Abstract: States routinely help firms manage risk by providing two core forms of support: information that reduces uncertainty about markets, partners, and political conditions, and financing that insures against commercial and political loss. We argue that firms treat these tools as a unified portfolio and reallocate between them when one becomes temporarily unavailable. We examine this logic in the context of export promotion, where ambassadors provide market intelligence and informal enforcement, while export credit agencies (ECAs) supply insurance, guarantees, and loans. Ambassadorial vacancies disrupt the informational pillar while leaving financial support intact. Using nearly three decades of monthly, deal-level data from the U.S. Export–Import Bank matched to global ambassadorial appointment records, we show that vacancies significantly increase firms’ reliance on ECA support without altering EXIM’s screening standards, risk assessments, or deal sizes. The findings reveal how firms compensate for fluctuations in state capacity, highlighting substitution across informational and financial instruments as a general feature of economic statecraft.
Moderator: Maggie Peters