How Trade Retaliation Affects Regime Support

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Abstract: Research has shown that restrictive trade policies, such as large subsidies, affect public opinion in affected states. This article examines the downstream effects of trade retaliation on public support for the democratic regime and its core representative institutions. It argues that exposure to retaliation can initially activate reciprocity preferences, increasing support for political institutions that are perceived to help government deter trade restrictions abroad. However, when the economic costs of retaliation become salient, exposure instead erodes regime support as citizens grow unwilling to bear these costs. The analysis draws on several datasets covering the United States from 2002 to 2022, combining individual- and local-level measures of regime support with exposure to retaliatory tariffs and online search behavior. The results suggest that US import tariffs do not systematically increase regime support. By contrast, exposure to foreign retaliatory tariffs reduces regime support between 2010-2022. These effects operate through sociotropic rather than personal evaluations. The findings suggest that, despite its strategic appeal as a deterrent, trade retaliation undermines durable regime support, revealing broader domestic political costs than previously understood.

Key words: political confidence; regime support; trade retaliation; United States public opinion.

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Restrictive trade policies, such as subsidies, tariffs, and trade sanctions, have long been part of economic statecraft. However, after the period of "hyperglobalization" during the 1990s and 2000s, we have seen renewed concerns over protecting domestic industries and countering perceived unfair trading practices (Dür and Invernizzi 2025; Evenett et al. 2025). Since the first Trump administration's exceptionally high tariffs in 2018, an additional concern has become the geopolitical dimension of restrictive trade policies (Prazeres 2020; Kirikakha et al. 2021). While trade disputes were more episodic and often WTO-mediated before 2018, from 2018 we have seen a qualitatively different, more escalating trade war between major powers.

As a consequence, citizens have been increasingly exposed to lopsided protectionism and harsh, retaliatory trade measures over the past three decades (Dür et al. 2020; Evenett and Fritz 2020). This has had ample effects on political behavior, which research has mainly examined with regard to increasing economic nationalism and demand for reciprocity. Research has shown that Western populations confronted with restrictive trade policies, such as the heavy subsidization of Chinese industries, have increasingly sided with more economically nationalist and right-leaning candidates that they believe represent their interests (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Rodrik 2018; Hays et al. 2019; Autor et al. 2020; Chilton et al. 2020; Milner 2021; Nicoli et al. 2022; Schweinberger 2022; Steiner and Harms 2023; Steinberg and Tan 2023). Interestingly, however, citizens exposed to costly retaliation often become more critical of their own government (Kim and Margalit 2021; Chyzh and Urbatsch 2021; Brutger et al. 2023; Blanchard et al. 2024; Mansfield and Solodoch 2024).

The view taken in this article is that citizens' exposure to trade disputes can have more far-reaching consequences for stable attitudes toward the political regime, which is the set of core political institutions that structure political decision-making. It examines the knock-on effects of retaliation on more support for the political regime, which is more deep-seated than support for policy or for incumbents. Regime support is central to a political system's stability, be it

autocratic or democratic. When citizens support their regime, they are more likely to internalize and comply with its norms and laws (Gilley 2006; Tyler 1990). We should thus separate the amount of support citizens have for particular leaders or political parties, from their more diffuse support for the political regime (Easton 1965, 1975). In the words of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2019, 422): "If the acid of disaffection has spread upwards to corrode the more diffuse level of support for democratic ideals and core regime principles, however, then this is seen as far more problematic for system stability. We therefore need to scrutinize the public's … confidence in core representative institutions".

The increasing exposure of Western societies to trade disputes raises three important questions: Does trade retaliation by one's own state increase citizens' support for, or alienate them from, the domestic political regime and its core institutions? Does exposure to foreign retaliation shape regime support in similar ways? Under which conditions are these effects particularly strong? In addressing these questions, this article proposes a theoretical mechanism connecting trade disputes and regime support: the salience of economic costs arising from exposure to trade disputes.

Theoretically, the article draws from the Accommodation Dilemma Framework laid out in the introduction to this special issue by examining how trade disputes exposure shapes citizens' regime support (Walter and Dellmuth this issue). During trade disputes, responses to restrictive trade measures are retaliatory to deter such policies and unwanted contagion where third states may engage in similar measures. However, states confront a fundamental "accommodation dilemma" (Walter 2021; Jurado et al. 2022; Walter and Plotke-Scherly 2025) when deciding about how to respond: accommodating the violator risks reputation losses and contagion where other states will then engage in similar non-cooperation, whereas non-accommodation, or retaliation in its harshest form, risks cooperation losses or at worst a breakdown of the cooperation altogether. While research has shown that citizens care about their state's response

to non-cooperation (Walter this issue), scholars have yet to systematically examine whether citizens are ultimately willing to bear the costs arising from retaliation, and with what consequences for their durable regime support.

This article makes two distinct contributions. First, it theorizes how local exposure to the economic effects of trade disputes affects the beliefs of citizens about their political regime. Generally, citizens' exposure to trade disputes bolsters their regime support by triggering preferences for reciprocity and associated fears of losing out by other states undermining fair trade even more (cf. Brutger and Rathbun 2021), should their government not retaliate. Where costs associated with the trade disputes are salient, in the sense of increased public awareness of trade disputes (cf. Guisinger 2009), however, citizens will eschew the costs. This will undermine their support for the political institutions enabling the retaliatory responses.

Empirically, the article provides new evidence from county- and individual-level data from the US between 2002 and 2022, examining the effects of county-level and personal exposure to the economic effects of retaliatory tariff peaks on confidence in political institutions. Political confidence measures blanket support for the political regime as a whole, rather than specific policies or office holders (Hooghe 2011; Devine 2024). The analysis captures trade disputes by testing the effects of exposure to retaliatory tariff peaks both by major trading partners targeting the US, and by the US targeting those partners, as peaks are unusually high tariffs with the potential to influct political harm and deter unwanted trade policies.

There are four main results. First, changes in exposure to US import tariffs do not generally affect local regime support, although a negative effect emerges during 2010–2014 in the second tariff tercile in Democrat-leaning counties. Second, foreign tariff peak exposure increased regime support in the highest tercile during the trade-liberalization period but reduced regime support between 2010 and 2022 across counties, when economic costs became more politically salient. Third, these findings are in line with expectations and are underpinned by an analysis

of online searches in counties about tariffs, which suggests that the results are meaningfully related to people's concerns about trade disputes. Fourth, the effects of tariff peaks appear to operate through sociotropic rather than personal mechanisms, as personal affectedness by US or foreign tariffs does not reduce regime support.

These findings add to three strands of International Political Economy public opinion research. First, to theories on the behavioral consequences of trade retaliation (e.g. Brutger et al. 2023; Schweinberger 2022; Steinberg and Tan 2023), they show how cost salience moderates this effect. Second, the results speak to research on so-called 'smart sanctions' that are designed to inflict political harm on a political actor or group in a target state (e.g. Drezner 1999; Grossman et al. 2018; Frye 2019), in that they show that foreign trade retaliation can undermine durable regime support in target states, and how this effect interacts with political ideology. Third, this article pays tribute to the literature on regime support, which has predominantly studied the individual-, communicative-, and organizational-level sources of regime support (e.g. Gilley 2006; McKay et al. 2023; Dellmuth 2024), demonstrating how local-level exposure to the economic costs from trade retaliation matters for regime support.

Theory and Hypotheses

Regime support refers to an evaluative orientation toward a regime's political institutions (Almond and Verba 1965). It captures a relational aspect between the public and the political regime, and has been shown to be more stable than the relatively volatile support for specific officeholders or policies (Easton 1975; Hooghe 2011; Devine and Valgarðsson 2024). Regime support nurtures state legitimacy, as it induces an internalization of the rules and norms of the regime, which motivates people to comply with those norms and rules. Conversely, when political authorities are not supported, people see them as coercive and become reluctant to abide by their rules (Tyler 1990; Hurd 1999; Gilley 2006). This creates space for contestation

and, at worst, compromises stability political stability (Brutger and Kertzer 2018; De Vries 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019).

Trade retaliation is a set of reactive trade measures intended to deter foreign restrictive trade policies, either by one's own state or a foreign state. It is best understood on two dimensions: a political concern with shielding specific industries from the adverse impacts of foreign trade policy, and a retaliatory component aimed at deterring undesirable policies of trading partners (Gawande and Hansen 1999; see also Conybeare 1987; Grossman and Helpman 1995). Examples are tariff peaks that disproportionately affect a specific product category or industry in one specific country, or also stark countervailing duties for heavily subsidized industries or anti-dumping measures fs that increase the costs and volumes of imports or quotas. In contrast, accommodative responses are characterized by inaction or moderate policy responses in line with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The argument about the effects of exposure to trade retaliation on regime support is based on two key premises. First, citizens have been shown to care about how their governments respond to non-cooperation by other states (Walter 2021; Jurado et al. 2022). Moreover, citizens tend to be sensitive to reputation losses from their states and associated contagion risks (Croco 2011; Brutger and Kertzer 2018; Goldfien et al. this issue; Walter this issue) Thus, although citizens have limited knowledge about trade and may not be able to correctly attribute responsibility for trade policy (Guisinger 2009; Mutz 2021), public opinion tends to be responsive to both trade exposure (Schaffer and Spilker 2019; Ballard-Rosa et al. 2021; Nicoli et al. 2022; Steiner and Harms 2023) and to exposure to trade retaliation (Chyzh and Urbatsch 2021; Kim and Margalit 2021; Brutger et al. 2023; Mansfield and Solodoch 2024).

Second, citizens tend to evaluate retaliation through the exposure of their local economy. They have social, material, and psychological stakes, which makes them aware of foreign influences in their local area (Ansolabehere et al. 2014; Frieden 2022). Economic geography

research has shown that citizens are able to develop an idea, albeit it may be vague, of the economic interest of their locale (Cutler 2007; Rickard 2020; Rodrik 2021), and tend to form attitudes based on changes in local labor markets (Colantone and Stanig 2018; Lechler 2019; Autor et al. 2020).

Support for political institutions should be positively affected when local economies become exposed to trade disputes. To begin with, in locales exposed to retaliation by their own state should bolster regime support among residents. This is because people generally prefer reciprocity, which is part of "a general preference for mutual and equal gain with a simultaneous insistence on not being exploited" (Brutger and Rathbun 2021, 881; see also Chilton, Milner, and Tingley 2020; Schweinberger 2022; Steinberg and Tan 2023). This preference becomes activated, in part, when international disputes challenge the state from the outside and thus strengthen a relational need for shared reality, which in turn leads citizens to view prevailing political institutions as appropriate (Jost et al. 2004). This can then lead citizens to develop an interest in a strong government that can deter foreign non-cooperation. For example, US import tariffs intended to protect local economies from targeted tariffs have been shown to bolster support for incumbents, although they do not have clear employment effects (Lake and Nie 2023; Autor et al. 2024). In turn, retaliatory responses by one's own state may be perceived as credible state protection, thereby undergirding diffuse support for the political regime and its core institutions.

Moreover, locales exposed to retaliation by a foreign state should bolster regime support among residents. This is due to the outsider object comprised by foreign trade retaliation, which triggers a greater identification with the national in-group that people expect to share common interests with (Margalit 2012; Steiner and Harms 2023). For instance, gas price shocks in Ukraine in the course of tit-for-tat trade disputes between Russia and Ukraine between 2017 and 2020 caused rally effects in Ukraine (Seitz and Zazzaro 2020). Economic sanctions put

forward by the EU against Israel in 2015 produced rally effects and anti-EU sentiment in Israel (Grossman et al. 2018). During the period 2016-2017, there was a backlash effect in public opinion in South Korea against China after China imposed economic sanctions imposed on South Korea (Sung and Park 2022). This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

Reciprocity Hypothesis: *Regime support will increase in counties exposed to trade disputes.*

This positive effect of local economies' exposure to trade retaliation on regime support is likely to be trumped by individual cost aversion. When the costs from retaliation become salient, retaliation undermines regime support. While there are different definitions of salience in public opinion research (e.g. Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; De Vries et al. 2021; Mikulaschek 2023), here it refers to the level of public awareness of citizens of the costs of trade retaliation, relative to other issues. This captures a key aspect of the notion of salience (Guisinger 2009), which is central to understanding how citizens form attitudes toward political institutions when their local economy is exposed to retaliation.

Where costs become salient, retaliation nurtures repeated frustration with policy, and thus an alienation of citizens from their regime. This may be because people are themselves incurring costs, or because they feel their local community bears the costs arising from retaliation (Kim and Margalit 2021). When retaliatory practices are perceived as costly it means that citizens prefer their government to instead accommodate noncooperation (Brutger et al. 2023). In turn, if this is not done, over time frustration under the impression of exposure to the economic costs of US or foreign retaliatory measures will build and undermine the more stable attitudes toward political institutions. The second hypothesis therefore posits:

Salience Hypothesis: *Regime support will decrease in counties exposed to trade disputes in which the associated economic costs are salient.*

Taken together, these hypotheses privilege a subnational-level explanation and bracket explanations of regime support that have to do with the procedures of state institutions and political rhetoric (see, e.g., Newton et al. 2017; Citrin and Stoker 2018; Levi and Stoker 2000) In the subsequent analyses, those types of variation are removed via fixed effects for broader state information environments and for time periods, in which we can expect the information environment about foreign economic pressure to differ (Blanchard et al. 2024). Moreover, the analysis moves beyond hypothesis testing by exploring the extent to which the results depend upon political ideology across the liberal-conservative spectrum, which has been shown to matter for attitudes toward internationalist issues (Brutger and Clark 2023; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2024; Ecker-Ehrhardt et al. 2024).

Measuring Regime Support and Exposure to Trade Disputes

The empirical strategy is based on the analysis of survey data from the US, matched to local-level data on exposure to trade disputes. Focusing on the US is advantageous in this study, as the US is the largest world economy and thus its responses to non-cooperation in trade have considerable political and economic effects. Moreover, the US has relatively autonomous local administrative entities, contributing to those local areas and their economic profile to be important social reference points in opinion formation about the US government and its policies (e.g. Arias and Blair 2024; Gaikwad et al. 2022; Kim and Margalit 2021). In line with existing literature, the unit of analysis in this study is a county.[2]

[2] This research design choice is further underpinned by a variance components analysis that shows that about 12.5% of the residual variation in confidence in the executive is among individuals within the same counties. This variation at the county level is meaningful and more pronounced than state and temporal clustering (see Appendix Table B1).

Due to data availability discussed below, the anlaysis covers the years 2002–2022. This is advantageous as it offers evidence from a time period which varies greatly regarding the degree to which trade disputes between the two countries was salient.[3] Before 2016, trade disputes consisted of episodes of non-cooperation and retaliatory responses, which were mostly within the scope of the GATT and often WTO-mediated. By contrast, when the first Trump administration came into power in 2016, rhetoric hardened and tariffs rose, and soon thereafter a tariff war emerged during which a range of retaliatory measures were issued in an escalatory manner, and where the economic costs were publicly discussed (Brutger et al. 2023; Dür and Invernizzi 2025). Thus, the time period enables an effective test of the hypotheses.

Next, I discuss the operationalization of the hypotheses, while the variable descriptions are further detailed in Appendix A.

Regime Support

The dependent variable is a post-stratified measure of regime support at the county level. Aggregating individual responses to the county level has two advantages. First, it allows the analysis to capture the collective political consequences of county-level exposure, which matches between the level of analysis to the theoretical expectations, as the theoretical focus is on place-based exposure and sociotropic evaluations. Second, as detailed below, data on industry classifications at the individual level to measure individual exposure to trade disputes is only available for a small number of respondents in the GSS.

The GSS is a nationally representative biennial survey among US citizens, and this article uses the cross-sectional cumulative dataset from the survey. The sample consists of adults, aged 18 or older, who were living in noninstitutional housing at the time when they participated in

[3] The start year is 2002 as the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) data system changed its industry classification in 2000, coding sectoral employment data using NAICS since 2001.

the survey. Most respondents were surveyed using an online website (54.5%), with smaller portions surveyed face-to-face (34.7%), by phone (7.6%), or using multimode interviewing (3.3%). The interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish, and the years observed are in 1993, then biennially between 1994 and 2018, and then in 2021 and in 2022 (Davern et al. 2024).[4]

The privileged measure of regime support in the main analysis is confidence in the executive branch of government. Political confidence refers to people's basic evaluative and affective orientation to the institutions and actors governing their polity (Citrin and Stoker 2018). It captures loyalty to the regime and its institutions rather than support for incumbents or specific outputs (Tyler 1997; Easton 1975; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2023) Confidence is only weakly correlated with support for specific office holders and policy preferences (Devine 2024; Devine and Valgarðsson 2024), making it a good proxy of regime support (Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Tyler 1997; Gilley 2006; De Vries 2018; Dellmuth et al. 2022) it is only somewhat sensitive to political questions.

The measure of regime support is citizen *confidence* in the executive branch of the federal government.[5] Although Congress formally regulates foreign commerce, it has long delegated substantial tariff authority to the president, including under national security, economic discrimination, and balance-of-payment deficit provisions (Zirpoli 2025).[6] As a result, tariff policy is typically associated with—and publicly attributed to—the presidential administration. That said, findings for confidence in Congress are reported in robustness checks, and findings for confidence in law-and-order institutions are presented as placebo checks, as those

[4] See detailed description of the sampling in the GSS in Appendix B.
[5] Question wording: Would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Hardly any (0), only some (1), a great deal (2). "Executive branch of the federal government".
[6] Section 338 of the Trade Act of 1930; Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; Sections 122, 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974; International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977.

institutions do not have a role in tariff policy and tariff peak exposure should thus not affect attitudes toward those.

To create the county-level confidence measure, I rely on multilevel regression with post-stratification (MrP), which is the work horse model in public opinion aggregation when the number of observations per unit is small (Leemann and Wasserfallen 2020). Averaging the responses at the county level would produce biased results (Toshkov 2015; Pitts et al. 2025). MrP estimates the percentage of those having confidence in a county by regressing a dichotomized outcome (1= 'only some' or 'a great deal' of confidence, 0='hardly any' confidence) on random intercepts for age and sex categories, as well as for counties and years, using county-level census data from the Minnesota Population Center (2020).[7]

Figure 1 shows the percentage of those having only some or a great deal of confidence in the executive across the observed time period. Confidence in the executive has a minimum value of 43.4% and a maximum of 82.9%, with a mean of 60.7% and a standard deviation of 7.5. In the left-hand panel, the decline in confidence underlines one of the central puzzles of public opinion research is why confidence in political institutions has declined in the US and in Europe, eroding the foundations of democratic legitimacy of representative democracies (Citrin and Stoker 2018; Hetherington 2018; Foster and Frieden 2021). The right-hand panel illustrates the percentage point change in confidence from one measurement point to the next, which is used as a dependent variable.

Figure 2 illustrates the variation spatially across counties. The map illustrates that there is no clear geographical pattern of confidence, or one of center-periphery, but rather, that confidence levels vary across the country. In contrast, voting patterns often exhibit a clear pattern, such as the vote shares in the 2016 presidential elections, where the Republicans

[7] These data have been generously shared by Jonsson (2025). The number of counties for which there is census data and where there are more than five observations is N=448, and the number of surveyed respondents in these counties varies from 5–406 ($\overline{N}$=29; $N_{(counties)}$=471).

outperformed the Democrats in the US' "industrial belt", where manufacturing has historically been an important sector but which has been in decline due to the forces of automation and globalization (Broz et al. 2021). However, Figure 2 shows that confidence is relatively high in the large surveyed, urban centers in California, such as Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, San Diego, and Stanislaus county. This is no uniform picture, given that confidence appears high also in more rural areas, such as Coconino county in Arizona. This warrants a closer look at specific counties for a clearer picture about the variation.



Figure 1. Confidence in the executive, 2002-2022.

Note: N=448 counties, 49 states and the District of Columbia. New Hampshire was not surveyed. Left panel: Post-stratified percentage of the county population having confidence in the executive derived from the GSS (Davern et al. 2024) and the county-level census data from the Minnesota Population Center (2020).. Right panel: Change in the percentage of the county population having confidence. See Appendix Table A1 and Appendix B.

Table 1 provides an overview of the five counties with the highest and the five counties with the lowest confidence in the executive at the beginning of the observed period in 2002, compared to the five counties with the highest and lowest confidence in the executive at the beginning of the observed period in 2022. High-confidence counties are mainly urban and

dominated by education and service sectors. In both 2002 and 2022, counties in New York (e.g., the Bronx, Monroe, and Westchester) rank among the highest in confidence, and in 2022 the District of Columbia also appears among the top five.



Figure 2. Confidence in the executive, across counties, 2002-2022.

Note: N=448 counties, 49 states and the District of Columbia. Average percentage of county population having confidence in the executive across the period 2002-2022, based on the post-stratified measure derived from the GSS (Davern et al. 2024) and the county-level census data from the Minnesota Population Center (2020). See Appendix Table A1 for variable definition and Appendix B for details about the methodology.

By contrast, the five counties with the lowest confidence in 2002 are all counties still had on average a relatively high percentage of the population having some or a great deal confidence in the executive. These counties differ substantially. Among the low-confidence counties, only Hamilton (Ohio) lies in the industrial belt, though several others historically had large manufacturing bases, especially in textiles (e.g., Barry and Gaston). In Barry, manufacturing accounts for 26.7% of employment, with another 9.2% in retail; in Gaston, manufacturing employs 15.5% and retail 12.5%. By 2022, the lowest-confidence counties show a different

profile. While Waukesha (Wisconsin) remains industrial, counties such as Butte and Horry are dominated by education and service-sector employment (Data USA 2025). This underlines that political confidence is not easily attributed to geographical location or industry composition (Frieden 2022).

Table 1. Confidence in the executive, select counties with lowest and highest confidence.

2002			2022		
State	**County**	**Confidence**	**State**	**County**	**Confidence**
Missouri	Barry	69.779	California	Butte	43.382
South Carolina	Horry	70.787	South Carolina	Horry	44.252
Oklahoma	Garfield	72.775	Arkansas	Cleburne	44.540
Ohio	Hamilton	72.977	New Mexico	Sandoval	46.000
North Carolina	Gaston	73.109	Wisconsin	Waukesha	46.341
…	…	…	…	…	…
California	San Francisco	82.512	New York	Westchester	61.269
New York	Westchester	82.642	New York	Bronx	61.336
New York	Monroe	82.688	California	Santa Clara	61.506
New York	Bronx	82.796	Massachusetts	Suffolk	62.120
California	Santa Clara	82.852	District of Columbia	District of Columbia	62.330

Note*:* Average percentage of county population having confidence in the executive in 2002 and 2022, based on the post-stratified measure derived from the GSS (Davern et al. 2024). See Appendix Table A1 and Appendix B.

Exposure to tariff peaks

The main analysis examines effects of the county-level share of employees exposed to trade disputes, operationalized as US tariff peaks against major trading partners on regime support, as well as those partners' tariff peaks against the US. Tariffs have often been used to punish noncooperative states even before the recent surge in tariff levels under the first and second Trump administration (Brutger et al. 2023; Dür and Invernizzi 2025). They tend to be more visible to citizens than more complex non-tariff barriers, such as investment screening or quotas

(Kono 2006; Brutger and Strezhnev 2022), and are thus suitable to capture public opinion effects.

Measuring retaliation is notoriously difficult, as the political motivation behind trade barriers is often not obvious based on the existing data (Gawande and Hansen 1999). Previous approaches that have focused on retaliatory tariffs during the US-China trade war since 2018, where there is data on products officially announced to be subject to retaliation (Kim and Margalit 2021), are ill-suited for this analysis because the motivation behind tariffs cannot be isolated over the long time period observed here. I therefore use tariff peaks, which reflect high, targeted duties, with the potential to coerce policy change and deter foreign trade restrictions, and that capture either strategic protection or coercive leverage, or both, which are the aspetcs of retaliation theorized above. Specifically, tariff peaks refer to the imposition of duties more than 15 percent above the international average tariff on products (World Bank 2024).

To create the measures, tariff peaks are aggregated from the six-digit product level. First, data are derived from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database for tariff peaks by the US and major economies trading with the US, targeting each other: China, Canada, EU, India, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and the UK (World Bank 2024). The tariff codes were mapped to NAICS codes at the 6-digit level, manually resolving remaining mismatches (see also Autor et al. 2024). For each product-year group, tariff peaks were identified: a value of 1 was assigned when international tariff spikes occurred, 0 when none occurred, and missing if only missing values were present. This produced variables for tariff peaks, for example for 6,342 products in the US–China dyad. Tariffs peaks in general are less frequent regular tariffs and follow a different temporal pattern (see Appendix Figure C1 and Table C1).[8]

[8] Exposure to tariff peaks captures variation that differs from exposure to general tariffs. Averaging data for the period 2002-2022, Pearson's r=0.315 (N=68,626) for exposure to US tariff peaks and to any US tariffs, and r=0.798 (N=68,628) for exposure to major states' tariff peaks and to any tariffs reported by these states.

These tariff peak measures were then merged with US Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) employment data (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025; see also Javorcik et al. 2025), which reports industries using different NAICS versions over time, at the county level using NAICS substrings (see Appendix C and for more details). The resulting variable is the share of employees exposed to tariff peaks, calculated by dividing the number of employees in each county that work in an industry exposed to a tariff, by all employees in the county. Only a small percentage of workers are affected by the tariffs—around 0.940 percent on average regarding US tariff peaks against its major trading partners; and 5.311 percent exposed to foreign tariff peaks (see Appendix Table C1; see also Kim and Margalit 2021).

Figure 3 visualizes the trajectory of tariff peaks over time. The left panel shows the measure of tariff peak exposure, and the right panel shows the measure of changes in tariff peak exposure used in the regression analysis. Between 2002 and 2016, which comprises the Bush and Obama administrations, the average percentage of employees exposed to US or foreign tariff peaks declined, consistent with continued liberalization. Exposure increases after 2017 during the second Trump administration, but drops slightly again after 2021 under Biden. US tariff peaks were relatively consistent over time across sectors, although tariff peak exposure is increasing between 2002 and 2016 in manufacturing, albeit in an incremental fashion. Exposure to foreign tariff peaks declined for most industries from 2002 to 2020, whereas exposure rose slightly across in manufacturing since 2021 (see Table C1 for sectoral differences)**.**

Figure 4 suggests that the spatial variation in tariff exposure is not very high (panel A), but that the variation is rather within-county variation (panel B). Panel B of Figure 5 mirrors earlier findings that US protective tariffs between 2018 and 2019 have mainly been for the so-called "US heartland", which comprises counties in the Midwest and the South of the US (Autor et al. 2024). It is also those areas that have seen rising exposure to foreign tariff peaks (Figure 4).



Figure 3. Tariff peaks over time, 2002-2022.

Note: *N*=3210 counties, 50 states and District of Columbia. Panel A: Percentage of workers exposed to tariffs and tariff peaks (World Bank 2024; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025). Panel B: Changes in tariff peaks between the US and major states that correspond to the temporal changes in the dependent variable, confidence in the executive.



Figure 4. Exposure to US tariff peaks targeting major states, 2002-2022.

Note: *N*=3210 counties, 50 states and District of Columbia. Panel A: Percentage of workers exposed to tariffs and tariff peaks (World Bank 2024; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025). Panel B: Changes in tariff peaks between the US and major states that correspond to the temporal changes in the dependent variable, confidence in the executive.



Figure 5. Exposure to major states' tariff peaks targeting the US, 2002-2022.

Note: *N*=3210 counties, 50 states and District of Columbia. Panel A: Percentage of workers exposed to tariffs and tariff peaks (World Bank 2024; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025). Panel B: Changes in tariff peaks between the US and major states that correspond to the temporal changes in the dependent variable, confidence in the executive.

Empirical Analysis

This section tests the hypotheses. As the dependent variable, Δ *Confidence* in the executive, is a percentage-point change in confidence in the executive, the analysis relies on a linear regression model, with high-dimensional fixed effects. The distribution of the dependent variable is close to normal (Figure D1), making it suitable for analysis with ordinary least squares (OLS), as skewed results due to extreme outliers are unlikely:[9]

$$\Delta\, Confidence_{cst} = \beta_1 \Delta\, Exposure\ to\ US\ tariff\ peaks_{cst} + \beta_2\, \Delta\, Exposure\ to\ foreign\ tariff\ peaks_{cst} + \alpha_{st} + \gamma_{st} + \varphi_{st} + \varepsilon_{cst}\,, \quad \text{(eq. 1)}$$

which estimates Δ *Confidence* in counties *c* clustered in states *s* and years *t,* conditional on the time-varying observed variables *Exposure to US tariff peaks, Exposure to foreign tariff*

[9] This deletes 'singletons' for which data is only available for one point in time, which is the case for one county in the sample.

peaks, state-year fixed effects α_{st}, the year fixed effects γ_{st}, a vector of controls φ_{st}, and a normally distributed error term ε_{cst}. The results should be interpreted as changes in confidence in response to changing exposure to tariff peaks within regions. The state fixed effects control for a potentially confounding influences of political events or political rhetoric by political elites and the media at the state and national levels, which previous research has shown might be related to confidence in the executive branch of government (e.g., Gidron and Hall 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2019). I cluster robust standard errors at the level of states and years to account for possible correlations across individuals within the same state. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000 (cf. Kim and Margalit 2021; Autor et al. 2024).

Despite the state and year fixed effects, that correlate with general geopolitical and national political shifts, there might still be unobserved county-level confounders, which I account for by including a range of standard demographic variables in the analysis: population shares for females, the percentage of college educated persons in the population, seven age groups as shares of adult population, and the share of non-Hispanic whites. I also include a range of economic variables. One might argue that unobserved characteristics in the global economy and political landscape might co-determine both tariff exposure and regime support. This could be the case because many citizens have been repeatedly exposed to information about tariffs from national-level channels, of which some have seen increasing demand since the exposure to notably Chinese imports has increased, notably Fox News (Autor et al. 2020). I include a range of socioeconomic indicators that previous research has shown to address such concerns: employment shares in agriculture and manufacturing, unemployment rates, logged population (Lake and Nie 2023), and the Chinese import shock measure (Autor et al. 2013; see also Colantone and Stanig 2018). These measures are defined in detail in Appendix Table A1.[10]

[10] The correlational analysis of the independent variables (Appendix Table D2) and the variance inflation factor (mean VIF=3.92) indicate no concern about multicollinearity. See Appendix Table A1 for variable descriptions, D1 for descriptive statistics, and for correlations between the independent variables. The

County-level Exposure to Tariff Peaks and Confidence

The hypotheses are tested by examining the effects of changes in tariff exposure on changes in political confidence. The estimated coefficients can be interpreted as percentage point changes. The observable implication of the *Reciprocity Hypothesis* is a positive association between changes in US tariff peak exposure and changes in confidence, as well as between foreign tariff peak exposure and changes in confidence. In contrast, the *Salience Hypothesis* is supported if these associations turn negative in years in which trade disputes are more salient.

Table 2 shows the results. The first model includes the entire sample, whereas the remaining models are broken down into different time periods: Model 2 is estimated for the period 2002-2008 during the Bush administration, an era of expanding trade, pro-globalization sentiment, early China integration and a relatively low politicization of trade; Model 3 is estimated for the years between 2010 and 2014 during the Obama administration, which includes the fallout from the recession after the global financial crisis 2007/2008 and a growing politicization of trade and the costs of globalization more broadly; and Model 4 includes the period 2016-2022 under the first Trump administration, which was dominated by a strong anti-trade rhetoric, high tariff levels, and increased public salience of trade (Brutger et al. 2023).

In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients of exposure to foreign tariff peaks are statistically insignificant. This suggests that during the years of trade liberalization, in which retaliation was rare and the costs not politically salient, exposure to foreign tariff peaks did not affect regime support. This finding contradicts the *Reciprocity Hypothesis*. In Models 3 and 4 for the time period from 2010, during the period in which trade becomes more politicized in the recovery from the financial crisis, the coefficient becomes negatively significant, in line with the *Salience Hypothesis*. This suggests that exposure to foreign tariffs leads to lower regime support when costs are salient. It also suggests that the negative reaction of the public to retaliatory trade disputes predates the trade war.

Table 2. County-level analysis of confidence in the executive

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2002-2022	Biennially between 2002-2008	Biennially between 2010-2014	2016, 2018, 2021, 2022
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.005	-0.056	0.054	0.016
	(-0.272)	(-1.571)	(0.895)	(1.809)
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.002	0.007	-0.014*	-0.005*
	(0.264)	(1.132)	(-2.628)	(-2.393)
Controls				
% Females	0.010	-0.044	0.018	-0.004
	(0.306)	(-0.582)	(0.748)	(-1.012)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.003*	-0.007	-0.001	-0.000
	(-2.281)	(-1.555)	(-0.952)	(-0.292)
% College educated	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.001**
	(-0.454)	(-0.153)	(-1.431)	(2.768)
% 20-29 years	-0.005	-0.050	0.010	-0.006**
	(-0.564)	(-1.770)	(1.030)	(-2.776)
% 30-39 years	0.018	0.043	-0.007	0.004*
	(1.104)	(0.828)	(-0.410)	(2.078)
% 40-49 years	-0.046	-0.259**	0.054*	-0.019***
	(-1.983)	(-3.181)	(2.358)	(-4.983)
% 50-59 years	-0.009	0.024	-0.003	0.004
	(-0.563)	(0.327)	(-0.059)	(0.963)
% 60-69 years	0.009	0.079	-0.035	0.004
	(0.357)	(1.230)	(-0.622)	(0.488)
% 70-79 years	0.001	-0.213	-0.093	-0.038***
	(0.017)	(-1.898)	(-1.013)	(-3.737)
% Over 80 years	-0.009	0.046	0.144**	0.038***
	(-0.312)	(0.524)	(2.744)	(3.643)
Δ Unemployment rate	-0.031**	-0.034	-0.001	-0.028***
	(-2.850)	(-0.820)	(-0.093)	(-6.074)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.001	0.000	-0.001	0.001
	(0.696)	(0.039)	(-0.220)	(1.488)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	-0.010	-0.043***	0.009	-0.001
	(-1.887)	(-4.216)	(1.845)	(-1.223)
Import shock	1.111	159.802	-46.663	2.219
	(0.026)	(0.425)	(-0.639)	(0.123)
Constant	-2.209	0.748	-2.107	-0.526*
	(-1.221)	(0.164)	(-1.596)	(-2.436)
N	1053	296	234	515
N (counties)	279	147	178	189
N (states)	45	37	36	39

Note: Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

To illustrate, in Model 2, for every one percentage-point increase in exposure to foreign tariff peaks, confidence in the executive decreases by 0.014 percentage points, holding all else constant. This also means that a slightly larger, five percentage-point increase in county-level tariff exposure would be associated with a 0.070 percentage point increase in confidence. The effects are thus significant but small. Consider the example of Erie, New York, in the recent period including the trade war. Confidence in government has continuously declined, from about 73.943 percentage of the population having confidence in the executive in 2002 to only

48.621% in 2022. In Erie, around 10.748% of the workforce was affected by foreign tariff peaks on major economies in 2002, which fell to 3.167 in 2016, and then rose slightly to 3.632% in 2022. Thus, Erie is close to the median local tariff peak exposure in 2022 (3.066), compared to other counties. Given the model and the statistically significant effects for the period since 2016, confidence in Erie is predicted to decrease by 0.465 percentage points between 2016-2022.

The effect of changes in exposure to tariff peaks could be nonlinear. Many counties only see marginal change in tariff exposure, as the percentage point change ranges from -26.774 to 7.717, with a mean of -.035 and a standard deviation of 1.224 percent of the affected employees. To examine a potential nonlinear effect, I now break down the tariff peak measures into terciles and interact them with the period effects shown in Table 2. Figure 6 shows the results in terms of the marginal effects of terciles of changes in tariff peak exposure on confidence in different time periods, estimated on the basis of a pooled model. This tests the significance of the interaction term across the counties within a specific tercile.

The results in Figure 6 largely mirror those in Table 2, but also provide some nuance. In the left panel, the marginal effect of changes in exposure US tariff peaks is insignificant in most instances, but is actually negatively significant in the second tariff tercile during the period 2010-2014, in line with the *Salience Hypothesis*. In the right panel, the results show that the negative effect of foreign tariff peaks found in Table 2 in the period 2010-2022 are strongest in the third tariff tercile, again in line with the *Salience Hypothesis*. There is also evidence for the *Reciprocity Hypothesis* in the third tariff tercile during 2002-2008, where I find a positive effect on confidence. This indicates a nonlinear effect, where people may not answer incrementally to changes in exposure to US tariff peaks, but rather to signals that their county experiences strong shifts toward being strongly exposed.



Figure 6. Marginal effects of changes in tariff peak exposure on confidence, across time periods

Note: Dependent variable is *Δ Confidence* in the executive, estimated as in Model 1 in Table 2, but including interaction terms between the exposure to tariff peak measures and period dummies, respectively. Left panel shows interactions with US tariff peak exposure, and right panel with foreign tariff peak exposure. Detailed regression results are in Appendix Table E1. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

These results are robust in a number of alternative model specifications. First, additional tests include a re-estimation of the main results (from Model 1 in Table 2) by dropping one each county in the sample. Although the counties are not strictly representative, they were selected in a multistage random sampling procedure. The results suggest that the effects of the tariff exposure variables are generally not sensitive to dropping counties (Appendix Figures F1-F2). Second, I re-estimate the analyses in Table 2 and Figure 5 by including confidence levels in the pre-observation period, to avoid findings being biased due to a regression to the mean (cf. Autor et al. 2020). However, the results remain robust (Appendix Tables F1-F2). Third, I re-estimated all results with confidence in Congress as a dependent variable. The reason is that, as discussed above, Congress has far-reaching authority over trade retaliation decisions. While the effects in Table 2 turn insignificant (Appendix Table F3), the results for

the nonlinear effects of foreign tariff peak exposure are robust (Appendix Table F4). Fourth, I test whether the effects spill over to an institution that has no mandate in tariff policy, the US Supreme Court. I re-estimate the analyses using this law-and-order institution as a dependent variable. The results for the linear effect are statistically insignificant (Appendix Table F5), but there is a negative effect of changes in exposure to foreign tariff peaks in the third tariff tercile, indicating a potential spillover effect of political frustration to other types of state institutions (Appendix Table F6). Fifth and finally, I weigh the tariff measure with the total exports in tariff-affected sectors in agriculture and manufacturing to the eight trading partners studied, in order to capture the importance of the tariff peaks not only for the local work force but also for the local economy as a whole. The results are robust, and the coefficient for exposure to US tariff peaks turns positively significant in model 4 in Table 2, indicating that in counties where the local economy as a whole depends more on exports to major trading partners, residents may have welcomed US retaliatory tariff peaks against perceived violations by those partners (Appendix Tables F7 and F8).

Summarizing the results so far, the evidence mainly supports the *Salience Hypothesis* in the context of changes in exposure to foreign tariff peaks between 2010-2022. There is only limited evidence in the context of changing exposure to US tariff peaks. I now turn to presenting supporting evidence from online searches and individual-level analyses.

Evidence from Online Searches

Different mechanisms can account for why citizens show less regime support in areas more heavily targeted by major states' tariffs. It may be a case of "naive" interpretation, whereby citizens knew little about the trade dynamics but felt less regime support because their personal economic situation had worsened due to the economic costs. Alternatively, citizens did know about the trade dynamics and saw it as a policy failure of trade disputes in geographic areas or

industries affected by the tariffs, residents in those areas would be more likely to form attitudes toward the political regime due to blame attribution.

To measure awareness, I use data on online searches, assuming that topics citizens search for online are salient to them. The data come from Google Trends, following established approaches to measuring public awareness of trade disputes (Kim and Margalit 2021). Trends is a publicly accessible database that reports relative interest in search queries across U.S. metropolitan areas. It covers the period from 2004 onward and provides yearly index scores for topics and search terms derived from anonymized search requests. Google normalizes search data by dividing the number of searches for a given term or topic by the total number of searches in the same location and period, yielding a measure of relative popularity. These values are then indexed from 0 to 100 within each term, where 100 represents the area with the highest relative search interest. As a result, identical index scores do not imply the same absolute number of searches across locations (Google 2025).

The measures were retrieved using individual search terms for 210 U.S. metropolitan areas and then matched to the county level using FIPS codes, following Kim and Margalit (2021). I rely on two indicators: the relative frequency of searches for "tariffs," and for the combined terms "China" and "tariffs."[11] The first captures general attention to tariff policy, while the second adds a geopolitical dimension. Search interest varies across counties and over time, with higher levels often observed in areas with economically exposed industries (see Appendix Figures D2 and D3). Take again the example of Erie, New York, which has a substantial manufacturing base, employing roughly 10 percent of the workforce. Smaller but economically significant shares are employed in wholesale trade (about 2.2 percent) and information (about 1.5 percent). Though small in size, wholesale trade and manufacturing rank among the county's highest sectors in median earnings (cf. Data USA 2025).

[11] An alternative string was "Chinese" and "tariffs", which yields highly similar results to "China" and "tariffs". These results are available upon request.

Given the nonlinear effects of trade dispute exposure, I regress online searches on terciles of changes in tariff peak exposure. As online searches are relative to all other counties in a specific year, I estimate the average effect of tariff exposure in levels, lagged by one year, in a pooled model with county fixed effects for the period 2002-2022:

$$Searches_{ct} = \beta_1 Exposure\ to\ US\ tariff\ peaks_{ct-1} + \beta_2\ Exposure\ to\ foreign\ tariff\ peaks_{ct-1} + \omega_t + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{ct}\,, \quad (2)$$

which estimates $Searches_{ct}$ for the two combination of strings discussed above, respectively, in counties *c,* in year *t,* conditional on the yearly, time-varying observed variables *Exposure to US tariff peaks*$_{ct-1}$*, Exposure to foreign tariff peaks*$_{ct-1}$, the county fixed effects ω_t, a vector of controls φ_t, and a normally distributed error term ε_{ct}. Due to the county fixed effect, the results should be interpreted as changes in relative online search frequency in responses to tariff exposure within regions in the year before. I cluster robust standard errors at the level of counties and states to account for possible correlation across individuals within the same county over time or within the same state.

Figure 7 shows the results for an effect of the interaction between US tariff peak exposure and time periods (as in Table 2) on "tariffs". The left panel shows that the results consistently indicate that exposure to US tariff peaks increased online searches during 2002-2008, but decreased them between 2010-2022. The exception is the insignificant effect in the third tercile for 2010-2014. While this may at first seem counterintuitive, there might be an attenuating effect of economic hardship as a result of tariff peak exposure on engagement with public topics online, as personal concerns become more important.

The right panel indicates effects particularly in the third tercile of US tariff peak exposure on "tariffs" and "China". In the period 2002-2008, US tariff peak exposure is negatively

associated with online searches for both terms. By contrast, US tariff peak exposure leads to a higher search frequency in both terciles. As job opportunities deteriorated in light of the 2018 trade war due to both US tariffs and foreign retaliatory tariffs (Javorcik et al. 2025), economic concern about the geopolitical aspect of trade may have risen, leading to higher searches for both terms during 2016-2022.

Figure 8 shows the results for foreign tariff peak exposure. In the left panel, it can be seen that in the third tercile of foreign tariff peak exposure, searches for "tariffs" increased during 2016-2022, but decreased during 2002-2008. This reflects a higher concern in foreign tariff peak exposed counties during the trade war period. However, the right panel shows that searches for both "tariffs" and "China" in thar period for China and tariffs are lower between 2010-2022, indicating lower geopolitical concern in the period comprising the trade war. This likely reflects a growing disengagement in the areas most affected by foreign tariff peaks, potentially, as discussed above, as a result of economic hardship directing the attention away from public concerns to personal concerns.

In sum, these results support the findings for the hypotheses in that they show that public awareness about tariffs is sensitive to changes in tariff exposure. Moreover, they show significantly different results in awareness in response to US and foreign tariff peak exposure. Exposure to US tariff peaks increased searches for "tariffs" in 2002–2008 but reduced them after 2010, consistent with an attenuating effect of economic hardship on engagement with public policy topics. By contrast, during the trade war period, exposure, especially to foreign retaliatory tariffs, raised search interest in highly exposed counties, though declining searches for "China" suggest growing disengagement in areas most affected by sustained tariff peak exposure. Taken together, this underlines the validity of the county-level results.



Figure 7. Online searches: Interaction between US tariff exposure and period

Note: Years included: 2004-2022. *N*=1174 (45 states and 324 counties). The dependent variable in the left panel is the relative frequency of online searches for "tariffs". The dependent variable in the right panel is the equivalent measure for combined searches for "China" and "tariff". 4. Detailed regression results are in Appendix Table E3.



Figure 8. Online searches: Interaction between foreign tariff exposure and period

Note: Years included: 2004-2022. *N*=1174 (45 states and 324 counties). The dependent variable in the left panel is the relative frequency of online searches for "tariffs". The dependent variable in the right panel is the equivalent measure for combined searches for "China" and "tariff". 4. Detailed regression results are in Appendix Table E3.

Evidence from Individual-level Data

To examine opinion shifts at the individual level, I estimate the original *Confidence* variable in the GSS, which takes on three ordered values (0=hardly any, 1=some, 2= a great deal, see Appendix Table A2). The main independent variable is the respondent's job's exposure to tariffs, matched to respondent's employment's 6-digit NAICS category (1= exposed, 0 = working and not exposed, or retired, unemployed, and still studying). As the number of people in the GSS for which there are NAICS codes are very few (0.4 percent are exposed to US peaks and 0.1 percent to foreign peaks), the results from this analysis should be taken as indicative.

I therefore estimate *Confidence* as a function of the independent variables and two cut points using ordered logistic regression. The main model is written as follows:[12]

$$logit\{\Pr\,(Confidence_{ist} > \mathrm{s} \mid x_{ist})\} = \beta_2(Individual\ tariff\ peak\ exposure_{ist}) + \omega_{ist} + \gamma_{st} + \varphi_t + \varepsilon_{ist}\,, \qquad \text{(eq. 2)}$$

Where $\Pr(Confidence_{ist} > \mathrm{s} \mid x_{ist})$ is the cumulative probability that respondent *i* living in state *s* in year *t* has a level of confidence that is higher than the threshold *s*; conditional on tariff exposure, ω_{ist} that is a vector for the individual-level controls; state fixed effects γ_{st}; year fixed effects φ_t; and ε_{ist} is the error term. The individual-level control variables are a continuous age variable, a dichotomous gender variable (1=female), three variables comparing no education to elementary school, high school, and higher education attainment, dummy variables comparing whites and blacks to other race, a dummy for manual worker, and one for urban residency.[13] Detailed variable descriptions are in Appendix Table D3.

[12] The parallel regression assumption holds, as indicated by separate logit regressions testing effects across cut points. Results available upon request. The VIF equals 1.56, as well as Pearson's correlation coefficients in Appendix Table D4, indicate no concern with multicollinearity.

[13] These results are robust in other model specifications, for example including individuals' ideological alignment (1=having the same party identification as the president, 0 otherwise), or personal economic satisfaction (1=satisfied, 0 otherwise).

Table 3 shows no evidence of tariff peak exposure to affect confidence at the individual level. Rather, it appears that younger people tend to have more confidence in the executive, and White people and manual workers have less confidence. However, the coefficients of age turns insignificant in Model 4, and the coefficient of Whites is insignificant in Model 2. These results suggest that people evaluate tariff peak exposure based on the effects on their sociotrope, rather than their personal work situation (see also Kim and Margalit 2021).

Table 3. Individual-level regressions of confidence on individual-level tariff exposure

	(1) 2002-2022	(2) 2002-2008	(3) 2010-2014	(4) 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022
Individual exposure to US tariff peaks	0.052	-0.115	-0.050	0.162
	(0.344)	(-0.489)	(-0.151)	(0.548)
Individual exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-0.087	0.188	-0.303	-0.180
	(-1.181)	(1.622)	(-1.812)	(-1.043)
Age	-0.005***	-0.009***	-0.008**	-0.002
	(-4.355)	(-4.609)	(-3.047)	(-1.309)
Ref: Male				
Gender	0.038	0.060	0.066	0.032
	(0.788)	(0.783)	(0.695)	(0.465)
Ref: Other				
Black	-0.143	-0.530***	0.273	-0.160
	(-1.717)	(-4.258)	(1.761)	(-1.674)
White	-0.400***	-0.005	-0.604***	-0.545***
	(-6.262)	(-0.032)	(-7.728)	(-5.949)
Ref: No education				
Elementary school	-0.454	-0.801	-0.337	-0.226
	(-0.857)	(-0.747)	(-0.369)	(-0.270)
High school	-0.939	-1.111	-1.042	-0.732
	(-1.788)	(-0.998)	(-1.173)	(-0.927)
Higher education	-0.798	-1.159	-0.775	-0.526
	(-1.522)	(-1.031)	(-0.895)	(-0.647)
Ref: Other employees				
Manual worker	-0.100*	-0.087	-0.079	-0.102
	(-2.126)	(-0.904)	(-1.009)	(-1.844)
Ref: Rural resident (<5000 inhabitants)				
Urban resident	0.087	-0.113	0.201	0.365***
	(1.225)	(-1.007)	(1.899)	(3.589)
Cut 1	-2.698***	-3.150**	-1.493	-1.278
	(-5.465)	(-2.673)	(-1.695)	(-1.561)
Cut 2	-0.429	-0.838	0.902	0.985
	(-0.860)	(-0.717)	(1.035)	(1.221)
N	16468	4773	4064	7631
N(*states*)	51	46	47	49

Note: Ordered logit estimations with fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted using the GSS post-stratification weight. Robust *t*-statistic, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Evidence on Political Ideology

Next, I test whether the results depend on political ideology, both at the county and individual levels. The effects of trade disputes on regime support are likely to be stronger among conservative citizens. Political polarization has become a key issue in the US (Autor et al. 2020), implying that many international issues become more closely related to partisan ideology (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2023). Conservatism has been associated with right-leaning people who tend to favor traditional family values, authoritarian policy styles, and the use of unilateral force or more generally policy styles that focus on getting better outcomes for one's own state rather than on achieving equal outcomes among states (Bobbio 1996; Hooghe et al. 2019; Brutger and Clark 2023). The preference of conservatives for a foreign policy that protects national autonomy also lies in their strong loyalty to the perceived ingroup and belief that a strong national authority is necessary to protect this ingroup (Kertzer et al. 2014). Conversely, the political left tends to favor multilateral cooperation and egalitarianism (Brutger 2021; Ecker-Ehrhardt et al. 2024), leading liberals to be more in favor of international cooperation than conservatives (Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Milner and Tingley 2013; Hooghe et al. 2019; Brutger and Clark 2023; Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2024).

I begin with a county-level test of whether concerns about local exposure to trade disputes are stronger in locales where most people are conservative. To this end, I interact tariff terciles and vote shares for the Republican party.[14] This examines whether it matters whether counties are predominantly Republican, rather than how the results change at incremental changes of vote shares. Figure 9 shows that the marginal effect of changes in US tariff peak exposure on changes in confidence tends not to depend on political ideology. Similarly, Figure 10 shows that the effect of changes in exposure to foreign tariff peaks does

[14] As conservative vote shares are calculated as the percentage of the Republican vote share to all other parties' vote shares, theoretically results might differ for Democratic vote shares, however, these results are the mirror image of the results for the Republicans (available upon request).

largely not depend on ideology, but there is one exception. In the second tercile, changes in foreign tariff peak exposure decreases regime support in Democrat counties during 2010-2014, whereas no effect is found in Republican counties. This may be due to the preferences in Democratic counties to be particularly malleable during the Obama administration and under the impression of the recovery after the 2007/2008 financial crisis, where liberals' faith in political institutions was weakened after being exposed to foreign tariff peaks.

Taken together, these additional tests underline the main county-level results und a nonlinear effect of trade dispute exposure. Four findings stand out. First, changes in exposure to US import tariffs do not appear to generally affect regime support at the local level, however, there is a negative effect during 2010-2014 in the second tariff tercile in Democrat counties. Second, the results suggest that foreign tariff peak exposure increased regime support in the third tariff tercile in the trade liberalization period, which supports the *Reciprocity Hypothesis;* but that it decreased regime support between 2010-2022 across counties, where economic costs were more politically salient, in line with the *Salience Hypothesis*. Third, exposure to tariff peaks is underpinned by an analysis of online search patterns, suggesting that exposure to US tariff peaks increased searches for "tariffs" in 2002–2008 but reduced them after 2010, consistent with an attenuating effect of economic hardship on engagement with public policy topics. During the period 2016-2022, especially exposure to foreign retaliatory tariffs, raised search frequency in highly exposed counties, however, declining searches for "China" suggest growing disengagement in areas most affected by sustained tariff peak exposure. Fourth, foreign tariffs operate through sociotropic rather than personal mechanisms, as there is no evidence that *personal* affectedness by US or foreign tariffs reduces regime support.



Figure 9. County-level interaction between US peaks and Republican vote shares

Note: *N*=1174 (45 states and 324 counties). Dependent variable is *Δ Confidence* in the executive, based on estimations in Model 2 in Table 4. See Appendix table E3 for full results.



Figure 10. County-level interaction between foreign peaks and Republican vote shares

Note: *N*=1174 (45 states and 324 counties). Dependent variable is *Δ Confidence* in the executive, based on estimations in Model 2 in Table 4. See Appendix table E3 for full results.

Conclusion

This article has examined how exposure to trade disputes affects support for the domestic political regime. Individual-level analyses reinforce the county-level results, showing that collective exposure matters more than individual exposure. This pattern mirrors prior findings that citizens evaluate political institutions through sociotropic economic assessments rather than narrow personal costs (Dellmuth and Chalmers 2018; Rodríguez-Pose 2018; Dijkstra et al. 2020; Lipps and Schraff 2021; Katsanidou and Mayne 2024). Regime support—understood as a relatively durable political attitude—thus responds primarily to locally shared economic conditions. The earlier period (2002–2008) illustrates how information environments shape these effects. US countervailing and antidumping measures against Chinese imports generated extensive domestic and international debate, including support from manufacturing interests and import-competing groups. In this context, trade disputes were framed as legitimate defensive responses to unfair competition, which appears to have muted negative effects on regime support. In the post-crisis years, however, rising cost aversion seems to have led to declining confidence in political institutions. There is evidence to suggest a spill-over effect to institutions that do not have a mandate in tariff policy, such as the US Supreme Court.

The findings add to three strands of public opinion research in International Political Economy. First, to the literature on the behavioral consequences of trade retaliation, they clarify how cost salience moderates the relationship between retaliation and opinion formation. While protective tariffs can in some cases increase support for incumbents and for further protectionist measures (Chilton et al. 2020; Schweinberger 2022; Steinberg and Tan 2023; Steiner and Harms 2023), trade retaliation has also been shown to fuel economic uncertainty, which people tend to punish at the ballot box (Chyzh and Urbatsch 2021; Fetzer and Schwarz 2021; Kim and Margalit 2021; Mansfield and Solodoch 2024). This article

complements this evidence by showing that, when costs are salient, exposure to foreign trade retaliation can also erode citizens' support for the political regime—a durable set of evaluative orientations that can take a long time to rebuild (cf. Easton 1965, 1975). States facing the dilemma about whether to accommodate a defecting state but risk contagion, or to retaliate but risk cooperation losses, should factor in a potential corrosion of regime support. Governments responding to non-cooperation thus face not only trade-offs between retaliation and accommodation, but also longer-term risks of political alienation from core institutions.

Second, turning the gaze to effects on public opinion elsewhere, the results speak to research on so-called 'smart sanctions' that are designed to inflict political harm on a political actor or group in a target state. This type of economic sanctions often produces rally-around-the-flag effects in target states by heightening external threat perceptions, although the evidence for the success of smart sanctions is quite mixed (Grossman et al. 2018; Seitz and Zazzaro 2020; Steinberg and Tan 2023; Lake and Nie 2023). This article shows that foreign trade retaliation, even if it has enduring repercussions over time, can undermine political regime support in target states. Such an effect depends on the salience of political costs, the public's awareness, and to some extent on ideological leanings in the target state.

Third, this article contributes to the literature on regime support by complementing existing work on individual-, communicative-, and country-level sources (Easton 1975; Gilley 2006; De Vries 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Foster and Frieden 2021; Dellmuth et al. 2022) with an analysis of local economic exposure. Despite an increasingly nationalized media landscape in the US (Autor et al. 2020), the findings show that local exposure to trade disputes continues to matter when costs are salient. This also speaks to a growing literature underlining how the saliency of international issues matters in order for citizens to form an opinion on them (De Vries et al. 2021; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2023; Mikulaschek 2023). It is

likely that elite or media framing that portrays trade disputes can further erode regime support, but this is a matter for future research.

Furthermore, political ideology conditions the effects of exposure to trade disputes on regime support. While there is evidence to suggest that Democrats are particularly likely to lose support under the impression of local exposure to costly trade disputes, since 2016 both Republicans and Democrats appear to react with declining regime support. In other words, once costs become visible, confidence in political institutions erodes across ideological camps.

While this article has been the first to test exposure to retaliation effects on regime support, it also faces a number of limitations. For one, it has privileged economic explanations. However, people also tend to think in geopolitical terms about their country's foreign policy, which becomes evident, for instance, when people express their preference for trading with allies (Carnegie et al. 2023; Brutger and Li 2022; Umaña et al. 2015; Schweinberger and Sattler 2023). Cultural factors such as racial identity (Mutz et al. 2021), social trust (Nguyen and Bernauer 2019), and other cultural considerations (Umaña et al. 2015; Spilker et al. 2018; Vasilopoulou et al. 2024), also matter. These cultural considerations could be modeled explicitly in terms of how they influence the effects of trade disputes on regime support.

Moreover, future research could focus on whether the same patterns can be found in other countries than the US. For instance, in closed autocracies, leaders similarly rely on public and elite support in maintaining regime stability (Cai 2008; Casper and Tyson 2014; Hyde and Saunders 2020), making an inquiry into the effects of trade disputes on regime support relevant. Another interesting example is Europe, where trade is politicized to different degrees in different member states (Young 2017) and where people are on average more reluctant to support tariffs than in the US (Grahn et al. 2025), which might have bearing on the effects of trade disputes on regime support.

All told, researching how trade disputes affect regime support is an important avenue for future research. We need to know more about how trade disputes can change beliefs about political institutions at domestic and international levels, as those beliefs ultimately matter for the legitimacy and stability of political systems and organizations.

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Appendix for "How Trade Retaliation Affects Regime Support"

Table A1. Variables in the county-level analysis

Variable	County-level measures	Source
Δ Confidence	Percentage point change in confidence in the executive from one survey year in the General Social Survey (GSS) to the next, calculated based on the percentage of individuals in the county population having great deal or only some confidence. Question wording: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Hardly any (0), only some (1), a great deal (2). DK and NA coded missing. "Executive branch of the federal government"; "Congress"; "The US Supreme Court". Survey years: 2000, 2002, 20024, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022. Post-stratified at the county-level (see Appendix B).	GSS (Davern et al. 2024)
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	Percentage point change from one survey year to the next in the GSS. Based on the percentage of employees working with the same products on which tariffs were imposed. Tariff peaks by the US (reporting) and China, Russia, Canada, Mexico, India, Turkey, Belgium (EU), and UK as partners, matched to employee categories on the product level, covering total international tariff peaks. The tariff peaks are then summed up per year across all partners (see Appendix C).	QCEW (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025), World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) (World Bank 2024)
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	Percentage point change from one survey year to the next in the GSS. Based on percentage of employees working with the same products on which tariffs were imposed. Tariff peaks reported by China, Russia, Canada, Mexico, India, Turkey, Belgium (EU), and UK, with the US as partner, matched to employee categories on the product level, covering total international tariff peaks. The tariff peaks are summed up per year across all partners (see Appendix C).	QCEW, WITS
Age categories	Percentage of persons belonging to an age group: 20-29 years, 30-39 years, 40-49 years; 50-59 years; 60-69 years; 70-79 years; Over 80 years	SEER (National Cancer Institute 2025)
% Females	Percentage of females in total population.	SEER
% College	Percentage of people with some college or associated degree, or a Bachelor's degree or higher. Missing values have been imputed by using nearest-neighbor imputation, imputing 2001-2004 with the value of 2000, and 2005-2007 with the value of 2008. Based on the American Community Survey (ACS).	US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
% Non-Hispanic whites	Percentage of white non-Hispanic population.	SEER
Republican county	1 if Republican party has a vote share larger than 50% in the previous presidential elections, and 0 otherwise. Calculated by dividing the votes cast to the Republican party by total cast votes for all parties.	Amlani and Algara (2021)
Online searches for "tariffs"	Index from 0 to 100 measuring online searches for "tariffs", relative to the total amount of searches in the same location and time period, resulting in a measure of the relative popularity of a term or topic. Based on this measure, Google then calculates an index capturing the relative interest in the search word in a county compared to the county scoring highest in a year.	Google (2025)
Online searches for "China" and "tariffs"	Index from 0 to 100 measuring online searches for both "China" and "tariffs" relative to the total amount of searches in the same location and time period, resulting in a measure of the relative popularity of a term or topic. Based on this measure, Google then calculates an index capturing the relative interest in the search word in a county in relation to the county scoring highest in a particular year.	Google (2025)
Population	Total population 18 and older in 2000.	SEER

Δ Unemployment rates	Percentage point change in unemployment rates, yearly, based on the percentage of unemployed persons. Based on Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS).	US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Employment in agriculture	Percentage of employees in the agricultural sector to total employment.	US Bureau of Economic Analysis (US BEA 2024)
Employment in manufacturing	Percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector to total employment.	US BEA (2024)
Import shock	Measure of import competition, calculated following the methodology by David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson (2013). Import shocks are defined as: $\text{ImportShock}_{ct} = \sum_{s} \frac{L_{s\,(pre-sample)}}{L_{(pre-sample)}} * \frac{\Delta\,\text{Imports}_{cst}}{L_{cs\,(pre-sample)}}$, (1) where c indexes countries, s sectors, and t years. The term $\Delta\,\text{Imports}_{cst}$ is the change in imports in local currency in 2015 prices from country A over the past n years in sector s, to country B. This country-level term is normalized by the number of workers in the same country and sector at the beginning of the sample period, $L_{cs\,(pre-sample)}$.	International Trade Administration (2024), WITS
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks (weighted)	Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks, multiplied by the exports of tariff-affected sectors (in agriculture and manufacturing) to the eight trading partnrs, in current USD.	QCEW, WITS
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks (weighted)	Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks, multiplied by the exports of tariff-affected sectors (in agriculture and manufacturing) to the eight trading partnrs, in current USD.	QCEW, WITS

Note: All variables are coded at the county level.

Table A2. Individual-level variables

Variable	Individual-level measure based on the GSS (Davern et al. 2024)
Confidence	Question wording: I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them? Hardly any (0), only some (1), a great deal (2). "Executive branch of the federal government"
Exposure to US tariff peaks	1 if respondent's industry of employment is exposed to international tariff peaks, based on six-digit NAICS labels in the GSS, and 0 otherwise, reported by the US, with China, Russia, Canada, Mexico, India, Turkey, Belgium (EU), and the UK as partners (see Appendix C). Respondents with NAICS labels that are not employed at the time of the survey are coded 0.
Exposure to major states' tariff peaks	1 if respondent's industry of employment is exposed to international tariff peaks, based on six-digit NAICS labels in the GSS, and 0 otherwise, reported by China, Russia, Canada, Mexico, India, Turkey, Belgium (EU), and UK as reporter, with the US as partner (see Appendix C). Respondents with NAICS labels that are not employed at the time of the survey are coded 0.
Voting	Respondent's vote for the Democratic (0) or Republican candidate (1) in the last presidential election. If a presidential election happened in the survey year, the measure uses the vote for the previous election. The question was asked 2010, 2012, 2014.
Age	Continuous respondent age
Female	Respondent's sex: 1= female, 0=otherwise
Education	Highest education attained: No education (1); Elementary (2); High school (3); Higher education (4). Dummy variables based on the categorical variable.
Race	White (1), Black (2), other (3). Dummy variables based on the categorical variable.
Urban resident	Urban area, classified as areas with more than 5000 inhabitants (1); rural area (0)
Ideologically aligned	If voted for the same political party as the residing President (1), otherwise (0)

Note: Data derived from the GSS (Davern et al. 2024). "Don't know", "No answer", and "Not applicable" coded as missing.

B Data collection and processing: post-stratification of survey data

The General Social Survey (GSS) has been conducted across the United States (US) with the aim of tracking shifts in the opinions and behavior of the American public. This article uses the cross-sectional cumulative dataset (Davern et al. 2024). The selection of counties in the GSS is based on a multi-stage area probability sampling design to draw a nationally representative sample of non-institutionalized adults aged 18 and older residing in households; for the county selection, stratified sampling by urbanicity, area, and demographic variables is employed. Afterwards, the GSS selected data based on housing units, employing an equal probability sampling technique for this selection (see Davern et al. 2024). The weight variable *wtssps* helps to approximate the full US population, and is used in all individual-level analyses in the article.

In the article's county-level analysis, I relied on multilevel regression with post-stratification (MrP). In the GSS data, the average number of observations per county for which the confidence variables are available ranges from 5–406 ($\overline{N}$=29; $N_{(counties)}$=471). *N*=5 is the limit for using county-level GSS data in line with the ethical guidelines of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, which administers the GSS. The number of observations that are used for post-stratification, after dropping counties in which either age or sex is missing for one or more categories, ranges from 5–85 ($\overline{N}$=16, $N_{(counties)}$=449). MrP has been shown to produce consistent estimates in the presence of small-N subnational data (e.g. Ghitza and Gelman 2013; Leemann and Wasserfallen 2020).

To estimate MrP, census data were derived from the Minnesota Population Center (2020) and pre-processed so that they represented different combinations of age ranges and sexes as proportions of the total county population. The age groups in the survey data were then matched with the census data age groups. MrP then estimates the percentage of those having confidence as a function of a set of random effects of counties, years, and age and sex categories (see Appendix Table A1), using weights computed using census data for the nearest year on the true or marginal distributions of each demographic characteristic. These weights were then applied to perform classical post-stratification.



Figure B1. Percentage of employees in the manufacturing sector, all counties versus GSS sample
Note: Kernel density of the percentage of employees in the manufacturing to all employees in a county. Data from the US BEA (US Bureau of Economic Analysis 2024). The left panel shows the data averaged across all US counties. The right panel shows the data in the GSS county sample.



Figure B2. Vote share for the Republican party, all counties versus GSS sample

Note: Kernel density of the vote shares of the Republican party ranging from 0-100 Amlani and Algara (2021). The left panel shows the data averaged across all US counties. The right panel shows the data in the GSS county sample.



Figure B3. Distribution of college educated, all counties versus GSS sample

Note: Share of college educated ranging from 0-100. Data from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2000 Decennial Census and 2008-12 and 2019-23 American Community Survey (ACS). The left panel shows the data averaged across all US counties. The right panel shows the data in the GSS county sample

Table B1. Intra-class correlations for confidence in the executive

Level	Intra-class correlation (ICC)	Standard error	Lower bound of 95% CI	Upper bound of 95% CI
Year	0.029	0.035	0.003	0.246
State FIPS | Year	0.037	0.033	0.006	0.195
County FIPS | State FIPS | Year	0.125	0.026	0.082	0.184

Note: Analysis based on data from the GSS (Davern et al. 2024). N=17,768 during the period 2002-2022 (see Appendix Table A1). Approximately 3 percent of the total variance in confidence is attributable to differences between years, suggesting weak temporal clustering. About 4 percent of the variance is attributable to state clustering within years, suggesting meaningful state-level clustering. Roughly 13 percent of the variance lies at the county level, which is a substantively large ICC. The confidence intervals (CI) are relatively tight, suggesting that county-level clustering is the dominant source of clustered variation in the data.

C Data collection and processing: exposure to tariff peaks

To create the measures of tariff peaks by major trading partners against the US, and tariff peaks by the US aginst those partners, product-level tariff data from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) were used. WITS data are reported in the Combined Harmonized System nomenclature at the 5-digit product level. To calculate the share of employees affected by tariffs, data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) were used. Using the R package concordance, the Combined Harmonized System was merged with the 2007 NAICS codes at the six-digit level, comprising the sectors 11, 21, and 31–33.

A significant portion of the detailed combinations of products and levels in the QCEW data are non-disclosed (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025). Missing values were imputed by following the methodology used by Autor et al. (2024). The idea behind the imputation is that when a figure is non-disclosed at any industry level, it will still be disclosed at higher levels of aggregation. The imputation function estimates the non-disclosed values by calculating the sums of higher levels of product aggregation, assuming that establishments operating within the same industry in other geographical areas have the same average employment figures per establishment. The imputation generates values for approximately 60% of non-disclosed values. Using the procedure in Autor et al. (2024), the Harmonized System codes were then converted to NAICS codes at the six-digit level and merged with the WITS tariff data. After a manual re-coding of mismatches, product-year groups with an identified international peak were coded as 1; groups without peaks were coded as 0. Groups containing only missing values were coded as missing.

For the county-level analysis, tariff peak data were linked to counties using FIPS codes. This was done annually for each six-digit NAICS industry, and exposure was measured as the share of employed workers in each county–year–industry subject to tariff peaks (Table C1). For the individual-level analysis, tariff peak data were linked to individuals in the GSS whose occupation label matched a product-level NAICS code exposed to tariff peaks (=1 if match, 0 otherwise).

Table C1. Exposure to tariffs and tariff peaks for the US-major states dyads

		US targeting partners		**Major partners targeting US**	
Period	Product group (2, aggregated)	Average share of employment exposed to tariff peaks	Average yearly number of employees exposed to tariff peaks (in million)	Average share of employment exposed to tariff peaks	Average yearly number of employees exposed to tariff peaks (in million)
2001-2008	11	1.33%	0.2	8.57%	2.2
	21	0.83%	0.1	7.06%	1.5
	31	1.23%	0.3	8.83%	2.8
	32	0.96%	0.3	8.99%	3.6
	33	0.92%	0.3	8.95%	3.7
2009-2016	11	1.19%	0.2	6.13%	1.4
	21	0.68%	0.1	4.17%	0.9
	31	0.91%	0.2	5.92%	1.2
	32	0.72%	0.2	5.83%	1.7
	33	0.72%	0.2	5.71%	1.7
2017-2020	11	1.08%	0.2	4.55%	1.1
	21	0.68%	0.1	2.92%	0.7
	31	0.94%	0.3	3.98%	1.5
	32	0.77%	0.3	3.74%	1.6
	33	0.74%	0.3	3.61%	1.6
2021-2022	11	1.29%	0.3	4.94%	1.4
	21	0.81%	0.1	3.42%	0.7
	31	1.12%	0.4	4.37%	1.7
	32	0.96%	0.4	4.34%	1.8
	33	0.91%	0.4	4.18%	1.9

Note: Percentage of workers exposed to tariffs and tariff peaks (World Bank 2024; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025). Calculations described above. 11= Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting; 21= Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction; 31= Manufacturing (Food, Textile, Apparel, Leather, Wood, Paper, Printing); 32= Manufacturing (Chemical, Plastics, Nonmetallic Mineral Products); 33= NAICS 33 – Manufacturing (Metal, Machinery, Electronics, Transportation Equipment, Furniture).



Figure C1. Number of tariffs and tariff peaks for the US-major states dyads

Note: QCEW (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2025) and WITS (World Bank 2024). Years in which international tariffs and international tariff peaks were decided. Major states = China, Russia, Canada, Mexico, India, Turkey, EU, and UK.

D Descriptive statistics and diagnostics

Table D1. County level: Summary statistics for variables

	Min	Mean	Max	SD	N
Δ Confidence in the executive	-10.600	-2.409	3.730	4.146	1059
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-12.870	-0.078	6.193	0.821	1059
Δ Exposure to major states' tariff peaks	-39.540	-0.635	42.460	4.621	1059
Republican-leaning	0	0.694	1.000	0.461	69000
% Female	25.220	49.900	58.020	2.247	72000
% Non-Hispanic white	2.682	86.430	100.000	16.330	72000
% College	16.900	50.110	91.270	11.640	73000
Age category: 20-29 years	1.163	11.950	40.110	3.305	72000
Age category: 30-39 years	3.659	11.980	25.580	1.828	72000
Age category: 40-49 years	5.252	13.200	27.270	2.014	72000
Age category: 50-59 years	2.921	13.720	34.410	1.869	72000
Age category: 60-69 years	1.646	11.510	28.800	2.938	72000
Age category: 70-79 years	0	7.428	32.470	2.240	72000
Age category: Over 80 years	0	4.339	14.910	1.512	72000
Online searches for "Tariff"	0	4.468	100.000	11.630	34000
Online searches for "China" AND "Tariff"	0	19.740	100.000	14.280	34000
Δ Confidence in Congress	36.040	55.800	80.500	10.380	1766
Δ Confidence in the US Supreme Court	58.310	80.830	89.820	6.765	1767
Confidence in the executive in 2000	55.210	64.870	72.690	3.241	3979
Agricultural employment in 2000	0	9.762	47.010	8.536	73000
Manufacturing employment in 2000	0.594	20.320	84.980	8.784	73000
Δ Unemployment rate	-6.000	-0.277	11.000	1.979	1056
Import shock	-1.551	0	0.742	0.010	70000

Note: Variable definitions and data sources as in Appendix Table A1.

Table D2. County level: Correlations between independent variables in main regression tables

Variable	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Δ Exposure to Exposure to US tariff peaks	1.000							
2. Δ Exposure to MS peaks	-0.035	1.000						
3. Republican-leaning	-0.051	-0.013	1.000					
4. % Female	0.019	-0.016	-0.267	1.000				
5. % Non-Hispanic white	-0.023	-0.030	0.357	-0.348	1.000			
6. % College	0.171	0.084	-0.286	0.023	-0.039	1.000		
7. Age: 20-29 years	0.047	-0.003	-0.210	-0.082	-0.219	0.160	1.000	
8. Age: 30-39 years	0.034	-0.027	-0.212	-0.052	-0.372	0.301	0.305	1.000
9. Age: 40-49 years	-0.051	-0.143	-0.001	0.087	-0.042	-0.014	-0.290	0.275
10. Age: 50-59 years	-0.002	0.001	0.025	0.142	0.183	-0.059	-0.602	-0.555
11. Age: 60-69 years	0.062	0.135	0.060	0.008	0.213	0.022	-0.460	-0.565
12. Age: 70-79 years	0.010	0.081	0.078	0.059	0.226	-0.088	-0.503	-0.590
13. Age: Over 80 years	-0.037	0.023	-0.077	0.202	0.235	-0.160	-0.458	-0.639

Variable	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.
9. Age: 40-49 years	1.000				
10. Age: 50-59 years	0.162	1.000			
11. Age: 60-69 years	-0.558	0.508	1.000		
12. Age: 70-79 years	-0.436	0.382	0.886	1.000	
13. Age: Over 80 years	-0.199	0.532	0.618	0.762	1.000

Note: N=1059. Pearson's r. MS=major states. Variable definitions and data sources as in Appendix Table A1.



Figure D1. County-level: post-stratified confidence in the executive

Note: Data derived from the GSS (Davern et al. 2024) and the Minnesota Population Center (2020). The left panel shows the post-stratified confidence measure. The right panel shows the percentage point change in that measure.



Figure D2. County level: Smoothed county-level online searches for both “China” and “tariff”

Note: Lowess-smoothed Google Index for online searches for both keywords “China” and “tariff”, derived from Google (2025), with jittered data points for counties. No data for 2002 available.



Figure D3. County level: Smoothed county-level online searches for “tariff”

Note: Lowess-smoothed Google Index for online searches for keyword “tariff”, derived from Google (2025), with jittered data points for counties. No data for 2002 available.

1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1

Table D3. Individual level: Summary statistics for variables

Variable	Min.	Mean	Max.	Std. dev.	N
Confidence in the executive	0	0.724	2	0.690	18000
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks (county-level)	-12.870	-0.078	6.193	0.821	1059
Δ Exposure to major states' tariff peaks (county-level)	-39.540	-0.635	42.460	4.621	1059
Employee's industry exposure to US tariff peaks	0	0.371	1	0.483	2724
Employee's industry exposure to MS' tariff peaks	0	0.845	1	0.362	2724
Voting	0	0.477	1	0.499	26000
Age	18	48.420	89	17.51	31000
Male	0	0.552	1	0.497	31000
Race (1=other, 0=Black or White)	0	0.147	1	0.354	31000
Race (1= Black, 0=other)	0	0.753	1	0.431	31000
Elementary school	0	0.062	1	0.240	31000
High school	0	0.338	1	0.473	31000
Higher education	0	0.598	1	0.490	31000
Manual worker	0	0.429	1	0.495	30000
Urban resident	0	0.863	1	0.344	31000

Note: MS=major states. Variable definitions and data sources as in Appendix Table A1.

Table D4. Individual level: Correlations between independent variables

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
1. Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	1.000							
2. Δ Exposure to MS' tariff peaks	0.015	1.000						
3. Manual worker	-0.015	-0.025	1.000					
4. Voting	-0.053	-0.091	0.022	1.000				
5. Urban resident	0.035	-0.000	-0.101	-0.130	1.000			
6. Age	0.004	0.024	0.006	0.062	-0.033	1.000		
7. Male	0.021	0.017	-0.153	-0.084	0.004	-0.011	1.000	
8. Race (1=other, 0=Black/ White)	0.028	0.016	0.073	-0.360	0.050	-0.079	0.064	1.000
9. Race (1= Black, 0=other)	-0.026	-0.024	-0.074	0.353	-0.085	0.113	-0.056	-0.798
10. Elementary school	-0.002	-0.017	0.157	-0.019	-0.048	0.110	-0.004	0.029
11. High school	-0.034	-0.028	0.317	0.055	-0.134	0.116	0.025	0.049
12. Higher education	0.033	0.033	-0.365	-0.046	0.148	-0.154	-0.023	-0.058

	9.	10.	11.	12.
9. Race (1= Black, 0=other)	1.000			
10. Elementary school	-0.068	1.000		
11. High school	-0.025	-0.108	1.000	
12. Higher education	0.050	-0.261	-0.930	1.000

Note: Pearson's r. N=9,392. MS=major states. Variable definitions and data sources as in Appendix Table A1.

E Detailed results for main regression tables

1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.2

Table E1. Full results for Figure 6 (county-level analysis of confidence)

	(1) 2002-2022	(2) 2002-2022	(3) 2002-2022
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		-0.229	
		(-0.322)	
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		-0.501	
		(-1.546)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		0.037	
		(0.047)	
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		0.318	
		(0.688)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd ter' Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			-2.881***
			(-8.066)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd ter' Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			0.286
			(0.868)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			-10.267***
			(-14.071)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd terc' Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			-6.488***
			(-8.323)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.426	-0.105	-0.313
	(-1.497)	(-0.315)	(-1.896)
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.478	-0.666	-0.070
	(-1.420)	(-1.210)	(-0.372)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-0.255	-0.244	-0.102
	(-0.966)	(-0.944)	(-0.445)
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.594**	0.577**	5.388***
	(2.785)	(2.694)	(10.483)
% Females	0.095	0.089	0.143
	(0.532)	(0.496)	(0.944)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.020*	-0.019	-0.003
	(-2.040)	(-2.009)	(-0.260)
% College educated	-0.004	-0.006	0.008
	(-0.442)	(-0.632)	(0.618)
% 20-29 years	0.194	0.192	0.156*
	(1.836)	(2.009)	(2.056)
% 30-39 years	-0.478***	-0.471***	-0.330***
	(-5.086)	(-5.437)	(-4.767)
% 40-49 years	0.350	0.330	0.238
	(1.354)	(1.361)	(1.542)
% 50-59 years	-0.367*	-0.342*	-0.177
	(-2.100)	(-2.091)	(-1.628)
% 60-69 years	1.185***	1.162***	0.581**
	(5.864)	(5.962)	(2.929)
% 70-79 years	-2.545***	-2.523***	-1.504***
	(-11.106)	(-10.608)	(-5.441)
% Over 80 years	1.775***	1.766***	1.015***
	(7.983)	(7.873)	(4.888)
Δ Unemployment rate	1.283***	1.283***	0.818***
	(13.018)	(13.358)	(11.816)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.036	0.036	0.016
	(1.235)	(1.256)	(0.723)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	0.030	0.029	0.005
	(1.350)	(1.332)	(0.390)
Import shock	-1441.455*	-1431.832*	-323.952

	(-2.452)	(-2.516)	(-1.150)
Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)			
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	3.546***	3.544***	7.947***
	(6.119)	(4.104)	(15.469)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	6.376***	6.409***	8.357***
	(9.288)	(7.833)	(18.672)
Constant	-7.961	-7.586	-14.694
	(-0.585)	(-0.576)	(-1.291)
N	1053	1053	1053
N (*counties*)	279	279	279
N (*states*)	45	45	45

Note: Dependent variable = Δ Confidence in the executive. All years included (2002-2022), 45 states, and 324 counties. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states (and periods in model 1). All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population. Robust standard errors, twoway clustered on counties and states, in parentheses. ~ p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001.

Table E2. Full results for Figures 7 and 8 (county level)

	(1) "Tariff"	(2) "China" AND "Tariff"	(3) "Tariff"	(4) "China" AND "Tariff"
Ref: 1st tercile Exposure to US tariff peaks (L1)				
2nd tercile Exposure to US tariff peaks (L1)	6.296***	-1.240	-0.390	0.622
	(7.639)	(-1.899)	(-0.549)	(1.764)
3rd tercile Exposure to US tariff peaks (L1)	6.317***	-2.434***	0.114	0.794
	(7.423)	(-4.338)	(0.152)	(1.634)
Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)				
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	-1.874**	0.690	-11.551***	1.856
	(-2.860)	(1.881)	(-9.152)	(0.824)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	6.530***	2.914***	-7.126***	6.527**
	(7.022)	(4.333)	(-5.329)	(2.808)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile US peaks (L1)	-8.208***	1.927*		
	(-9.935)	(2.162)		
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile US peaks (L1)	-11.711***	4.138***		
	(-12.680)	(4.842)		
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile US peaks (L1)	-7.875***	3.469**		
	(-8.893)	(2.935)		
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile US peaks (L1)	-10.853***	6.601***		
	(-10.620)	(9.241)		
Ref: 1st tercile Exposure to foreign tariff peaks (L1)				
2nd tercile Exposure to foreign tariff peaks (L1)	1.020*	-2.227*	-0.396	-3.264
	(2.318)	(-2.093)	(-0.341)	(-1.216)
3rd tercile Exposure to foreign tariff peaks (L1)	-0.849	-3.890**	-6.022***	-4.836
	(-1.624)	(-2.759)	(-5.298)	(-1.717)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile foreign peaks (L1)			-0.582	1.706
			(-0.409)	(0.709)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile foreign peaks (L1)			1.814	1.575
			(1.414)	(0.688)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile foreign peaks (L1)			5.981***	1.522
			(4.492)	(0.617)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile foreign peaks (L1)			10.688***	1.010
			(8.282)	(0.420)
% College educated	1.425***	0.385***	1.311***	0.430***
	(13.330)	(4.708)	(14.010)	(5.700)
Constant	-24.361***	-4.777	-12.043***	-7.649*
	(-7.385)	(-1.819)	(-4.170)	(-2.276)
N	32536	32536	32536	32536
N(counties)	1715	1715	1715	1715
N(states)	48	48	48	48

Note: Years included: 2004-2022. Dependent variables = online searches for "tariff" or for "China" and "tariff". Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with fixed effects for counties. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on counties, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table E3. Full results for Figures 9 and 10

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	2002-2022	2002-2022	2002-2022
Republican county × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		0.999	
		(1.042)	
Republican county × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks		-1.149	
		(-1.362)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.440	
		(-0.558)	
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.622	
		(-1.938)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.115	
		(-0.123)	
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.299	
		(-0.757)	
Republican county × Crisis recovery (2010-2014)		-0.559	0.520
		(-0.711)	(1.482)
Republican county × Protectionist turn (2016-2022)		-0.927	0.786
		(-1.002)	(1.831)
Republican county × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks × Crisis recovery (2010-2014)		0.439	
		(0.497)	
Republican county × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks × Protectionist turn (2016-2022)		0.429	
		(0.342)	
Republican county × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks × Crisis recovery (2010-2014)		2.323	
		(0.499)	
Republican county × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks × Protectionist turn (2016-2022)		6.039	
		(1.259)	
Republican county × 2nd tercile Δ Foreign peaks			-0.388
			(-0.822)
Republican county × 3rd tercile Δ Foreign peaks			0.846
			(1.449)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ Foreign peaks			-3.226***
			(-7.290)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ Foreign peaks			0.288
			(0.704)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ Foreign peaks			-10.183***
			(-12.782)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ Foreign peaks			-6.219***
			(-8.650)
Republican county × 2nd tercile Δ Foreign peaks × Crisis recovery (2010-2014)			2.799***
			(3.903)
Republican county × 2nd tercile Δ Foreign peaks × Protectionist turn (2016-2022)			0.276
			(0.343)
Republican county × 3rd tercile Δ Foreign peaks × Crisis recovery (2010-2014)			-0.601
			(-0.637)
Republican county × 3rd tercile Δ Foreign peaks × Protectionist turn (2016-2022)			-0.808
			(-0.887)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ US peaks			
2nd tercile Δ US peaks	-0.414	-0.191	-0.332*
	(-1.461)	(-0.908)	(-2.073)
3rd tercile Δ US peaks	-0.462	-0.256	-0.038
	(-1.378)	(-0.579)	(-0.194)
Ref: Left leaning			
Right leaning	0.282	0.368	-0.535*
	(0.864)	(0.554)	(-2.174)
Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)			
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	3.585***	3.710***	7.776***
	(6.841)	(4.228)	(14.170)

Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	6.450***	6.634***	7.994***
	(10.615)	(11.528)	(14.535)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Foreign peaks			
2nd tercile Δ foreign peaks	1.863*	1.868*	9.283*
	(2.451)	(2.636)	(2.529)
3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks	4.445***	3.500***	13.503***
	(8.489)	(6.822)	(31.699)
% Females	0.100	0.007	0.095
	(0.533)	(0.031)	(0.638)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.022*	-0.025**	-0.005
	(-2.689)	(-2.781)	(-0.521)
% College educated	-0.007	-0.010	0.005
	(-0.626)	(-0.946)	(0.363)
% 20-29 years	0.197	0.188	0.148
	(1.867)	(1.987)	(1.915)
% 30-39 years	-0.463***	-0.425***	-0.293***
	(-4.546)	(-4.949)	(-4.629)
% 40-49 years	0.359	0.288	0.217
	(1.433)	(1.245)	(1.418)
% 50-59 years	-0.367*	-0.292	-0.187
	(-2.164)	(-1.761)	(-1.836)
% 60-69 years	1.182***	1.099***	0.625**
	(5.934)	(5.300)	(3.142)
% 70-79 years	-2.548***	-2.472***	-1.546***
	(-11.039)	(-9.765)	(-5.280)
% Over 80 years	1.814***	1.802***	1.052***
	(8.171)	(8.457)	(4.905)
Δ Unemployment rate	1.277***	1.282***	0.809***
	(12.939)	(12.911)	(11.733)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.030	0.027	0.013
	(0.912)	(0.915)	(0.584)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	0.028	0.026	0.003
	(1.286)	(1.231)	(0.241)
Import shock	-1436.337*	-1426.343*	-370.645
	(-2.445)	(-2.513)	(-1.191)
Constant	-8.391	-3.212	-11.907
	(-0.588)	(-0.209)	(-1.074)
N	1053	1053	1053
N(states)	279	279	279
N(counties)	45	45	45

Note: Dependent variable = Δ Confidence in the executive. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with fixed effects for states. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

F Robustness checks



Figure F1. Jackknife changes in exposure to US tariff peaks

Note: Coefficients when one county is dropped. Jackknife is a leave-one-out strategy of the estimation of a parameter to assess bias (Nisbet et al. 2018). This re-estimates the relationship of tariff exposure and regime support excluding one county at a time. Based on the estimation of the concomitant Model 1 in Table 2, the plot indicates that the value of zero remains outside the confidence interval and the model is not sensitive to dropping counties.



Figure F2. Jackknife changes in exposure to foreign tariff peaks

Notes: Coefficients when one county is dropped. Jackknife is a leave-one-out strategy of the estimation of a parameter to assess bias (Nisbet et al. 2018). This re-estimates the relationship of tariff exposure and regime support excluding one county at a time. Based on the estimation of the concomitant Model 1 in Table 2, the plot indicates that the value of zero remains outside the

confidence interval and the model is not sensitive to dropping counties.

Table F1. Results for Table 2, including confidence levels in the pre-observation period (2000)

	(1) 2002-2022	(2) Biennially between 2002-2008	(3) Biennially between 2010-2014	(4) 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	0.003	-0.124*	0.047	0.040
	(0.091)	(-2.187)	(0.587)	(1.731)
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-0.001	0.007	-0.032**	-0.013***
	(-0.139)	(0.898)	(-3.341)	(-3.804)
% Females	0.046	-0.010	0.010	-0.002
	(1.611)	(-0.203)	(0.214)	(-0.317)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.000	-0.003	-0.000	0.001
	(-0.268)	(-1.000)	(-0.010)	(1.719)
% College educated	0.006*	0.004	-0.004	0.002***
	(2.544)	(0.633)	(-0.937)	(4.693)
% 20-29 years	-0.014	-0.027	0.001	-0.011*
	(-0.758)	(-0.508)	(0.034)	(-2.520)
% 30-39 years	-0.005	-0.041	0.007	0.003
	(-0.227)	(-0.764)	(0.198)	(0.858)
% 40-49 years	-0.078	-0.159	0.046	-0.031***
	(-1.869)	(-1.339)	(1.014)	(-3.775)
% 50-59 years	0.005	-0.021	-0.004	0.010
	(0.205)	(-0.287)	(-0.040)	(1.260)
% 60-69 years	0.050	0.327*	-0.049	0.003
	(1.386)	(2.524)	(-0.358)	(0.362)
% 70-79 years	0.010	-0.369***	-0.290	-0.054***
	(0.153)	(-4.290)	(-1.618)	(-4.199)
% Over 80 years	-0.101	0.045	0.305*	0.038**
	(-1.871)	(0.785)	(2.771)	(3.573)
Δ Unemployment rate	-0.038**	-0.010	-0.004	-0.031***
	(-3.249)	(-0.240)	(-0.211)	(-6.350)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	-0.002	-0.008	0.002	-0.000
	(-0.897)	(-0.790)	(0.556)	(-0.096)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	0.000	-0.018	0.008	0.001
	(0.042)	(-1.633)	(0.899)	(0.918)
Import shock	-0.197	125.410	-43.061	6.884
	(-0.005)	(0.378)	(-0.482)	(0.206)
Confidence in government (in 2000)	0.044***	0.105***	0.002	0.006***
	(8.605)	(11.440)	(0.372)	(6.190)
Constant	-7.023**	-9.767*	-1.275	-0.924*
	(-3.433)	(-2.619)	(-0.362)	(-2.479)
N	465	142	102	212
N(counties)	84	61	54	70
N(states)	27	22	18	25

Note: Dependent variable = Confidence in the executive. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F2. Results for Figure 5, including confidence levels in 2000

	(1) 2002-2022	(2) 2002-2022	(3) 2002-2022
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile *Δ* US peaks		-0.552	
		(-0.800)	
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile *Δ* US peaks		-0.911**	
		(-2.973)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile f *Δ* US peaks		-0.356	
		(-0.465)	
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile *Δ* US peaks		0.409	
		(0.862)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile *Δ* foreign peaks			-3.678***

			(-8.484)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-0.034
			(-0.096)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-10.511***
			(-11.996)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-6.286***
			(-6.144)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.491	0.101	-0.409*
	(-1.489)	(0.312)	(-2.210)
3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.655	-0.817	-0.175
	(-1.828)	(-1.437)	(-0.829)
Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)			
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	3.526***	3.651***	7.752***
	(5.201)	(3.765)	(12.437)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	6.196***	6.281***	7.714***
	(7.769)	(7.254)	(15.797)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks		-0.601	0.273
	(-2.032)	(-1.963)	(1.119)
3rd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.502	0.467	5.207***
	(1.729)	(1.671)	(8.136)
% Females	0.084	0.048	0.122
	(0.413)	(0.247)	(0.807)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.023*	-0.022*	-0.014
	(-2.097)	(-2.075)	(-1.653)
% College educated	0.022	0.019	0.039***
	(1.926)	(1.527)	(3.940)
% 20-29 years	0.155	0.157	0.154
	(0.893)	(1.005)	(1.220)
% 30-39 years	-0.490**	-0.485***	-0.431***
	(-3.530)	(-3.938)	(-4.979)
% 40-49 years	0.246	0.189	0.170
	(0.731)	(0.608)	(0.739)
% 50-59 years	-0.433*	-0.362	-0.292*
	(-2.266)	(-2.006)	(-2.257)
% 60-69 years	1.268***	1.194***	0.745**
	(4.250)	(4.160)	(2.992)
% 70-79 years	-2.798***	-2.717***	-1.738***
	(-8.375)	(-7.740)	(-4.750)
% Over 80 years	2.001***	1.970***	1.151**
	(6.013)	(5.877)	(3.253)
Δ Unemployment rate	1.304***	1.308***	0.786***
	(9.171)	(9.492)	(9.012)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.050	0.052	0.029
	(1.421)	(1.442)	(1.149)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	0.037	0.033	0.018
	(1.550)	(1.504)	(1.585)
Import shock	-1760.508*	-1754.295*	-339.026
	(-2.163)	(-2.214)	(-0.952)
Confidence in government (in 2000)	0.074*	0.078*	0.025
	(2.173)	(2.381)	(1.703)
Constant	18.339	15.133	26.845
	(0.846)	(0.676)	(1.510)
N	580	580	580

Note: Dependent variable = Confidence in the executive. All years (2002-2022). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F3. Results for Table 2, with confidence in Congress as a dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2002-2022	Biennially between 2002-2008	Biennially between 2010-2014	2016, 2018, 2021, 2022
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.009	-0.028	-0.028	-0.000
	(-0.851)	(-1.541)	(-1.547)	(-0.031)
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.003	0.004	0.002	-0.000
	(0.713)	(0.707)	(0.660)	(-0.285)
% Females	-0.029	-0.062	-0.029*	-0.002
	(-1.921)	(-0.896)	(-2.357)	(-0.598)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001*
	(-0.376)	(-0.321)	(0.072)	(2.335)
% College educated	-0.002	-0.013*	-0.003	0.003***
	(-1.188)	(-2.577)	(-2.002)	(7.117)
% 20-29 years	-0.008	-0.011	-0.000	-0.013***
	(-0.870)	(-0.452)	(-0.056)	(-5.538)
% 30-39 years	0.019*	0.058*	0.031*	-0.001
	(2.260)	(2.095)	(2.686)	(-0.159)
% 40-49 years	-0.029	-0.022	-0.013	-0.027**
	(-1.433)	(-0.351)	(-0.515)	(-3.006)
% 50-59 years	-0.031	-0.078	0.007	0.001
	(-1.304)	(-1.211)	(0.251)	(0.138)
% 60-69 years	0.026	0.071	-0.015	-0.004
	(1.078)	(0.786)	(-0.726)	(-0.454)
% 70-79 years	0.007	-0.131	0.046	-0.017
	(0.197)	(-1.092)	(1.463)	(-1.435)
% Over 80 years	-0.012	0.152	-0.001	0.010
	(-0.510)	(1.525)	(-0.041)	(0.932)
Δ Unemployment rate	-0.009	-0.024	0.008	-0.008***
	(-1.673)	(-1.118)	(1.425)	(-4.506)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	0.000
	(0.141)	(-0.367)	(-1.163)	(0.273)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	-0.008*	-0.023	-0.006*	-0.000
	(-2.277)	(-1.795)	(-2.566)	(-0.166)
Import shock	-1.305	-45.206	11.525	12.948
	(-0.036)	(-0.394)	(0.286)	(0.900)
Constant	-0.780	-0.142	-3.576***	0.028
	(-0.718)	(-0.031)	(-3.931)	(0.113)
N	1052	295	234	515
N (counties)	278	146	178	189
N (states)	45	37	36	39

Note: Dependent variable = Confidence in Congress. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F4. Results for Figure 6, with confidence in Congress as a dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	2002-2022	2002-2022	2002-2022
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.073	
		(-0.328)	
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.101	
		(-0.185)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile f Δ US peaks		0.405	
		(0.904)	
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.386	
		(-0.792)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-2.158***
			(-8.501)

Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-3.435***
			(-5.808)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-3.114***
			(-8.184)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-7.521***
			(-7.819)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.025	0.034	-0.028
	(-0.101)	(0.141)	(-0.102)
3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.432	-0.332	-0.310
	(-1.620)	(-0.862)	(-1.830)
Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)			
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	-2.223***	-2.266***	0.558
	(-10.452)	(-10.239)	(1.575)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	4.583***	4.755***	9.346***
	(18.944)	(13.532)	(16.462)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.630*	0.594*	1.847***
	(2.298)	(2.303)	(9.145)
3rd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-0.629*	-0.661*	2.725***
	(-2.467)	(-2.585)	(9.323)
% Females	0.025	0.037	0.023
	(0.203)	(0.284)	(0.203)
% Non-Hispanic whites	0.017	0.017	0.021
	(1.325)	(1.291)	(1.921)
% College educated	-0.032	-0.030	-0.029
	(-1.520)	(-1.370)	(-1.307)
% 20-29 years	0.065	0.067	0.056
	(0.792)	(0.822)	(0.829)
% 30-39 years	-0.282	-0.283	-0.239*
	(-1.884)	(-1.838)	(-2.204)
% 40-49 years	-0.005	0.005	0.154
	(-0.029)	(0.035)	(1.115)
% 50-59 years	-0.170	-0.197	-0.277
	(-0.954)	(-1.044)	(-1.530)
% 60-69 years	0.950***	0.959***	0.462*
	(6.036)	(5.767)	(2.365)
% 70-79 years	-2.715***	-2.713***	-1.929***
	(-11.347)	(-10.941)	(-6.424)
% Over 80 years	1.711***	1.707***	1.349***
	(9.962)	(9.971)	(6.699)
Constant	-11.080	-9.856	-6.460
	(-1.599)	(-0.856)	(-1.010)
N	1173	1173	1173
N (counties)	278	278	278
N (states)	45	45	45

Note: Dependent variable = Confidence in Congress. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F5. Results for Table 2, with confidence in the US Supreme Court as a dependent variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2002-2022	Biennially between 2002-2008	Biennially between 2010-2014	2016, 2018, 2021, 2022
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.039	-0.001	-0.038	-0.093*
	(-1.910)	(-0.084)	(-1.227)	(-2.442)
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.002	-0.003	0.001	0.023
	(0.706)	(-1.175)	(0.162)	(1.471)
% Females	-0.085***	-0.056**	-0.054*	-0.121**

	(-3.635)	(-3.150)	(-2.190)	(-3.141)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.003
	(-0.978)	(0.014)	(-1.672)	(-1.053)
% College educated	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(-0.238)	(1.365)	(0.575)	(0.926)
% 20-29 years	0.002	-0.014	0.020	0.004
	(0.237)	(-1.332)	(1.762)	(0.240)
% 30-39 years	0.021*	0.009	-0.001	0.034
	(2.126)	(0.513)	(-0.091)	(1.363)
% 40-49 years	-0.033	-0.066	0.042	-0.103
	(-1.314)	(-1.929)	(1.857)	(-1.446)
% 50-59 years	0.043	0.020	0.032	0.090
	(1.931)	(0.721)	(1.247)	(1.522)
% 60-69 years	-0.014	-0.016	-0.074**	-0.010
	(-0.634)	(-0.316)	(-2.803)	(-0.201)
% 70-79 years	-0.041	-0.022	0.057	-0.104
	(-0.852)	(-0.351)	(1.336)	(-1.046)
% Over 80 years	0.074	-0.000	0.065	0.129
	(1.745)	(-0.004)	(1.564)	(1.786)
Δ Unemployment rate	-0.016	-0.019	0.003	-0.026
	(-1.336)	(-1.550)	(0.461)	(-1.167)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.002	-0.004	-0.002	0.008
	(0.531)	(-1.033)	(-0.967)	(1.326)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	-0.005	-0.005	-0.001	-0.005
	(-1.892)	(-1.107)	(-0.546)	(-1.808)
Import shock	73.428	171.120	33.081	86.135
	(1.819)	(1.401)	(1.679)	(1.686)
Constant	1.433	2.944*	-0.178	1.668
	(1.265)	(2.507)	(-0.150)	(0.852)
N	1053	296	234	515
N (counties)	279	147	178	189
N (states)	45	37	36	39

Note: Dependent variable = Confidence in Congress. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F6. Results for Figure 6, with confidence in the US Supreme Court as a dependent variable

	(1) 2002-2022	(2) 2002-2022	(3) 2002-2022
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		-0.309	
		(-0.666)	
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ US peaks		0.164	
		(0.155)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile f Δ US peaks		0.195	
		(0.175)	
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ US peaks		-1.190	
		(-1.083)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-0.125
			(-0.167)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-0.958
			(-0.707)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-2.461***
			(-3.529)
Protectionist (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ foreign peaks			-12.207***
			(-7.548)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	0.084	0.002	0.047
	(0.194)	(0.004)	(0.096)
3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.572	-0.381	-0.487
	(-1.557)	(-0.766)	(-1.843)

Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)			
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	-7.288***	-7.541***	-4.500***
	(-12.961)	(-17.883)	(-5.096)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	-3.966***	-3.592***	2.301
	(-5.526)	(-3.558)	(1.999)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	0.131	0.028	-1.292
	(0.317)	(0.076)	(-1.863)
3rd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-5.551***	-5.625***	-1.834***
	(-10.638)	(-10.634)	(-3.715)
% Females	-0.035	0.002	0.082
	(-0.086)	(0.005)	(0.201)
% Non-Hispanic whites	0.029	0.028	0.034
	(1.063)	(1.022)	(1.149)
% College educated	-0.002	0.003	-0.002
	(-0.069)	(0.080)	(-0.047)
% 20-29 years	0.191	0.200	0.249
	(0.949)	(0.990)	(1.290)
% 30-39 years	-0.590*	-0.599*	-0.536*
	(-2.237)	(-2.187)	(-2.148)
% 40-49 years	-0.754*	-0.710*	-0.286
	(-2.214)	(-2.114)	(-0.949)
% 50-59 years	0.832**	0.747**	0.560*
	(3.449)	(2.955)	(2.119)
% 60-69 years	1.769***	1.809***	1.191**
	(5.083)	(4.919)	(2.937)
% 70-79 years	-5.738***	-5.751***	-4.605***
	(-10.703)	(-10.622)	(-6.529)
% Over 80 years	3.180***	3.176***	2.749***
	(7.190)	(7.390)	(5.901)
Δ Unemployment rate	0.831***	0.845***	0.532***
	(14.543)	(15.118)	(3.977)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.099	0.103	0.072
	(1.863)	(1.889)	(1.787)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	0.083	0.088	0.070
	(1.582)	(1.567)	(1.429)
Import shock	-1688.924**	-1757.306**	-687.662
	(-2.693)	(-2.714)	(-1.182)
Constant	20.084	19.076	3.653
	(0.791)	(0.710)	(0.131)
N	1058	1058	1058
N (counties)	279	279	279
N (states)	45	45	45

Note: Dependent variable = US Supreme Court. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F7. County-level analysis of confidence in the executive, using trade-weighted tariff measures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	2002-2022	Biennially between 2002-2008	Biennially between 2010-2014	2016, 2018, 2021, 2022
Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks (weighted)	0.000**	-0.000	0.000	0.000*
	(2.978)	(-1.525)	(0.099)	(2.248)
Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks (weighted)	-0.000*	0.000	-0.000*	-0.000**
	(-2.556)	(1.053)	(-2.110)	(-3.526)
Controls	0.009	-0.040	0.013	-0.005
% Females	(0.290)	(-0.520)	(0.565)	(-1.051)
	-0.003*	-0.007	-0.002	-0.000
% Non-Hispanic whites	(-2.349)	(-1.523)	(-0.995)	(-0.292)
	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.001**

% College educated	(-0.522)	(-0.148)	(-1.247)	(2.866)
	-0.005	-0.050	0.010	-0.006*
% 20-29 years	(-0.519)	(-1.765)	(1.031)	(-2.579)
	0.018	0.044	-0.009	0.005*
% 30-39 years	(1.118)	(0.831)	(-0.527)	(2.129)
	-0.046	-0.260**	0.055*	-0.019***
% 40-49 years	(-1.974)	(-3.196)	(2.348)	(-4.864)
	-0.008	0.023	-0.003	0.004
% 50-59 years	(-0.508)	(0.308)	(-0.069)	(0.993)
	0.009	0.077	-0.036	0.005
% 60-69 years	(0.376)	(1.197)	(-0.622)	(0.671)
	0.000	-0.211	-0.086	-0.039***
% 70-79 years	(0.010)	(-1.877)	(-0.917)	(-3.827)
	-0.009	0.047	0.139*	0.037***
% Over 80 years	(-0.305)	(0.522)	(2.566)	(3.719)
	-0.031**	-0.033	-0.001	-0.028***
Δ Unemployment rate	(-2.838)	(-0.790)	(-0.097)	(-6.205)
	0.002	-0.000	-0.001	0.001
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	(0.681)	(-0.022)	(-0.343)	(1.797)
	-0.010	-0.043***	0.008	-0.001
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	(-1.927)	(-4.236)	(1.735)	(-1.403)
	-5.607	158.288	-32.505	-2.782
Import shock	(-0.110)	(0.416)	(-0.406)	(-0.171)
	-2.202	0.585	-1.842	-0.520*
Constant	(-1.195)	(0.127)	(-1.372)	(-2.255)
	(-1.221)	(0.164)	(-1.596)	(-2.436)
N	1053	296	234	515
N (counties)	279	147	178	189
N (states)	45	37	36	39

Note: Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states and years. All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population in 2000. Robust standard errors, clustered on states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

Table F8. Full results for Figure 6, using trade-weighted tariff tercile measures

	(1) 2002-2022	(2) 2002-2022	(3) 2002-2022
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		1.531*	
		(2.138)	
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		1.029	
		(1.795)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		0.330	
		(0.330)	
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks		0.921	
		(1.237)	
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 2nd ter' Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			-2.828***
			(-8.765)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 2nd ter' Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			0.365
			(1.284)
Crisis recovery (2010-2014) × 3rd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			-9.980***
			(-14.841)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022) × 3rd terc' Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			-6.035***
			(-10.693)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	0.016	-0.918	-0.102
	(0.055)	(-1.739)	(-0.600)
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to US tariff peaks	-0.143	-0.798	0.035
	(-0.596)	(-1.025)	(0.238)
Ref: 1st tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks			
2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-1.535***	-1.544***	-0.066
	(-7.283)	(-7.294)	(-0.221)

2nd tercile Δ Exposure to foreign tariff peaks	-0.160	-0.138	5.226***
	(-0.626)	(-0.502)	(10.591)
% Females	0.160	0.156	0.230
	(0.921)	(0.825)	(1.791)
% Non-Hispanic whites	-0.015	-0.014	-0.001
	(-1.585)	(-1.335)	(-0.173)
% College educated	-0.006	-0.009	0.007
	(-0.660)	(-0.881)	(0.879)
% 20-29 years	0.184	0.175	0.133*
	(1.836)	(1.875)	(2.125)
% 30-39 years	-0.448***	-0.440***	-0.364***
	(-4.838)	(-4.813)	(-4.911)
% 40-49 years	0.337	0.345	0.173
	(1.363)	(1.581)	(0.962)
% 50-59 years	-0.436*	-0.442**	-0.130
	(-2.230)	(-2.781)	(-0.922)
% 60-69 years	1.128***	1.147***	0.462*
	(5.497)	(5.872)	(2.542)
% 70-79 years	-2.449***	-2.458***	-1.530***
	(-9.999)	(-9.837)	(-7.527)
% Over 80 years	1.705***	1.692***	1.044***
	(8.275)	(8.359)	(6.021)
Δ Unemployment rate	1.258***	1.255***	0.918***
	(12.428)	(12.028)	(10.446)
Employment share in manufacturing (2000)	0.025	0.021	0.009
	(1.055)	(0.894)	(0.406)
Employment share in agriculture (2000)	0.022	0.019	-0.007
	(1.078)	(1.130)	(-0.469)
Import shock	-1459.212**	-1508.310***	-128.093
	(-3.383)	(-3.581)	(-0.371)
Ref: Trade liberalization consensus (2002-2008)			
Crisis recovery (2010-2014)	3.257***	2.317*	7.752***
	(5.246)	(2.352)	(20.870)
Protectionist turn (2016-2022)	5.704***	4.791***	8.278***
	(7.702)	(4.923)	(15.428)
Constant	-7.961	-7.586	-14.694
	(-0.585)	(-0.576)	(-1.291)
N	1053	1053	1053
N (*counties*)	279	279	279
N (*states*)	45	45	45

Note: Dependent variable = Δ Confidence in the executive. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations with high-dimensional fixed effects for states (and periods in model 1). All regressions are weighted by counties' total voting age population. Robust standard errors, twoway clustered on counties and states, in parentheses. ~ $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$.

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