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X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for GRIPE
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DTSTART:20210314T070000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230712T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230712T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230303T235114Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230704T054022Z
UID:1307-1689163200-1689168600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Siyao Li (Pittsburgh)\, Aditi Sahasrabuddhe (Brown\, presenter)\, Scott Wingo (CACR)\, "The Limits Of Economic Statecraft: RMB Internationalization And The External Security Environment"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nExpanded use of the Chinese currency beyond China’s own borders is an important indication of China’s growing influence in global affairs. Contrary to earlier expectations however\, China has only internationalized its currency\, the renminbi (RMB)\, on a very limited scale. While this outcome is not altogether puzzling\, we argue that the conventional wisdom on international reserve currencies has overlooked security considerations\, namely security and military partnerships from the currency issuing state\, and the external security environment as key factors in generating and strengthening support for international markets in its currency. We advance an historically informed argument of the security limits to RMB internationalization. We demonstrate that the deployment of China’s primary tool for currency internationalization—RMB swaps—is constrained by the dual exigencies of guaranteeing security for overseas economic interests in addition to domestic goals of maintaining domestic financial stability. We then show that RMB internationalization is influenced by both Chinese and US security alliances. We find that\, counterintuitively\, the growth of China’s military power and ability to back its economic interest seem to constrain its choice of BSA partners in regions closer to China given existing US military alliances. \n\nModerater: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/sahasrabuddhe-2023jul12/
CATEGORIES:season8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230614T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230614T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230303T234925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230525T195513Z
UID:1300-1686744000-1686749400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Sung Eun Kim (Korea)\, Rebecca Perlman (Princeton\, presenter) and Grace Zeng (Princeton)\, "The Politics of Rejection: Explaining Chinese Import Refusals"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nHealth and safety standards offer a convenient means by which governments can credibly claim to be protecting the population\, even while pursuing less publicly- oriented goals. In the realm of international trade\, such regulatory standards have most often been studied as a method of veiled protectionism that can help nations privilege domestic industry while skirting World Trade Organization requirements of openness. Yet precisely because health and safety standards create ambiguity about their intent and are therefore difficult to punish\, nations may be incentivized to use them for goals that extend well beyond protecting domestic industry. In particular\, we theorize that governments will\, at times\, use regulatory barriers as a means of po- litical retribution. In order to show this\, we collect and translate detailed\, original data on import refusals by Chinese border inspectors between 2011 and 2019. Though os- tensibly intended to keep dangerous products out of the hands of Chinese consumers\, we demonstrate that import rejections have systematically been used by the Chinese government as a way to punish states that act against China’s interest. \nModerator: Lauren Prather \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/perlman-2023jun14/
CATEGORIES:season8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230517T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230517T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230303T234801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230509T153831Z
UID:1295-1684324800-1684330200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Minju Kim (Syracuse\, presenter) and Shu Fu (Chicago)\, “Bringing Home the Bacon: Politician Ambassadors and Home State Trade”
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nAmbassadors promote domestic exports to a host country and represent the inter- est of their home country at large. However\, are trade benefits equally distributed domestically? In the United States\, a substantial number of ambassadors are former governors or legislators (“politician ambassadors”). We argue that politician ambas- sadors are particularly equipped with knowledge and incentives to promote exports from their home states to host countries. Leveraging the biographic information of 164 ambassadors and US state-level exports to 30 major export destinations from 2002 to 2020\, we find that the home states of politician ambassadors\, compared to other states\, enjoy a significant export increase to host countries on average (“home-state effect”). We find that the home-state effect is particularly apparent in countries where the US exports the most\, and in industries that export final goods. Personal background of ambassadors can explain how the benefits of diplomacy are distributed domestically. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \n\n\n\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/kim-2023may17/
CATEGORIES:season8
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230419T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230419T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230103T042925Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230411T165833Z
UID:1223-1681896600-1681902000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Boram Lee (LSE)\, "Baptists and Bootleggers in Trade Politics: How Treaty Recognition Makes Side Agreements Credible"
DESCRIPTION:Studies show that liberalizing governments include social and environmental clauses in trade agreements to gain pro-trade support from activists. However\, these studies do not address how the government makes issue linkage credible to activists\, who understand that the government has weak incentives to enforce such linkages once the agreement is ratified. How do liberalizing governments make issue linkage credible to activists despite the commitment problem? Focusing on U.S. government decisions regarding environmental clauses in trade agreements\, I argue that a liberalizing government uses international treaties to mitigate activists’ fears of defection. By recognizing environmental international organizations’ authority in trade agreements\, the government can mitigate activists’ fear of defection and increase their support for trade agreements. Using original data\, I find that the government recognized environmental treaties with more ties to U.S.-based activists in designing environmental clauses in trade agreements from 2000 to 2016. Based on a comparative case study\, I also show that activists with ties to recognized treaties supported issue linkage whereas those without ties to the treaties joined forces with anti-trade groups. \n\n\n\nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/lee-2023april19/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230322T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230322T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230103T041148Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230302T173857Z
UID:1220-1679486400-1679491800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Ed Mansfield (Penn\, presenter) and Omer Solodoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)\, "Pandemic Protectionism: COVID-19 and the Rise of Public Opposition to Trade"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nHow did the COVID-19 pandemic affect public attitudes toward international trade? In this study\, we argue that the pandemic promoted protectionist sentiment in the United States. Based on cross-sectional and panel data\, we find a substantial increase in Americans’ opposition to trade following the outbreak of the pandemic. This heightened opposition was both long-lasting and pervasive\, cutting across demographic\, economic\, and partisan lines. We also find that experiencing a personal pandemic shock stemming from contracting the Coronavirus or suffering economically from the pandemic contributed to rising hostility to trade. Further\, the effect of such shocks was driven primarily by Republicans\, a result that accords with partisan motivated reasoning. \n\n\n\n\n\n\nLink to PDF \nModerator: Cameron Ballard-Rosa
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/mansfield-2023mar22/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230215T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230103T040526Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230525T190341Z
UID:1215-1676462400-1676467800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Kate McNamara (Georgetown)\, "The Politics of the New European Industrial Policy: How a Post-Neoliberal Shift Is Transforming the European Union"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nMarkets require rules\, made and enforced by governments\, and modern market-making has therefore unfolded as an intrinsic part of state-building. While the European Union is not a Weberian state\, it has not been immune to these processes. Over the last three decades it has constructed a Single European Market and a currency while building political authority and expanding its institutional capacities. The EU has done this through supranational market-making largely centered on neoliberal precepts of competition and openness. Today\, however\, the EU is breaking with that tradition by pursuing an active\, interventionist European industrial and geopolitical market-making strategy\, layered above the member-states. Scholars have yet to fully grapple with this new and contentious shift. This paper begins this task by describing and mapping European industrial policy and situating it within the larger global turn to industrial policy\, while raising a series of questions about the political sources and consequences of this change for the EU’s political development\, and for broader transformations in capitalism in Europe and beyond. \nModerator: Sarah Bauerle Danzman \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/mcnamara-2023feb15/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20230125T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20230125T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20230103T034828Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230118T162912Z
UID:1212-1674648000-1674653400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Patrick Bayer (Strathclyde\, presenter) and Federica Genovese (Essex)\, "Climate Policy Costs\, Regional Identity and Backlash against International Cooperation"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nScholars in international political economy are increasingly interested in how the sub- national patterns of major economic adjustments such as trade investment and environmental reforms fuel public opposition to international institutions that are meant to catalyze those adjustments. While the literature has sharpened the understanding of material policy costs and their implications for public opinion\, the impact of less material considerations—for example\, specific subnational identities—is still largely unexplained. In this paper\, we explore if and how vulnerability to climate policy\, which pushes communities to lash out against rapid decarbonization\, is moderated by a sense of strong regional identities\, which may reduce the appreciation for national policies at the expense of international ambition. We present new survey evidence from the United Kingdom that assesses if and how communities with different sensitivities to distributive climate policy costs and subnational identities form varying preferences for international cooperation. Our study of 3\,000 individuals from three different geographically targeted areas supports our argument and highlights the importance of new climate-related cleavages among politically relevant constituencies on international integration. \n\n\n\nModerator: Iain Osgood \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/bayer-2023jan25/
CATEGORIES:season7
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221130T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221130T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20220921T082120Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221130T052203Z
UID:1045-1669809600-1669815000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Chase Foster (Technische Universität München) and Jeffry Frieden (Harvard)\, "Compensation\, Austerity\, and Populism: Social Spending and Voting in 17 Western European Countries"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThere has been a dramatic rise in voting for populist parties in Europe over the past twenty years. There are clear material and non-material sources of this backlash against political and economic integration\, which is part of the broader global trend. We assess the role of government social policy in dampening or provoking populist sentiment\, on two different dimensions. First\, we ask whether the existence of a broader and deeper social safety net mitigated the political discontent that took the form of populist voting. Here we examine a panel of 187 elections from 1990 to 2017 and find evidence that populist parties fared worse where countries spent more on social support\, especially for labor market programs that provide income to workers experiencing unemployment or early retirement from the workforce (“passive labor market” policies). This suggests that “compensatory” social spending did work to dampen support for populism. Second\, we ask whether cuts to government support for those facing economic distress\, largely undertaken with reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s\, stimulated populist discontent. Here we add an analysis of pooled cross-sectional data from eight waves of the European Social Survey. We find that cuts to social spending\, especially spending on passive labor market policies\, were strongly associated with increased support for populist parties. The effect was stronger among those individuals who had experienced unemployment and among those facing adverse economic circumstances. This suggests that the welfare and labor-market reforms of the 1990s and early 2000s may have alienated vulnerable segments of the population and driven them toward populist political parties. \n\n\n\nModerator: Iain Osgood \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/frieden_foster-2022nov30/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221116T093000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221116T110000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20220921T081909Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221116T221908Z
UID:1041-1668591000-1668596400@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Simone Cremaschi (Bocconi)\, Paula Rettl (Bocconi)\, Marco Cappelluti (UCL)\, and Catherine E. De Vries (Bocconi\, presenter)\, "Geographies of Discontent: How Public Service Deprivation Increased Far-Right Support in Italy"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\n\n\n\nElectoral support for far-right parties is often linked to specific geographies of discontent. We argue that public service deprivation\, defined as reduced access to public services at the local level\, helps explain these patterns in far-right support. Public service deprivation increases the appeal of far-right parties by making people more worried about immigration and increased competition for public services. We examine our argument using three studies from Italy\, home to some of the most electorally successful far-right parties in recent decades. We examine cross-sectional data from municipalities (study 1)\, exploit a national reform forcing municipalities below a certain population threshold to jointly share local public services (study 2)\, and explore geo-coded individual-level election survey data (study 3). Our findings suggest that public service deprivation helps us better understand geographic differences in far-right support and the mechanisms underlying them. \nModerator: Federica Genovese \nZoom link: https://essex-university.zoom.us/j/95646499175?pwd=cGszcEpXSU9iVHBmRndIWjd3eGh2Zz09 \nMeeting ID: 956 4649 9175\nPassword: gripe2022f\nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/devries-nov16/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20221026T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20221026T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20220921T081801Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221026T211730Z
UID:1038-1666785600-1666791000@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:David Gill (Nottingham)\, "The Default Taboo: Repayment Norms during the Great Depression"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \n\n\n\nFrance and Britain were responsible for the two largest sovereign defaults in modern history when they unilaterally suspended war debt repayments to the United States during the Great Depression. Despite facing similar economic challenges\, Paris defaulted in 1932 whereas London continued payment until 1934. Conventional explanations for why states default or repay their debts— which tend to focus on future borrowing costs\, the risk of sanctions\, economic spillover effects\, or domestic-political trade-offs—struggle to explain this variation. This article refocuses attention on the role of ideas and norms in policymakers’ decision-making at critical moments on the path to default. Archival research in Britain and the United States reveals a default taboo in operation in London. The taboo functioned instrumentally\, affecting cost-benefit calculations\, but also substantively\, making repayment legitimate and appropriate. Variation in the key mechanisms of normative influence— domestic public opinion\, international reputation\, and personal moral convictions—provides a stronger explanation of repayment behavior than existing theories. British policymakers were initially concerned about outraging the public\, feared non-payment by Britain’s own debtors\, and believed repayment was morally right. Britain defaulted only after these concerns faded\, and despite economic recovery. In contrast\, French policymakers faced immediate and strong public resistance to repayment\, held more limited concerns about international reputation\, and were more divided on the morality of default. Analysis of these historical examples\, which represent difficult cases due to pervasive assumptions about economic rationality\, highlights the importance of ideas and norms in the study of sovereign debt and helps to explain why states can repay debts in bad times or default in good times. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF \nClick here for Zoom recording with passcode: se*tT97%
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/gill-oct26/
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20220928T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20220928T133000
DTSTAMP:20260514T135615
CREATED:20220913T223429Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220928T184246Z
UID:998-1664366400-1664371800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Julian Michel (UCLA)\, Michael K. Miller (GWU)\, Margaret E. Peters (UCLA)\, "Get Out: How Autocratic Regimes Select Who Emigrates"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Most autocracies restrict emigration\, yet still allow some citizens to voluntarily exit. How do these regimes decide who can leave? We argue that many autocracies strategically target anti-regime actors for emigration\, thereby crafting a more loyal population without the drawbacks of persistent cooptation or repression. However\, this generates problematic incentives for citizens to join opposition activity to secure exit. In response\, autocracies simultaneously punish dissidents for attempting to emigrate\, screening out all but the most determined opponents. To test our theory\, we examine an original dataset coded from 20\,000 pages of declassified emigration applications from East Germany’s state archives. In the first individual-level test of an autocracy’s emigration decisions\, we find that active opposition promoted emigration approval\, but also punishment for applying. Pensioners were also more likely to secure exit and professionals less likely. Our results shed light on global migration’s political sources and an overlooked strategy of autocratic resilience. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF \nClick here for Zoom recording with passcode: U8rc=EeP
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/maggie-peters-ucla-get-out-how-autocratic-regimes-select-who-emigrates/
END:VEVENT
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