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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260218T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260218T130000
DTSTAMP:20260610T134027
CREATED:20260121T175651Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260211T070241Z
UID:1865-1771416000-1771419600@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Lisa Dellmuth (Stockholm)\, How Trade Retaliation Affects Regime Support
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Research has shown that restrictive trade policies\, such as large subsidies\, affect public opinion in affected states. This article examines the downstream effects of trade retaliation on public support for the democratic regime and its core representative institutions. It argues that exposure to retaliation can initially activate reciprocity preferences\, increasing support for political institutions that are perceived to help government deter trade restrictions abroad. However\, when the economic costs of retaliation become salient\, exposure instead erodes regime support as citizens grow unwilling to bear these costs. The analysis draws on several datasets covering the United States from 2002 to 2022\, combining individual- and local-level measures of regime support with exposure to retaliatory tariffs and online search behavior. The results suggest that US import tariffs do not systematically increase regime support. By contrast\, exposure to foreign retaliatory tariffs reduces regime support between 2010-2022. These effects operate through sociotropic rather than personal evaluations. The findings suggest that\, despite its strategic appeal as a deterrent\, trade retaliation undermines durable regime support\, revealing broader domestic political costs than previously understood. \nModerator: Federica Genovese \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/dellmuth-2026-02-18/
CATEGORIES:season14
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DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260318T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260318T130000
DTSTAMP:20260610T134027
CREATED:20260227T204502Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260307T052923Z
UID:1890-1773835200-1773838800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Faisal Ahmed (Wellesley) and Jonas Bunte (Vienna)\, "Government Support and Firm Strategy: The Case of Ambassadors and Export Finance"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: States routinely help firms manage risk by providing two core forms of support: information that reduces uncertainty about markets\, partners\, and political conditions\, and financing that insures against commercial and political loss. We argue that firms treat these tools as a unified portfolio and reallocate between them when one becomes temporarily unavailable. We examine this logic in the context of export promotion\, where ambassadors provide market intelligence and informal enforcement\, while export credit agencies (ECAs) supply insurance\, guarantees\, and loans. Ambassadorial vacancies disrupt the informational pillar while leaving financial support intact. Using nearly three decades of monthly\, deal-level data from the U.S. Export–Import Bank matched to global ambassadorial appointment records\, we show that vacancies significantly increase firms’ reliance on ECA support without altering EXIM’s screening standards\, risk assessments\, or deal sizes. The findings reveal how firms compensate for fluctuations in state capacity\, highlighting substitution across informational and financial instruments as a general feature of economic statecraft. \nModerator: Maggie Peters \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/ahmed-2026-03-18/
CATEGORIES:season14
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260422T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260422T130000
DTSTAMP:20260610T134027
CREATED:20260121T180045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260414T020555Z
UID:1869-1776859200-1776862800@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Junghyun Lim (UNC)\, "Depopulation Paradox? Depopulation Risk and Immigration Policy Preferences"
DESCRIPTION:How does depopulation risk shape individuals’ support for open immigration policies? Depopulation poses growing challenges in developed economies\, including declining tax revenue\, and skills shortages. While immigration is often proposed as a major solution\, it remains unclear whether those most affected are receptive to it. On one hand\, depopulation may boost support for immigration by highlighting its economic benefits. Yet it may also raise concerns among natives about losing majority status and fostering out-group anxiety\, leading to stronger opposition to immigration. I examine this question using a survey experiment in Italy\, a country facing serious depopulation. I find that raising awareness about depopulation risk has little effect on preferences regarding immigration policies\, while significantly increasing support for pro-natalist policies and the repatriation of co-nationals. Among those with strong in-group biases\, depopulation awareness reduces support for immigration. These findings demonstrate a paradox: even as the need for immigration grows\, public support remains limited or declines\, revealing a key challenge in using immigration to mitigate depopulation. \nModerator: Stephen Chaudoin \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/lim-2026-04-22/
CATEGORIES:season14
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260617T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260617T130000
DTSTAMP:20260610T134027
CREATED:20260610T190055Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260610T190055Z
UID:1922-1781697600-1781701200@gripe.polisci.ucla.edu
SUMMARY:Theo Serlin (KCL\, presenter) and Hye Young You (Princeton)\, "Protection by Covariance"
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: Trade policy is the prototypical case of lobbying influence. Despite evidence to the contrary\, most analyses of lobbying on trade assume a quid pro quo model of influence. We examine the implications of the legislative subsidy theory of lobbying for trade policy. We develop a model in which lobbying increases the weight legislators receive in the policymaking process. Industries seeking protection lobby legislators whose districts contain greater industry employment. Consequently\, legislators whose districts contain large industries prone to lobby exert more influence on policy. In equilibrium\, industries that co-locate with other large and lobbying-prone industries receive higher tariffs. We test these predictions using data on US trade policy from 1989 to 2016\, exploiting redistricting-induced shocks to industry co-location. Within-district spillover effects help explain why existing studies estimate small effects of lobbying on trade policy. Lobbying advantages not only large and organized industries\, but also weaker industries that share their locations. \nModerator: Bobby Gulotty \nLink to PDF
URL:https://gripe.polisci.ucla.edu/event/serlin-2026-06-17/
CATEGORIES:season15
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