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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for GRIPE
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250115T110000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250107T222421Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250114T173008Z
UID:1659-1736933400-1736938800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Krzysztof Pelc (Oxford)\, “Who’s Afraid of Moral Trade?”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: While conventional wisdom views divisiveness as an obstacle to engagement among individuals belonging to different ideological camps\, this article examines a mechanism that relies on such differences. In a moral trade\, individuals with different beliefs exchange commitments on actions pertaining to those beliefs\, in a way that is mutually beneficial. If structured correctly\, Democrats and Republicans\, pro-life and pro-choice advocates\, vegetarians and evangelists can all commit to arrangements that can generate “moral gains\,” turning zero-sum games into positive-sum games. This article formalizes moral trade and examines some of its unique characteristics\, emphasizing in particular the distinction between consumption tastes and moral tastes. The potential gains from moral trade are vast\, yet would such trades ever take place? Despite its potential for mutual benefit\, moral trade may run afoul of prevalent norms against commodification of principled beliefs. It is also prone to significant credibility problems: parties have reason to doubt the other side’s true beliefs\, and fear that they will not follow through on their commitments. To gauge the significance of these obstacles\, I run two survey experiments on a combined sample of 4300 US respondents\, strategically timed in the run-up to the 2024 Presidential election. Large majorities appear open to moral trade. Individual-level variation suggests a balance of self-interested and normative considerations. On the basis of the results\, moral trade holds promise as a welfare-enhancing mechanism in polarized societies\, yet the design of the exchange mechanism matters.\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/pelc-2025-01-15/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250219T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250219T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250212T215857Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250213T065808Z
UID:1692-1739966400-1739971800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Leo Baccini (McGill\, presenter)\, John Hicks (Wisconsin) and Paula Rettl (Harvard)\, Populism and Political Trust: Evidence from Latin America
DESCRIPTION:We investigate the effect of populism in countries experiencing severe economic inequality. We posit that left populist parties use a mix of strong redistribution policies\, which tackle the roots of political dissatisfaction\, and anti-elite rhetoric\, which increases credibility in maintaining the electoral pledges\, to build electoral support. In turn\, this policy and rhetoric innovation leads to an increase in trust in institutions among left populist voters\, especially when their party is in power. We test our argument in Latin America\, using a repeated cross-section individual-level dataset (1995-2020) and an original survey experiment. We find strong evidence that left populist parties elevate political trust among their voters and that this positive effect is driven by pledges to implement generous redistributive policies. Trust does not increase among voters of other party’s families\, including right populist parties. We also find that the use of populist rhetoric increases voters’ confidence in the actual implementation of social spending and poverty reduction programs when left populist parties are the incumbent. \nLink to PDF \n 
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/baccini-2025-02-19/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250319T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250319T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250212T215952Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250507T181254Z
UID:1696-1742385600-1742391000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Beatriz Jambrina-Canseco (LSE) and Stephanie Rickard (LSE\, presenter)\, The Political Impact of Active Labor Market Policies Amid Manufacturing Job Losses
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Transformative political shifts\, such as rising polarization\, disillusionment with globalization\, and the surge of radical parties\, have been linked to the disappearance of manufacturing jobs in advanced economies. We argue that the political effects of deindustrialization are shaped by public policy responses. Leveraging the geographic and temporal variation in job losses and active labor market support within a single country\, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences model to compare electoral outcomes over time in municipalities with and without mass layoffs\, and with and without generous re-training and re-employment programs for displaced workers. We find that incumbents gain votes in areas where layoffs are paired with generous active labor market programs\, while radical left parties typically lose votes. We provide evidence that these political effects are driven\, in part\, by local labor market dynamics. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \n 
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/rickard-2025-03-19/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250416T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250416T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250212T220250Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250410T003843Z
UID:1699-1744804800-1744810200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Zoe Ge (IE\, presenter) and Mengfan Cheng (NYU)\, Can International Organizations Shape Technology Development?
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Technology development is unequal. Existing research suggests that the lack of credible and profitable market demand causes such unequal innovations\, leading to the neglect of technologies with low market returns. We study how international organizations (IOs) can mitigate such inequalities. Specifically\, IOs can leverage their central role in global aid procurement and provide information about the potential market demand\, which helps channel investment into neglected technologies. Empirically\, we investigate how the World Health Organization’s (WHO) information provision on vaccine priority can shape R&D investment in infectious diseases. First\, we study how the WHO sets priorities for vaccines. Using disease characteristics to explore the variation in the credibility of market demand across different diseases\, we find that diseases with unequal geographic distribution receive higher priority from the WHO\, while severe diseases are not listed as a high priority\, confirming that the WHO provides information to substitute for the lack of credible market demand. Further\, we evaluate the effects of this priority-setting strategy and find increased market entry of vaccine products listed as a high priority. However\, we do not find increased R&D investment in high-priority diseases. This paper reveals the potential and constraints of information provision by IOs to correct for market failure in technology development.\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ge-2025-04-09/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250505T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250505T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250415T194534Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250430T191255Z
UID:1747-1746446400-1746451800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Tal Sadeh (Tel Aviv\, presenter)\, Gal Bitton (Harvard)\, Benjamin Daßler (LMU) and Yuval Hirshorn (Tel Aviv\, presenter)\, "Blame Attribution and Blame Shifting to International Organizations: The case of Bank-Supervision in the EU"
DESCRIPTION:The 2010-12 European banking crisis triggered severe recessions\, job losses\, and austerity measures. In response\, member states delegated some bank-supervision authority to the European Union (EU). We argue that blame for a taxpayer-funded bank rescue can be shifted from the government to the EU\, especially from Left-wing governments\, and especially by Eurosceptic citizens. We also argue that blame shifting cannot take place where the public does not attribute blame to the government for bank rescue in the first place\, which is the case for net recipients of taxpayer-funded bank rescues\, the well informed\, those who trust banks\, and ideological supporters of the party in government (in group bias). We test these arguments using a conjoint survey experiment with 1\,724 participants in Germany. We find that a hypothetical taxpayer-funded bank rescue reduces support for governing parties by 18 percent on average\, but that this effect is mitigated by 11 percent on average if the EU is involved in bank-supervision. Our contribution to the literatures on retrospective and economic voting\, and blame avoidance\, is threefold: (1) we use experimental design to separate blame attribution from blame shifting\, studying the potential for blame shifting (citizens’ behavior\, not government action); (2) we control for blame attribution to\, and shifting from non-government; (3) we demonstrate that banking failures in particular can change citizens’ political behavior\, and that banking failures can politicize bank supervision by the public\, even if in normal times it may seem as too technical for citizens to grasp. Our findings provide important insights into the potential for international organizations (IO) to offer blame avoidance opportunities for national governments. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/sadeh-2025-05-05/
CATEGORIES:season12
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250917T123000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250917T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250710T221639Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250909T200405Z
UID:1789-1758112200-1758115800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Chris Johns (Georgetown) and Dennis Quinn (Georgetown)\, "Emerging Market Bonds Spreads and the Impact of Trump 2 April 2025 Tariffs: Liberation Day?"
DESCRIPTION:We employ difference-in-differences (DiD) event studies to assess the impact of Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariff announcement on sovereign bond spreads and yields in emerging markets (EMs). We consider a largely unexplored question: how do trade policy shocks affect the cost of EM sovereign borrowing? Using daily data surrounding the tariff announcement\, we find that countries with high exposure to U.S. trade paradoxically experienced smaller increases in spreads\, while those with low economic complexity and high political and economic risk faced substantially higher financing costs. These findings underscore the importance of country-specific risk factors in shaping financial responses to tariff shocks. JEL Codes: F13\, F34\, F65\, G15 \nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa \nNo paper PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/quinn-2025-09-17/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251008T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251008T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250710T221254Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20250929T164658Z
UID:1776-1759924800-1759930200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Calvin Thrall (Columbia)\, "Industrial Diversification and the Rise of the Local Chamber"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Despite the well-documented nationalization of local politics over the late 20th century\, one type of local organization has flourished: the chamber of commerce. Local chambers\, influential interest groups in which firms operating in a given municipality band together to lobby for improved local business conditions\, are now present in over 6\,700 municipalities across nearly 2\,300 counties. Why has the private sector been so successful at organizing locally\, despite the costs inherent in collective action? I argue that industrial diversification at the local level makes chamber formation more likely; when firms are co-located with complementary industries rather than direct competitors\, lobbying for geographically-specific (“place-based”) benefits offers greater relative gains. I provide evidence in support of this explanation using new data on thousands of local chambers incorporated between 1970 and 2018\, an identification strategy based on a novel Bartik-style shift-share instrument\, and member-level data for twenty individual chambers. The results demonstrate how broader patterns of structural economic change have affected interest representation at the local level. \nModerator: Gabi Spilker \nPaper PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/thrall-2025-10-08/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251119T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251119T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250710T221409Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251112T174901Z
UID:1779-1763553600-1763557200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Laura Comini (Michigan) and Hao Zhang (NYU)\, How Disasters Drive Action: Subsidiaries\, Supply Chains\, and Climate Lobbying
DESCRIPTION:Tackling climate change generates non-rivalrous and non-excludable benefits\, while the costs of climate action fall on individual firms. This should incentivize firms to free ride on each others’ efforts. Yet\, corporate lobbying on climate issues has increased steadily across sectors. We develop a framework where exposure to climate disasters reduces free-riding by aligning private incentives with collective good. Disasters update firms’ perception of future costs\, risk likelihood\, and discount rates\, motivating present-day action. Ownership and production networks amplify this effect by making costs measurable\, concentrated\, and attributable to a few firms. Supplier substitutability\, however\, limits the diffusion of action. Using a comprehensive dataset linking U.S. firms\, domestic subsidiaries\, and supply chain partners to environmental lobbying\, we find that disasters affecting firms or their subsidiaries increase lobbying\, while disasters impacting suppliers matter only when alternatives are scarce. These results highlight spatial and structural factors shaping climate action in multi-unit\, networked firms. \nModerator: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nPDF here
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/zhang-2025-11-19/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20251210T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20251210T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20250710T221446Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20251204T211551Z
UID:1782-1765368000-1765371600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Carles Boix (Princeton)\, Valentina Gonzalez-Rostani (USC)\, Erica Owen (Pittsburgh\, presenter)\, "The Political Economy of Automation and Fragmented Production: Evidence from Mexico"
DESCRIPTION:How does automation in the Global North shape politics and violence in the Global South? We develop a political economy theory in which robot adoption in advanced economies reduces demand for export-oriented labor in developing countries\, depressing wages and employment and creating social and political consequences. We test this argument in Mexico\, a close trade partner of the United States. Using commuting-zone data\, we construct exposure measures combining pre-NAFTA export employment with U.S. industry robot growth and initial offshoring intensity\, while accounting for domestic robot adoption and other shocks. To address endogeneity\, we instrument foreign exposure with European robot diffusion. We find that regions more exposed to foreign robots experience higher levels of violent organized crime\, including narcocrime and homicides (but not property crime)\, and stronger support for left-populist candidates. These findings demonstrate how automation shocks ripple through global value chains to reshape society and elections. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/owen-2025-12-10/
CATEGORIES:season13
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260121T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260121T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20260114T202310Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260114T205731Z
UID:1845-1768996800-1769000400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Sojun Park (MIT)\, "Innovation\, Imitation\, and Political Cleavages in International Trade and Patent Protection"
DESCRIPTION:When do exporting firms impose trade barriers against their foreign competitors in global markets? In this paper\, I contend that the decline of market power drives exporting firms’ support for restrictive trade policies. I develop a theoretical model showing that product obsolescence leads incumbent firms to lobby for international intellectual property protection\, which raises barriers to entry within their markets. To test the theory\, I estimate product life cycles using millions of patent citations and analyze U.S. lobbying reports filed on U.S. trade agreements that adopt higher standards for global patent protection. I find that U.S. exporters that manufacture products with longer life cycles lobby Congress more to pass the trade agreements. Their lobbying reports also reveal the risk of imitation in international trade using keywords\, such as counterfeit. The results imply that global businesses operatin behind the technological frontier engage in political activity for entry deterrence. \nLink to PDF \nModerater: Rachel Wellhausen
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/park-2026-01-21/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260218T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260218T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20260121T175651Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260211T070241Z
UID:1865-1771416000-1771419600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Lisa Dellmuth (Stockholm)\, How Trade Retaliation Affects Regime Support
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Research has shown that restrictive trade policies\, such as large subsidies\, affect public opinion in affected states. This article examines the downstream effects of trade retaliation on public support for the democratic regime and its core representative institutions. It argues that exposure to retaliation can initially activate reciprocity preferences\, increasing support for political institutions that are perceived to help government deter trade restrictions abroad. However\, when the economic costs of retaliation become salient\, exposure instead erodes regime support as citizens grow unwilling to bear these costs. The analysis draws on several datasets covering the United States from 2002 to 2022\, combining individual- and local-level measures of regime support with exposure to retaliatory tariffs and online search behavior. The results suggest that US import tariffs do not systematically increase regime support. By contrast\, exposure to foreign retaliatory tariffs reduces regime support between 2010-2022. These effects operate through sociotropic rather than personal evaluations. The findings suggest that\, despite its strategic appeal as a deterrent\, trade retaliation undermines durable regime support\, revealing broader domestic political costs than previously understood. \nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/dellmuth-2026-02-18/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260318T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260318T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20260227T204502Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260307T052923Z
UID:1890-1773835200-1773838800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Faisal Ahmed (Wellesley) and Jonas Bunte (Vienna)\, "Government Support and Firm Strategy: The Case of Ambassadors and Export Finance"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: States routinely help firms manage risk by providing two core forms of support: information that reduces uncertainty about markets\, partners\, and political conditions\, and financing that insures against commercial and political loss. We argue that firms treat these tools as a unified portfolio and reallocate between them when one becomes temporarily unavailable. We examine this logic in the context of export promotion\, where ambassadors provide market intelligence and informal enforcement\, while export credit agencies (ECAs) supply insurance\, guarantees\, and loans. Ambassadorial vacancies disrupt the informational pillar while leaving financial support intact. Using nearly three decades of monthly\, deal-level data from the U.S. Export–Import Bank matched to global ambassadorial appointment records\, we show that vacancies significantly increase firms’ reliance on ECA support without altering EXIM’s screening standards\, risk assessments\, or deal sizes. The findings reveal how firms compensate for fluctuations in state capacity\, highlighting substitution across informational and financial instruments as a general feature of economic statecraft. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ahmed-2026-03-18/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260422T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260422T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20260121T180045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T020555Z
UID:1869-1776859200-1776862800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Junghyun Lim (UNC)\, "Depopulation Paradox? Depopulation Risk and Immigration Policy Preferences"
DESCRIPTION:How does depopulation risk shape individuals’ support for open immigration policies? Depopulation poses growing challenges in developed economies\, including declining tax revenue\, and skills shortages. While immigration is often proposed as a major solution\, it remains unclear whether those most affected are receptive to it. On one hand\, depopulation may boost support for immigration by highlighting its economic benefits. Yet it may also raise concerns among natives about losing majority status and fostering out-group anxiety\, leading to stronger opposition to immigration. I examine this question using a survey experiment in Italy\, a country facing serious depopulation. I find that raising awareness about depopulation risk has little effect on preferences regarding immigration policies\, while significantly increasing support for pro-natalist policies and the repatriation of co-nationals. Among those with strong in-group biases\, depopulation awareness reduces support for immigration. These findings demonstrate a paradox: even as the need for immigration grows\, public support remains limited or declines\, revealing a key challenge in using immigration to mitigate depopulation. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/lim-2026-04-22/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260520T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260520T130000
DTSTAMP:20260515T131955
CREATED:20260121T170458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260121T170458Z
UID:1861-1779278400-1779282000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Jiakun Jack Zhang (Kansas\, presenter)\, Clayton Webb (Kansas)\,  Robert M. Kubinec (South Carolina) Daniel L. Nielson (UT Austin) and Danny Cowser (UT Austin)\, "Partisanship in the Boardroom: How Political Cues Shape Business Attitudes Toward Tariffs"
DESCRIPTION:Survey experiments demonstrate that not pocketbook concerns but rather anxiety and social identity—perhaps especially partisanship—drive individuals’ attitudes toward trade policy. Yet analysts widely believe that firm-level trade politics are solely determined by economic interests\, with internationally competitive firms lobbying for free trade and uncompetitive firms demanding tariffs. However\, firms are managed by people\, who may be swayed by the same non-economic concerns as other individuals. The trade politics literature has thus largely overlooked the effects of the political ideology of firms’ managers\, which may moderate the effects of economic interests on firms’ political engagement. This study reports results from a survey experiment on managers of U.S.-based businesses to learn the effects of partisan framing on managers’ political support for tariffs vs. free trade in the context of the Trump Administration’s decision to increase tariffs on most U.S. trade partners in 2025. The findings suggest that managers widely favor free trade but partisan framing conditions their attitudes significantly. These results indicate that political ideology may be an important driver of firm-level political behavior and should receive greater attention in future research. \nPaper TBA \nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/zhang-2026-05-20/
CATEGORIES:season14
END:VEVENT
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