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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221130T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221130T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T084315
CREATED:20220921T082120Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T052203Z
UID:1045-1669809600-1669815000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Chase Foster (Technische Universität München) and Jeffry Frieden (Harvard)\, "Compensation\, Austerity\, and Populism: Social Spending and Voting in 17 Western European Countries"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThere has been a dramatic rise in voting for populist parties in Europe over the past twenty years. There are clear material and non-material sources of this backlash against political and economic integration\, which is part of the broader global trend. We assess the role of government social policy in dampening or provoking populist sentiment\, on two different dimensions. First\, we ask whether the existence of a broader and deeper social safety net mitigated the political discontent that took the form of populist voting. Here we examine a panel of 187 elections from 1990 to 2017 and find evidence that populist parties fared worse where countries spent more on social support\, especially for labor market programs that provide income to workers experiencing unemployment or early retirement from the workforce (“passive labor market” policies). This suggests that “compensatory” social spending did work to dampen support for populism. Second\, we ask whether cuts to government support for those facing economic distress\, largely undertaken with reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s\, stimulated populist discontent. Here we add an analysis of pooled cross-sectional data from eight waves of the European Social Survey. We find that cuts to social spending\, especially spending on passive labor market policies\, were strongly associated with increased support for populist parties. The effect was stronger among those individuals who had experienced unemployment and among those facing adverse economic circumstances. This suggests that the welfare and labor-market reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s may have alienated vulnerable segments of the population and driven them toward populist political parties. \n\n\n\nModerator: Iain Osgood \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/frieden_foster-2022nov30/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221116T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221116T110000
DTSTAMP:20260515T084315
CREATED:20220921T081909Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221116T221908Z
UID:1041-1668591000-1668596400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Simone Cremaschi (Bocconi)\, Paula Rettl (Bocconi)\, Marco Cappelluti (UCL)\, and Catherine E. De Vries (Bocconi\, presenter)\, "Geographies of Discontent: How Public Service Deprivation Increased Far-Right Support in Italy"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\n\n\n\nElectoral support for far-right parties is often linked to specific geographies of discontent. We argue that public service deprivation\, defined as reduced access to public services at the local level\, helps explain these patterns in far-right support. Public service deprivation increases the appeal of far-right parties by making people more worried about immigration and increased competition for public services. We examine our argument using three studies from Italy\, home to some of the most electorally successful far-right parties in recent decades. We examine cross-sectional data from municipalities (study 1)\, exploit a national reform forcing municipalities below a certain population threshold to jointly share local public services (study 2)\, and explore geo-coded individual-level election survey data (study 3). Our findings suggest that public service deprivation helps us better understand geographic differences in far-right support and the mechanisms underlying them. \nModerator: Federica Genovese \nZoom link: https://essex-university.zoom.us/j/95646499175?pwd=cGszcEpXSU9iVHBmRndIWjd3eGh2Zz09 \nMeeting ID: 956 4649 9175\nPassword: gripe2022f\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/devries-nov16/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221026T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221026T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T084315
CREATED:20220921T081801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221026T211730Z
UID:1038-1666785600-1666791000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:David Gill (Nottingham)\, "The Default Taboo: Repayment Norms during the Great Depression"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nFrance and Britain were responsible for the two largest sovereign defaults in modern history when they unilaterally suspended war debt repayments to the United States during the Great Depression. Despite facing similar economic challenges\, Paris defaulted in 1932 whereas London continued payment until 1934. Conventional explanations for why states default or repay their debts— which tend to focus on future borrowing costs\, the risk of sanctions\, economic spillover effects\, or domestic-political trade-offs—struggle to explain this variation. This article refocuses attention on the role of ideas and norms in policymakers’ decision-making at critical moments on the path to default. Archival research in Britain and the United States reveals a default taboo in operation in London. The taboo functioned instrumentally\, affecting cost-benefit calculations\, but also substantively\, making repayment legitimate and appropriate. Variation in the key mechanisms of normative influence— domestic public opinion\, international reputation\, and personal moral convictions—provides a stronger explanation of repayment behavior than existing theories. British policymakers were initially concerned about outraging the public\, feared non-payment by Britain’s own debtors\, and believed repayment was morally right. Britain defaulted only after these concerns faded\, and despite economic recovery. In contrast\, French policymakers faced immediate and strong public resistance to repayment\, held more limited concerns about international reputation\, and were more divided on the morality of default. Analysis of these historical examples\, which represent difficult cases due to pervasive assumptions about economic rationality\, highlights the importance of ideas and norms in the study of sovereign debt and helps to explain why states can repay debts in bad times or default in good times. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF \nClick here for Zoom recording with passcode: se*tT97%
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/gill-oct26/
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220928T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220928T133000
DTSTAMP:20260515T084315
CREATED:20220913T223429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220928T184246Z
UID:998-1664366400-1664371800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Julian Michel (UCLA)\, Michael K. Miller (GWU)\, Margaret E. Peters (UCLA)\, "Get Out: How Autocratic Regimes Select Who Emigrates"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Most autocracies restrict emigration\, yet still allow some citizens to voluntarily exit. How do these regimes decide who can leave? We argue that many autocracies strategically target anti-regime actors for emigration\, thereby crafting a more loyal population without the drawbacks of persistent cooptation or repression. However\, this generates problematic incentives for citizens to join opposition activity to secure exit. In response\, autocracies simultaneously punish dissidents for attempting to emigrate\, screening out all but the most determined opponents. To test our theory\, we examine an original dataset coded from 20\,000 pages of declassified emigration applications from East Germany’s state archives. In the first individual-level test of an autocracy’s emigration decisions\, we find that active opposition promoted emigration approval\, but also punishment for applying. Pensioners were also more likely to secure exit and professionals less likely. Our results shed light on global migration’s political sources and an overlooked strategy of autocratic resilience. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF \nClick here for Zoom recording with passcode: U8rc=EeP
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/maggie-peters-ucla-get-out-how-autocratic-regimes-select-who-emigrates/
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