GRIPE

Theo Serlin (KCL, presenter) and Hye Young You (Princeton), "Protection by Covariance"
2026-06-17 12:00 - 13:00 (America/New_York)
Abstract: Trade policy is the prototypical case of lobbying influence. Despite evidence to the contrary, most analyses of lobbying on trade assume a quid pro quo model of influence. We examine the implications of the legislative subsidy theory of lobbying for trade policy. We develop a model in which lobbying increases the weight legislators receive in the policymaking process. Industries seeking protection lobby legislators whose districts contain greater industry employment. Consequently, legislators whose districts contain large industries prone to lobby exert more influence on policy. In equilibrium, industries that co-locate with other large and lobbying-prone industries receive higher tariffs. We test these predictions using data on US trade policy from 1989 to 2016, exploiting redistricting-induced shocks to industry co-location. Within-district spillover effects help explain why existing studies estimate small effects of lobbying on trade policy. Lobbying advantages not only large and organized industries, but also weaker industries that share their locations.
Moderator: Bobby Gulotty
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Thomas M. Flaherty (presenter), Duy Trinh, Changlip Kim, and Olivia Hundley "Commerce and Campaigns: The Local Roots of Globalization Messaging in US Presidential Speeches"
2026-07-15 12:00 - 13:00
Abstract: Issues like trade are often considered too technical and low salience to appear in national debates, raising questions over the increasing supply of trade messages in campaign speeches. We develop a theoretical framework that explains where and when elites supply trade messages. Incumbent-party candidates avoid trade messages, even where doing so would win local support, while challengers use trade messages to strategically inform electorally competitive regions of trade’s local impacts. In aggregate, a minority of geographies are supplied one-sided trade information campaigns. Using a within-candidate design, we find empirical support using an original dataset covering all campaign rally speeches by presidential candidates from 2008 to 2024, which we geocode and analyze with semi-supervised text methods to quantify where presidential campaigns emphasize trade relative to other issues. Our results are robust to exogenous sources of local interests, pre-trends, and placebo tests using immigration messages. The findings clarify the supply-side origins of the globalization backlash during the understudied campaign stage.
Moderator: Iain Osgood
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