong in-group biases\, depopulation awareness reduces support for immigration. These findings demonstrate a paradox: even as the need for immigration grows\, public support remains limited or declines\, revealing a key challenge in using immigration to mitigate depopulation. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/lim-2026-04-22/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260318T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260318T130000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20260227T204502Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260307T052923Z
UID:1890-1773835200-1773838800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Faisal Ahmed (Wellesley) and Jonas Bunte (Vienna)\, "Government Support and Firm Strategy: The Case of Ambassadors and Export Finance"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: States routinely help firms manage risk by providing two core forms of support: information that reduces uncertainty about markets\, partners\, and political conditions\, and financing that insures against commercial and political loss. We argue that firms treat these tools as a unified portfolio and reallocate between them when one becomes temporarily unavailable. We examine this logic in the context of export promotion\, where ambassadors provide market intelligence and informal enforcement\, while export credit agencies (ECAs) supply insurance\, guarantees\, and loans. Ambassadorial vacancies disrupt the informational pillar while leaving financial support intact. Using nearly three decades of monthly\, deal-level data from the U.S. Export–Import Bank matched to global ambassadorial appointment records\, we show that vacancies significantly increase firms’ reliance on ECA support without altering EXIM’s screening standards\, risk assessments\, or deal sizes. The findings reveal how firms compensate for fluctuations in state capacity\, highlighting substitution across informational and financial instruments as a general feature of economic statecraft. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ahmed-2026-03-18/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260218T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260218T130000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20260121T175651Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260211T070241Z
UID:1865-1771416000-1771419600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Lisa Dellmuth (Stockholm)\, How Trade Retaliation Affects Regime Support
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Research has shown that restrictive trade policies\, such as large subsidies\, affect public opinion in affected states. This article examines the downstream effects of trade retaliation on public support for the democratic regime and its core representative institutions. It argues that exposure to retaliation can initially activate reciprocity preferences\, increasing support for political institutions that are perceived to help government deter trade restrictions abroad. However\, when the economic costs of retaliation become salient\, exposure instead erodes regime support as citizens grow unwilling to bear these costs. The analysis draws on several datasets covering the United States from 2002 to 2022\, combining individual- and local-level measures of regime support with exposure to retaliatory tariffs and online search behavior. The results suggest that US import tariffs do not systematically increase regime support. By contrast\, exposure to foreign retaliatory tariffs reduces regime support between 2010-2022. These effects operate through sociotropic rather than personal evaluations. The findings suggest that\, despite its strategic appeal as a deterrent\, trade retaliation undermines durable regime support\, revealing broader domestic political costs than previously understood. \nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/dellmuth-2026-02-18/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260121T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260121T130000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20260114T202310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260114T205731Z
UID:1845-1768996800-1769000400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Sojun Park (MIT)\, "Innovation\, Imitation\, and Political Cleavages in International Trade and Patent Protection"
DESCRIPTION:When do exporting firms impose trade barriers against their foreign competitors in global markets? In this paper\, I contend that the decline of market power drives exporting firms’ support for restrictive trade policies. I develop a theoretical model showing that product obsolescence leads incumbent firms to lobby for international intellectual property protection\, which raises barriers to entry within their markets. To test the theory\, I estimate product life cycles using millions of patent citations and analyze U.S. lobbying reports filed on U.S. trade agreements that adopt higher standards for global patent protection. I find that U.S. exporters that manufacture products with longer life cycles lobby Congress more to pass the trade agreements. Their lobbying reports also reveal the risk of imitation in international trade using keywords\, such as counterfeit. The results imply that global businesses operatin behind the technological frontier engage in political activity for entry deterrence. \nLink to PDF \nModerater: Rachel Wellhausen
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/park-2026-01-21/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251210T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251210T130000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250710T221446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251204T211551Z
UID:1782-1765368000-1765371600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Carles Boix (Princeton)\, Valentina Gonzalez-Rostani (USC)\, Erica Owen (Pittsburgh\, presenter)\, "The Political Economy of Automation and Fragmented Production: Evidence from Mexico"
DESCRIPTION:How does automation in the Global North shape politics and violence in the Global South? We develop a political economy theory in which robot adoption in advanced economies reduces demand for export-oriented labor in developing countries\, depressing wages and employment and creating social and political consequences. We test this argument in Mexico\, a close trade partner of the United States. Using commuting-zone data\, we construct exposure measures combining pre-NAFTA export employment with U.S. industry robot growth and initial offshoring intensity\, while accounting for domestic robot adoption and other shocks. To address endogeneity\, we instrument foreign exposure with European robot diffusion. We find that regions more exposed to foreign robots experience higher levels of violent organized crime\, including narcocrime and homicides (but not property crime)\, and stronger support for left-populist candidates. These findings demonstrate how automation shocks ripple through global value chains to reshape society and elections. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/owen-2025-12-10/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251119T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251119T130000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250710T221409Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251112T174901Z
UID:1779-1763553600-1763557200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Laura Comini (Michigan) and Hao Zhang (NYU)\, How Disasters Drive Action: Subsidiaries\, Supply Chains\, and Climate Lobbying
DESCRIPTION:Tackling climate change generates non-rivalrous and non-excludable benefits\, while the costs of climate action fall on individual firms. This should incentivize firms to free ride on each others’ efforts. Yet\, corporate lobbying on climate issues has increased steadily across sectors. We develop a framework where exposure to climate disasters reduces free-riding by aligning private incentives with collective good. Disasters update firms’ perception of future costs\, risk likelihood\, and discount rates\, motivating present-day action. Ownership and production networks amplify this effect by making costs measurable\, concentrated\, and attributable to a few firms. Supplier substitutability\, however\, limits the diffusion of action. Using a comprehensive dataset linking U.S. firms\, domestic subsidiaries\, and supply chain partners to environmental lobbying\, we find that disasters affecting firms or their subsidiaries increase lobbying\, while disasters impacting suppliers matter only when alternatives are scarce. These results highlight spatial and structural factors shaping climate action in multi-unit\, networked firms. \nModerator: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nPDF here
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/zhang-2025-11-19/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251008T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251008T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250710T221254Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250929T164658Z
UID:1776-1759924800-1759930200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Calvin Thrall (Columbia)\, "Industrial Diversification and the Rise of the Local Chamber"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Despite the well-documented nationalization of local politics over the late 20th century\, one type of local organization has flourished: the chamber of commerce. Local chambers\, influential interest groups in which firms operating in a given municipality band together to lobby for improved local business conditions\, are now present in over 6\,700 municipalities across nearly 2\,300 counties. Why has the private sector been so successful at organizing locally\, despite the costs inherent in collective action? I argue that industrial diversification at the local level makes chamber formation more likely; when firms are co-located with complementary industries rather than direct competitors\, lobbying for geographically-specific (“place-based”) benefits offers greater relative gains. I provide evidence in support of this explanation using new data on thousands of local chambers incorporated between 1970 and 2018\, an identification strategy based on a novel Bartik-style shift-share instrument\, and member-level data for twenty individual chambers. The results demonstrate how broader patterns of structural economic change have affected interest representation at the local level. \nModerator: Gabi Spilker \nPaper PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/thrall-2025-10-08/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250917T123000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250917T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250710T221639Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250909T200405Z
UID:1789-1758112200-1758115800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Chris Johns (Georgetown) and Dennis Quinn (Georgetown)\, "Emerging Market Bonds Spreads and the Impact of Trump 2 April 2025 Tariffs: Liberation Day?"
DESCRIPTION:We employ difference-in-differences (DiD) event studies to assess the impact of Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement on sovereign bond spreads and yields in emerging markets (EMs). We consider a largely unexplored question: how do trade policy shocks affect the cost of EM sovereign borrowing? Using daily data surrounding the tariff announcement\, we find that countries with high exposure to U.S. trade paradoxically experienced smaller increases in spreads\, while those with low economic complexity and high political and economic risk faced substantially higher financing costs. These findings underscore the importance of country-specific risk factors in shaping financial responses to tariff shocks. JEL Codes: F13\, F34\, F65\, G15 \nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa \nNo paper PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/quinn-2025-09-17/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250505T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250505T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250415T194534Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250430T191255Z
UID:1747-1746446400-1746451800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Tal Sadeh (Tel Aviv\, presenter)\, Gal Bitton (Harvard)\, Benjamin Daßler (LMU) and Yuval Hirshorn (Tel Aviv\, presenter)\, "Blame Attribution and Blame Shifting to International Organizations: The case of Bank-Supervision in the EU"
DESCRIPTION:The 2010-12 European banking crisis triggered severe recessions\, job losses\, and austerity measures. In response\, member states delegated some bank-supervision authority to the European Union (EU). We argue that blame for a taxpayer-funded bank rescue can be shifted from the government to the EU\, especially from Left-wing governments\, and especially by Eurosceptic citizens. We also argue that blame shifting cannot take place where the public does not attribute blame to the government for bank rescue in the first place\, which is the case for net recipients of taxpayer-funded bank rescues\, the well informed\, those who trust banks\, and ideological supporters of the party in government (in group bias). We test these arguments using a conjoint survey experiment with 1\,724 participants in Germany. We find that a hypothetical taxpayer-funded bank rescue reduces support for governing parties by 18 percent on average\, but that this effect is mitigated by 11 percent on average if the EU is involved in bank-supervision. Our contribution to the literatures on retrospective and economic voting\, and blame avoidance\, is threefold: (1) we use experimental design to separate blame attribution from blame shifting\, studying the potential for blame shifting (citizens’ behavior\, not government action); (2) we control for blame attribution to\, and shifting from non-government; (3) we demonstrate that banking failures in particular can change citizens’ political behavior\, and that banking failures can politicize bank supervision by the public\, even if in normal times it may seem as too technical for citizens to grasp. Our findings provide important insights into the potential for international organizations (IO) to offer blame avoidance opportunities for national governments. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/sadeh-2025-05-05/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250416T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250416T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250212T220250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250410T003843Z
UID:1699-1744804800-1744810200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Zoe Ge (IE\, presenter) and Mengfan Cheng (NYU)\, Can International Organizations Shape Technology Development?
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Technology development is unequal. Existing research suggests that the lack of credible and profitable market demand causes such unequal innovations\, leading to the neglect of technologies with low market returns. We study how international organizations (IOs) can mitigate such inequalities. Specifically\, IOs can leverage their central role in global aid procurement and provide information about the potential market demand\, which helps channel investment into neglected technologies. Empirically\, we investigate how the World Health Organization’s (WHO) information provision on vaccine priority can shape R&D investment in infectious diseases. First\, we study how the WHO sets priorities for vaccines. Using disease characteristics to explore the variation in the credibility of market demand across different diseases\, we find that diseases with unequal geographic distribution receive higher priority from the WHO\, while severe diseases are not listed as a high priority\, confirming that the WHO provides information to substitute for the lack of credible market demand. Further\, we evaluate the effects of this priority-setting strategy and find increased market entry of vaccine products listed as a high priority. However\, we do not find increased R&D investment in high-priority diseases. This paper reveals the potential and constraints of information provision by IOs to correct for market failure in technology development.\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ge-2025-04-09/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250319T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250319T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250212T215952Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250507T181254Z
UID:1696-1742385600-1742391000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Beatriz Jambrina-Canseco (LSE) and Stephanie Rickard (LSE\, presenter)\, The Political Impact of Active Labor Market Policies Amid Manufacturing Job Losses
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Transformative political shifts\, such as rising polarization\, disillusionment with globalization\, and the surge of radical parties\, have been linked to the disappearance of manufacturing jobs in advanced economies. We argue that the political effects of deindustrialization are shaped by public policy responses. Leveraging the geographic and temporal variation in job losses and active labor market support within a single country\, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences model to compare electoral outcomes over time in municipalities with and without mass layoffs\, and with and without generous re-training and re-employment programs for displaced workers. We find that incumbents gain votes in areas where layoffs are paired with generous active labor market programs\, while radical left parties typically lose votes. We provide evidence that these political effects are driven\, in part\, by local labor market dynamics. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \n 
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/rickard-2025-03-19/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250219T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250219T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250212T215857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250213T065808Z
UID:1692-1739966400-1739971800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Leo Baccini (McGill\, presenter)\, John Hicks (Wisconsin) and Paula Rettl (Harvard)\, Populism and Political Trust: Evidence from Latin America
DESCRIPTION:We investigate the effect of populism in countries experiencing severe economic inequality. We posit that left populist parties use a mix of strong redistribution policies\, which tackle the roots of political dissatisfaction\, and anti-elite rhetoric\, which increases credibility in maintaining the electoral pledges\, to build electoral support. In turn\, this policy and rhetoric innovation leads to an increase in trust in institutions among left populist voters\, especially when their party is in power. We test our argument in Latin America\, using a repeated cross-section individual-level dataset (1995-2020) and an original survey experiment. We find strong evidence that left populist parties elevate political trust among their voters and that this positive effect is driven by pledges to implement generous redistributive policies. Trust does not increase among voters of other party’s families\, including right populist parties. We also find that the use of populist rhetoric increases voters’ confidence in the actual implementation of social spending and poverty reduction programs when left populist parties are the incumbent. \nLink to PDF \n 
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/baccini-2025-02-19/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20250107T222421Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T173008Z
UID:1659-1736933400-1736938800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Krzysztof Pelc (Oxford)\, “Who’s Afraid of Moral Trade?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: While conventional wisdom views divisiveness as an obstacle to engagement among individuals belonging to different ideological camps\, this article examines a mechanism that relies on such differences. In a moral trade\, individuals with different beliefs exchange commitments on actions pertaining to those beliefs\, in a way that is mutually beneficial. If structured correctly\, Democrats and Republicans\, pro-life and pro-choice advocates\, vegetarians and evangelists can all commit to arrangements that can generate “moral gains\,” turning zero-sum games into positive-sum games. This article formalizes moral trade and examines some of its unique characteristics\, emphasizing in particular the distinction between consumption tastes and moral tastes. The potential gains from moral trade are vast\, yet would such trades ever take place? Despite its potential for mutual benefit\, moral trade may run afoul of prevalent norms against commodification of principled beliefs. It is also prone to significant credibility problems: parties have reason to doubt the other side’s true beliefs\, and fear that they will not follow through on their commitments. To gauge the significance of these obstacles\, I run two survey experiments on a combined sample of 4300 US respondents\, strategically timed in the run-up to the 2024 Presidential election. Large majorities appear open to moral trade. Individual-level variation suggests a balance of self-interested and normative considerations. On the basis of the results\, moral trade holds promise as a welfare-enhancing mechanism in polarized societies\, yet the design of the exchange mechanism matters.\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/pelc-2025-01-15/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20241120T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20241120T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20240909T195928Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241115T182701Z
UID:1594-1732104000-1732109400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Sarah Brooks (OSU\, presenter)\, Santiago Lacroix Eussler (OSU) and Erik Voeten (Georgetown)\, "Green Transition versus the Environment?: The Politics of Mining for Critical Minerals"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: The energy transition has created a global rush for critical minerals that are indispensable for the manufacturing of “green” technology\, such as electric vehicles\, solar panels\, and wind turbines. Critical minerals are predominantly mined\, however\, on land that is proximate to vulnerable communities\, and in developing countries. The environmental toll imposed by mining thus incurs locally and immediately to such communities\, while the benefits of the green transition are long-term and global. How do citizens in those mineral-rich countries evaluate the complicated trade-offs of mining for critical minerals? Mining projects for green technology inputs have in many instances stalled over public protests related to local environmental damages. We ask to what extent do the global environmental benefits of mining’s contribution to decarbonization offset some of these concerns? Are citizens willing to compensate the (indigenous) communities where mining takes place with a share of the government mining revenue? How do nationalism and geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China affect support for mining projects? We answer these questions using a pre-registered conjoint survey experiment in Argentina\, which is rich in lithium. We find that concerns over local environmental damages are by far the most important attribute that determines preferences\, although a mine’s utility for green technology modestly increases support. Argentine citizens with stronger pro-environmentalist attitudes are more opposed to lithium mining\, but respondents are less willing to redistribute tax revenues to local communities when they are informed that the community is indigenous. Finally\, Argentinians prefer ownership by the national state-owned company (YPF)\, while preferences for Chinese or North American ownership are affected by partisanship\, and consistently opposed to Chinese ownership. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/brooks-2024-11-20/
CATEGORIES:season11
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20241016T121500
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20241016T134500
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20240909T195847Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20241003T215123Z
UID:1591-1729080900-1729086300@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Lauren Ferry (Mississippi\, presenter) and Patrick E. Shea (Glasgow)\, Crises and Consequences: The Role of US Support in International Bond Markets
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Sovereign default and restructurings should\, in theory\, lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or capital market exclusion. However\, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent and not uniform across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships\, particularly with the United States\, in shaping sovereign credit outcomes. US support conditions the expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidized insurance. This dynamic incentivizes supported states to engage in riskier financial behavior\, increasing their likelihood of default. Paradoxically\, post-default US support continues to signal a greater ability to pay compared to non-supported states\, reducing creditors’ incentives to punish. Using data on commercial defaults from 1970 to 2012\, we find that states with higher levels of US support are more likely to restructure their debts. After restructuring\, these states face lower borrowing costs and experience shorter periods of exclusion from bond markets. Our findings highlight how international political dynamics shape both the likelihood of default and subsequent market reactions\, contributing to our understanding of the complex interplay between geopolitics and sovereign debt. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ferry-2024-10-16/
CATEGORIES:season11
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240918T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240918T131500
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20240909T195707Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240909T230145Z
UID:1587-1726660800-1726665300@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Didac Queralt (Yale)\, "Her Majesty’s Aid: A Principal–Agent Analysis of Development Assistance in the Late British Empire"
DESCRIPTION:Can foreign aid expand fiscal capacity? Drawing on principal–agent theory\, I argue that foreign aid builds capacity when the interests of the donor and the political leadership of the recipient state are aligned and when aid administrators in the recipient’s bureaucracy face high-powered incentives to exert effort toward the mission’s goal. Using history as a laboratory\, I examine both predictions by studying the impact of the precursor of foreign aid—the Colonial Development & Welfare fund—on tax efforts in 12 British colonies in Africa between 1929 and 1969. Drawing on originally collected data and archival research\, I demonstrate that imperial aid boosted colonial taxation because patronage governors were replaced by career officials who shared Lon- don’s agenda for the colonies; and because meeting the fiscal mandate of the program was incentive-compatible with professional advancement of colonial bureaucrats. The analysis offers practical insights about aid efforts to build capacity in sovereign nations. \n\n\n\nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/queralt-2024-09-18/
CATEGORIES:season11
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240417T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240417T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20231222T083141Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240410T225912Z
UID:1528-1713355200-1713360600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Fiona Bare (Princeton) and Jeff Colgan (Brown\, presenter)\, "Has the Paris Climate Agreement Changed Corporate Behavior?"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Did firms shift resources to decarbonization in the wake of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change\, especially in industries where technology permits relatively cheap low- carbon options? The Paris Agreement marked a key moment in climate cooperation\, uniting countries towards a common goal of limiting global temperature increase to well below 2 degrees. However\, achieving this target is largely dependent on the behavior of corporate actors given that companies have been responsible for the lion’s share of greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper\, we examine whether the Paris Agreement changed corporate behavior among “convertible” industries\, focusing on automobile manufacturers. Political science literature points to two very different viewpoints on this question. Using five types of primary source materials such as earnings call transcripts and production reports\, we find quite limited evidence that the Paris Agreement shifted business strategy in the car sector. Overall\, the evidence should lead dispassionate analysts to revise downward their beliefs about Paris impact. Still\, the Paris Agreement might have created an enabling environment for more ambitious domestic policy in the long run. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/colgan-2024-04-17/
CATEGORIES:season10
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240320T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240320T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20231026T210446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240318T213619Z
UID:1479-1710936000-1710941400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Carolina Moehlecke (Fundação Getulio Vargas\, presenter)\, Matias Spektor (FGV) and Guilherme Fasolin (Vanderbilt)\, "Drivers of Negative Perceptions of Chinese FDI: Experimental Evidence from Brazil"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Over the past decade\, China’s direct investment in Brazil has quadrupled\, making it one of the main investors in Latin America’s largest economy. This study examines Brazilians’ perceptions of this recent phenomenon. Using a conjoint experiment\, we find that Brazilians view Chinese investment as less advantageous compared to investments from Europe and the United States. We propose that this negative stance towards Chinese capital in Brazil arises from informational cues and frames around the topic. To test this overarching hypothesis\, we conduct a vignette survey experiment in Brazil with treatments highlighting worrisome outcomes of Chinese investment\, such as closer ties with a non-democratic country\, excessive economic dependency\, threats to sovereignty\, association with communism\, and the growing influence of Chinese culture in Brazilian society. The results indicate that all treatments except the influence of Chinese culture negatively affect Brazilians’ views on Chinese investment. Moreover\, we observe significant variation based on political self-identification\, with right-leaning individuals more affected by the treatments\, particularly those related to economic dependency and non-democracy. In contrast\, traditional drivers of preferences toward FDI do not produce significant effects. We employ text analysis of Congressional debates to provide further evidence that a top-down process shapes Brazilians’ attitudes toward Chinese FDI\, especially those stemming from the political right. By examining the micro foundations of Brazilians’ stances on Chinese FDI — a globalization feature whose benefits usually surpass the costs — we contribute to a growing literature that examines China’s ability and limits to influence the developing world amid great-power competition. \nLink to PDF \nModerator: Sarah Bauerle Danzman
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/moehleck-2024-03-20/
CATEGORIES:season10
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240221T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240221T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20231222T083642Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240214T182126Z
UID:1531-1708516800-1708522200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Danielle Gilbert (Northwestern) and Lauren Prather (UCSD)\, "No Man Left Behind? Hostage Deservingness and the Politics of Hostage Recovery"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Kidnappings of soldiers\, journalists\, aid workers\, and other civilians by armed groups happen every day\, yet the politics of hostage recovery remains understudied. We develop an original theory about hostage deservingness that investigates how hostages’ personal responsibility for their own capture shapes public opinion and elite decision-making. We also examine the influence of traditional principles associated with hostage recovery and the costs of recovery. Our multi-method approach includes the use of survey experiments embedded in large national surveys of Americans and 22 interviews with current and former senior hostage recovery personnel. Across our experiments\, we find that when capture occurs under circumstances that suggest the hostage bears responsibility\, support for recovery decreases\, especially when costs are high. We further demonstrate that policymakers are similarly susceptible to notions of deservingness\, which affects all parts of the recovery process: internal debate among policymakers\, operational decisions\, and messaging to the public. \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/prather-2024-02-21/
CATEGORIES:season10
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20240117T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20240117T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20231221T140339Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240117T064113Z
UID:1524-1705483800-1705489200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Tuuli-Anna Huikuri (Zurich) and Sujeong Shim (NYU Abu Dhabi)\, "Never Let Me Go: Exit Clauses in International Agreements"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Growing literature examines when states exit international institutions and why. International agreements\, however\, differ in how easy it is for signatory states to withdraw from them. Why do some states sign treaties that are difficult to terminate\, while others prefer treaties that are easy to withdraw from? We investigate this question in the context of international investment agreements\, exploiting variation in the flexibility of their exit clauses. We argue that the strictness of treaty commitments depends on the extent of domestic-level uncertainty and the severity of the international-level commitment problem.  Capital exporting democracies face a dilemma: they have to balance between constraining capital importers and maintaining flexibility for themselves. They resolve the dilemma by adjusting their demands for treaty-strictness based on the commitment problem of their partner states\, demanding exit clauses that require longer commitment periods when dealing with autocratic importers\, while allowing more flexibility with democratic importers. To test our argument\, we construct an original dataset of termination features in over 2\,500 international investment treaties\, conduct elite interviews with treaty negotiators\, and find supporting evidence for our theory. This study contributes to the understanding of durability in international institutions\, as well as negotiations over economic agreements.\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/huikuri-2024-01-17/
CATEGORIES:season10
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231206T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231206T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230906T184114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231201T223956Z
UID:1421-1701864000-1701869400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Allison Carnegie (Columbia\, presenter) and Ricky Clark (Cornell)\, "Perils of Populism: How Populists Warp Global Governance"
DESCRIPTION:Link to PDF \nNote: The PDF contains two chapters: the introduction and one empirical chapter from the book. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/carnegie-2023-12-06/
CATEGORIES:season9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231115T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231115T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230906T183755Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231107T223310Z
UID:1417-1700040600-1700046000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Chloe Ahn (UPenn) and Nina Obermeier (King’s College London\, presenter)\, "Cryptocurrency and the State: Evidence from South Korea"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: National currencies regulated by state monetary authorities have long been associated with nation-state building and the expansion of state control. The rise of cryptocurrencies—that is\, digital currencies outside of state control—has the potential to challenge the dominance of the state in this area and to disrupt state-society relations traditionally mediated through state-issued currencies. However\, as recent crises and scandals involving cryptocurrencies demonstrate\, cryptocurrencies may—in the absence of regulation—be perceived as too volatile and unsafe to act as a true alternative to state-regulated currencies or to investments that offer some level of government protection. In fact\, the failure of cryptocurrencies to provide a safe alternative financial system may lead people to appreciate the role of government in regulating markets more. We test these expectations in the case of South Korea\, using a number of different approaches. First\, a quantitative content analysis of recent South Korean news media shows that despite public attention to the possibility of “striking it rich” through cryptocurrency investment\, public discourse on cryptocurrency has recently become dominated by discussion of the weaknesses of non-state-regulated currencies\, particularly after a series of scandals. Second\, a nationally representative survey experiment reveals that exposing South Koreans to information about the volatility of cryptocurrencies increases their trust in government\, as hypothesized. At the same time\, exposure to positive information about cryptocurrencies does not undermine trust in government or support for government regulation. These results point to limitations to the potential of unregulated cryptocurrencies to offer an alternative to state-issued currencies or government-regulated investment vehicles. \nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/obermeier-2023-11-15/
CATEGORIES:season9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20231011T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20231011T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230906T183546Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20231004T181152Z
UID:1414-1697025600-1697031000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Bobby Gulotty (Chicago\, presenter) and Anton Strezhnev (Chicago)\, "The Political Benefits of the Monoculture: Estimating Political Manipulation in the Market Facilitation Program"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Many redistributive programs use estimates of need to determine access. These esti- mates\, in turn\, depend on a formulaic combination of objective measures and subjective evaluations. Such formulas do not eliminate political influence\, but instead force politicians to use industrial policy to target individuals by way of their positions as economic producers or consumers\, rather than by their membership in a relevant political community. In the politics of farm subsidies\, the government may lack the data or expertise to render political communities sufficiently legible to target via product-specific transfer schemes. We use these constraints to examine the impact of the US Department of Agriculture’s Market Facilitation Program (MFP) which provided over $16 billion in direct payments\, surplus purchasing\, and other forms of support to US agricultural producers from 2018 to 2020. According to official statements\, these funds were allocated in response to “objective” econometric estimates of the damage caused by the US-China trade war. We use county and crop-level administrative data to reconstruct the formula used to significantly expand payments in 2019 and show how the determination of damages for particular crops propagated via the formula into county-specific compensation rates based on these counties’ prior planting decisions. We find that counties receiving higher levels of formula-induced compensation\, on average\, have higher Republican Party presidential vote shares in the 2020 presidential election. Instrumenting for actual MFP disbursements in 2019-2020 using the reconstructed formula\, we find that each additional $10 million in MFP payments to a county increased that county’s 2020 Trump vote share by about 0.6 percentage points on average. \nLink to PDF \nModerator: Iain Osgood
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/gulotty-2023-10-11/
CATEGORIES:season9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230920T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230920T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230906T182913Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230917T213625Z
UID:1408-1695202200-1695207600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Haillie Lee (Seoul National University) and Erik Voeten (Georgetown\, presenter)\, "Transboundary Air Pollution and Hazy Accountability: Evidence from South Korea and China"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Environmental problems often originate at least partially in other jurisdictions. We argue that trans- boundary pollution can increase public hostility towards the polluting country and break accountability links in the country that receives some of its pollution from abroad. We examine this argument in the context of trans-boundary air pollution in South Korea. South Korea’s air pollution is the worst in the OECD and it partially originates in China. We combine daily air quality measurements with Gallup World Poll surveys from 2015-2022 to show that on days with bad air quality\, Koreans become significantly less satisfied with China’s leadership but not with the Korean government\, including the government’s efforts to preserve the environment. We also use air quality as an instrument for subjective satisfaction with air quality and find that subjective beliefs about air quality have a strong negative causal effect on satisfaction with China’s leadership but have no significant effect on satisfaction with the Korean government. This evidence suggests that air pollution partially causes negative Korean views to- wards China and that cross-border deflection of responsibility may relief pressure from the South Korean government to adopt stronger environmental measures. Moreover\, we find that the effect runs through reduced confidence in the local economy rather than the effects of pollution on perceived life satisfaction or health. \nLink to PDF \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/voeten-2023-09-20/
CATEGORIES:season9
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230712T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230712T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230303T235114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230704T054022Z
UID:1307-1689163200-1689168600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Siyao Li (Pittsburgh)\, Aditi Sahasrabuddhe (Brown\, presenter)\, Scott Wingo (CACR)\, "The Limits Of Economic Statecraft: RMB Internationalization And The External Security Environment"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nExpanded use of the Chinese currency beyond China’s own borders is an important indication of China’s growing influence in global affairs. Contrary to earlier expectations however\, China has only internationalized its currency\, the renminbi (RMB)\, on a very limited scale. While this outcome is not altogether puzzling\, we argue that the conventional wisdom on international reserve currencies has overlooked security considerations\, namely security and military partnerships from the currency issuing state\, and the external security environment as key factors in generating and strengthening support for international markets in its currency. We advance an historically informed argument of the security limits to RMB internationalization. We demonstrate that the deployment of China’s primary tool for currency internationalization—RMB swaps—is constrained by the dual exigencies of guaranteeing security for overseas economic interests in addition to domestic goals of maintaining domestic financial stability. We then show that RMB internationalization is influenced by both Chinese and US security alliances. We find that\, counterintuitively\, the growth of China’s military power and ability to back its economic interest seem to constrain its choice of BSA partners in regions closer to China given existing US military alliances. \n\nModerater: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/sahasrabuddhe-2023jul12/
CATEGORIES:season8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230614T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230614T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230303T234925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230525T195513Z
UID:1300-1686744000-1686749400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Sung Eun Kim (Korea)\, Rebecca Perlman (Princeton\, presenter) and Grace Zeng (Princeton)\, "The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nHealth and safety standards offer a convenient means by which governments can credibly claim to be protecting the population\, even while pursuing less publicly- oriented goals. In the realm of international trade\, such regulatory standards have most often been studied as a method of veiled protectionism that can help nations privilege domestic industry while skirting World Trade Organization requirements of openness. Yet precisely because health and safety standards create ambiguity about their intent and are therefore difficult to punish\, nations may be incentivized to use them for goals that extend well beyond protecting domestic industry. In particular\, we theorize that governments will\, at times\, use regulatory barriers as a means of po- litical retribution. In order to show this\, we collect and translate detailed\, original data on import refusals by Chinese border inspectors between 2011 and 2019. Though os- tensibly intended to keep dangerous products out of the hands of Chinese consumers\, we demonstrate that import rejections have systematically been used by the Chinese government as a way to punish states that act against China’s interest. \nModerator: Lauren Prather \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/perlman-2023jun14/
CATEGORIES:season8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230517T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230517T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230303T234801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230509T153831Z
UID:1295-1684324800-1684330200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Minju Kim (Syracuse\, presenter) and Shu Fu (Chicago)\, “Bringing Home the Bacon: Politician Ambassadors and Home State Trade”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nAmbassadors promote domestic exports to a host country and represent the inter- est of their home country at large. However\, are trade benefits equally distributed domestically? In the United States\, a substantial number of ambassadors are former governors or legislators (“politician ambassadors”). We argue that politician ambas- sadors are particularly equipped with knowledge and incentives to promote exports from their home states to host countries. Leveraging the biographic information of 164 ambassadors and US state-level exports to 30 major export destinations from 2002 to 2020\, we find that the home states of politician ambassadors\, compared to other states\, enjoy a significant export increase to host countries on average (“home-state effect”). We find that the home-state effect is particularly apparent in countries where the US exports the most\, and in industries that export final goods. Personal background of ambassadors can explain how the benefits of diplomacy are distributed domestically. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \n\n\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/kim-2023may17/
CATEGORIES:season8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230419T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230419T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230103T042925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230411T165833Z
UID:1223-1681896600-1681902000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Boram Lee (LSE)\, "Baptists and Bootleggers in Trade Politics: How Treaty Recognition Makes Side Agreements Credible"
DESCRIPTION:Studies show that liberalizing governments include social and environmental clauses in trade agreements to gain pro-trade support from activists. However\, these studies do not address how the government makes issue linkage credible to activists\, who understand that the government has weak incentives to enforce such linkages once the agreement is ratified. How do liberalizing governments make issue linkage credible to activists despite the commitment problem? Focusing on U.S. government decisions regarding environmental clauses in trade agreements\, I argue that a liberalizing government uses international treaties to mitigate activists’ fears of defection. By recognizing environmental international organizations’ authority in trade agreements\, the government can mitigate activists’ fear of defection and increase their support for trade agreements. Using original data\, I find that the government recognized environmental treaties with more ties to U.S.-based activists in designing environmental clauses in trade agreements from 2000 to 2016. Based on a comparative case study\, I also show that activists with ties to recognized treaties supported issue linkage whereas those without ties to the treaties joined forces with anti-trade groups. \n\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/lee-2023april19/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230322T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230322T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230103T041148Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230302T173857Z
UID:1220-1679486400-1679491800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Ed Mansfield (Penn\, presenter) and Omer Solodoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)\, "Pandemic Protectionism: COVID-19 and the Rise of Public Opposition to Trade"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nHow did the COVID-19 pandemic affect public attitudes toward international trade? In this study\, we argue that the pandemic promoted protectionist sentiment in the United States. Based on cross-sectional and panel data\, we find a substantial increase in Americans’ opposition to trade following the outbreak of the pandemic. This heightened opposition was both long-lasting and pervasive\, cutting across demographic\, economic\, and partisan lines. We also find that experiencing a personal pandemic shock stemming from contracting the Coronavirus or suffering economically from the pandemic contributed to rising hostility to trade. Further\, the effect of such shocks was driven primarily by Republicans\, a result that accords with partisan motivated reasoning. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nLink to PDF \nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/mansfield-2023mar22/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T161943
CREATED:20230103T040526Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230525T190341Z
UID:1215-1676462400-1676467800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Kate McNamara (Georgetown)\, "The Politics of the New European Industrial Policy: How a Post-Neoliberal Shift Is Transforming the European Union"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nMarkets require rules\, made and enforced by governments\, and modern market-making has therefore unfolded as an intrinsic part of state-building. While the European Union is not a Weberian state\, it has not been immune to these processes. Over the last three decades it has constructed a Single European Market and a currency while building political authority and expanding its institutional capacities. The EU has done this through supranational market-making largely centered on neoliberal precepts of competition and openness. Today\, however\, the EU is breaking with that tradition by pursuing an active\, interventionist European industrial and geopolitical market-making strategy\, layered above the member-states. Scholars have yet to fully grapple with this new and contentious shift. This paper begins this task by describing and mapping European industrial policy and situating it within the larger global turn to industrial policy\, while raising a series of questions about the political sources and consequences of this change for the EU’s political development\, and for broader transformations in capitalism in Europe and beyond. \nModerator: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/mcnamara-2023feb15/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR