BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//GRIPE - ECPv6.15.20//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:GRIPE
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for GRIPE
REFRESH-INTERVAL;VALUE=DURATION:PT1H
X-Robots-Tag:noindex
X-PUBLISHED-TTL:PT1H
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/New_York
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20210314T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20211107T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20220313T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20221106T060000
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
TZNAME:EDT
DTSTART:20230312T070000
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
TZNAME:EST
DTSTART:20231105T060000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220928T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220928T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T133633
CREATED:20220913T223429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220928T184246Z
UID:998-1664366400-1664371800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Julian Michel (UCLA)\, Michael K. Miller (GWU)\, Margaret E. Peters (UCLA)\, "Get Out: How Autocratic Regimes Select Who Emigrates"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Most autocracies restrict emigration\, yet still allow some citizens to voluntarily exit. How do these regimes decide who can leave? We argue that many autocracies strategically target anti-regime actors for emigration\, thereby crafting a more loyal population without the drawbacks of persistent cooptation or repression. However\, this generates problematic incentives for citizens to join opposition activity to secure exit. In response\, autocracies simultaneously punish dissidents for attempting to emigrate\, screening out all but the most determined opponents. To test our theory\, we examine an original dataset coded from 20\,000 pages of declassified emigration applications from East Germany’s state archives. In the first individual-level test of an autocracy’s emigration decisions\, we find that active opposition promoted emigration approval\, but also punishment for applying. Pensioners were also more likely to secure exit and professionals less likely. Our results shed light on global migration’s political sources and an overlooked strategy of autocratic resilience. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF \nClick here for Zoom recording with passcode: U8rc=EeP
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/maggie-peters-ucla-get-out-how-autocratic-regimes-select-who-emigrates/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR