Abstract: Research has shown that restrictive trade policies, such as large subsidies, affect public opinion in affected states. This article examines the downstream effects of trade retaliation on public support for the democratic regime and its core representative institutions. It argues that exposure to retaliation can initially activate reciprocity preferences, increasing support for political institutions that are perceived to help government deter trade restrictions abroad. However, when the economic costs of retaliation become salient, exposure instead erodes regime support as citizens grow unwilling to bear these costs. The analysis draws on several datasets covering the United States from 2002 to 2022, combining individual- and local-level measures of regime support with exposure to retaliatory tariffs and online search behavior. The results suggest that US import tariffs do not systematically increase regime support. By contrast, exposure to foreign retaliatory tariffs reduces regime support between 2010-2022. These effects operate through sociotropic rather than personal evaluations. The findings suggest that, despite its strategic appeal as a deterrent, trade retaliation undermines durable regime support, revealing broader domestic political costs than previously understood.
Moderator: Federica Genovese