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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for GRIPE
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260617T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260617T130000
DTSTAMP:20260610T190055Z
CREATED:20260610T190055Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260610T190055Z
UID:1922-1781697600-1781701200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Theo Serlin (KCL\, presenter) and Hye Young You (Princeton)\, "Protection by Covariance"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Trade policy is the prototypical case of lobbying influence. Despite evidence to the contrary\, most analyses of lobbying on trade assume a quid pro quo model of influence. We examine the implications of the legislative subsidy theory of lobbying for trade policy. We develop a model in which lobbying increases the weight legislators receive in the policymaking process. Industries seeking protection lobby legislators whose districts contain greater industry employment. Consequently\, legislators whose districts contain large industries prone to lobby exert more influence on policy. In equilibrium\, industries that co-locate with other large and lobbying-prone industries receive higher tariffs. We test these predictions using data on US trade policy from 1989 to 2016\, exploiting redistricting-induced shocks to industry co-location. Within-district spillover effects help explain why existing studies estimate small effects of lobbying on trade policy. Lobbying advantages not only large and organized industries\, but also weaker industries that share their locations. \nModerator: Bobby Gulotty \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/serlin-2026-06-17/
CATEGORIES:season15
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260715T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260715T130000
DTSTAMP:20260708T014226Z
CREATED:20260708T002245Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260708T014226Z
UID:1965-1784116800-1784120400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Thomas M. Flaherty (presenter)\, Duy Trinh\, Changlip Kim\, and Olivia Hundley "Commerce and Campaigns: The Local Roots of Globalization  Messaging in US Presidential Speeches"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Issues like trade are often considered too technical and low salience to appear in national debates\, raising questions over the increasing supply of trade messages in campaign speeches. We develop a theoretical framework that explains where and when elites supply trade messages. Incumbent-party candidates avoid trade messages\, even where doing so would win local support\, while challengers use trade messages to strategically inform electorally competitive regions of trade’s local impacts. In aggregate\, a minority of geographies are supplied one-sided trade information campaigns. Using a within-candidate design\, we find empirical support using an original dataset covering all campaign rally speeches by presidential candidates from 2008 to 2024\, which we geocode and analyze with semi-supervised text methods to quantify where presidential campaigns emphasize trade relative to other issues. Our results are robust to exogenous sources of local interests\, pre-trends\, and placebo tests using immigration messages. The findings clarify the supply-side origins of the globalization backlash during the understudied campaign stage. \nModerator: Iain Osgood \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/thomas-m-flaherty/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260819T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260819T130000
DTSTAMP:20260812T011733Z
CREATED:20260811T232700Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260812T011733Z
UID:1988-1787140800-1787144400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Kexin Bai and Quan Li (presenter) "Navigating Targeted Sanctions: A Real Options Theory of American Firm Responses and Financial Performance"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Do targeted sanctions hurt American firms financially? Existing research offers competing\narguments but little firm-level evidence on financial fundamentals. We shift the debate from\naggregate sender costs to response-conditional performance. Our real options theory shows\nthat partial\, evolving sanctions present firms with binary choices depending on their starting\nposition. Prior suppliers stay or exit; prior non-suppliers enter or stay out. Firms select among these options based on their resources and each option’s expected value\, so response-group performance reflects selection into each path. We test the theory using U.S. Entity List restrictions on Huawei. We examine 545 supplier and peer firms during 2015–2023 with probit and doubly robust difference-in-differences models. Outside options predict exit; financial flexibility predicts entry. Entrants achieve a persistent ROA advantage of 4–5 percentage points. Exiters and stayers show no statistically significant peer-relative underperformance. Treating exposed firms as a single group\, therefore\, obscures response-conditional financial outcomes of targeted sanctions. \nModerator: Rachel Wellhausen \nLink to Paper \nLink to Appendix
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/quan-li/
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261014T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261014T130000
DTSTAMP:20261013T065724Z
CREATED:20261013T051502Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20261013T065724Z
UID:1996-1791979200-1791982800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Stephen Chaudoin and Michael-David Mangini (presenter) "Dependence\, Chokepoints\, and Robots"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Policymakers are obsessed with how trade flows create dependencies and vulnerabilities. They’ve spent billions of dollars on subsidies and deployed industrial policy to decrease their foreign dependence and remove chokepoint vulnerabilities that their adversaries could exploit. Where are these vulnerabilities? Have they become more concentrated in chokepoints over time? Will industrial policy to reshore production via automation actually decrease dependence? We answer all three questions for the United States using an original measure of dependence constructed at the most fine-grained detail possible\, building on the work of Mangini and Chaudoin (2026). The measure is microfounded in structural models of the welfare gains from trade\, and it incorporates downstream input-output consequences as well as alternative products and suppliers. We first show how U.S. dependence originates from some products associated with so-called chokepoints and many others that are not. The degree to which U.S. dependence is concentrated in chokepoints has not increased over time. We then use data from the wave of industrial automation in the 1990s and 2000s to assess whether automation decreased dependence. We show that\, if anything\, automation increased dependence. Industries that automated more quickly were a source of greater dependence in later years. These findings have major implications for where we identify chokepoints and what can be done about them. \nModerator: Lauren Prather \nLink to Paper
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/michael-david-mangini/
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